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Perspective Access Networks
Abstract
Perspective Access Networks provide an infrastructure from which users can spec-
ify the location from which they wish to view the Internet. The ability to specify
location has become necessary as the Internet has become increasingly inconsistent.
An increasing preponderance of middleboxes, location-dependent services, and large-
scale content filtering have contributed to this situation.
Our work offers the following contributions. First, we propose an infrastructure
that routes traffic to a location from which a given resource can be viewed, taking
instructions from user-specified attributes describing the desired location. Second, we
analyze the tradeoff between the expressivity of user requests and the finite resources
available within the network for propagating metadata about available perspectives.
Third, we stipulate a set of real scenarios that fall within the limits of what can
reasonably be handled by a system appropriately tuned to manage the tradeoff, and
we argue that the specific algorithm we propose can handle the scenarios effectively.
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SOMETHING there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,
And spills the upper boulders in the sun;
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
The work of hunters is another thing:
I have come after them and made repair
Where they have left not one stone on a stone,
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,
No one has seen them made or heard them made,
But at spring mending-time we find them there.
I let my neighbour know beyond the hill;
And on a day we meet to walk the line
And set the wall between us once again.
We keep the wall between us as we go.
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.
And some are loaves and some so nearly balls
We have to use a spell to make them balance:
“Stay where you are until our backs are turned!”
We wear our fingers rough with handling them.
Oh, just another kind of out-door game,
One on a side. It comes to little more:
There where it is we do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbours.”
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
“Why do they make good neighbours? Isn’t it
Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That wants it down.” I could say “Elves” to him,
But it’s not elves exactly, and I’d rather
He said it for himself. I see him there
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed.
He moves in darkness as it seems to me,
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his fathers saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
He says again, “Good fences make good neighbours.”
— Robert Frost, Mending Wall
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Introduction
The Internet is not flat: the set of resources that a user can access via the Internet
is determined in part by how that user is connected. The network itself acts to limit
access to particular resources in such a manner that access to certain resources is
restricted to those observing them from particular locations.
Network location can be used to restrict or modify access to resources in two
ways. First, network elements such as routers, network address translators, and
firewalls may filter, modify, redirect, or naturally limit traffic based upon the location
indicated by the network address of a given source or destination. Second, a server
may choose to selectively refuse service or provide different service based upon the
network location from which the traffic is apparently originating. In both cases, by
providing a client the ability to specify where it wants to appear in the network, we can
mitigate the network access constraints imposed by its particular attachment point.
Of course, creating a tool for this purpose creates a point of contention, since clients
could potentially establish end-to-end connections with other parties in defiance of
1
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policies introduced by intervening network carriers.
Clark et al. characterize the ongoing arguments concerning Internet governance
as a tussle in which various parties seek to manipulate the various intrinsic tech-
nical mechanisms of the Internet to their advantage. For example, governments,
corporations, or network access providers might deploy firewalls, and end users might
establish tunnels to circumvent them (28). Designers of network elements and ser-
vices need to know what information they can use as a basis for authentication and
access control. Indeed, the current political climate includes substantial discussion
of how to determine the right way forward, and there is a clear need for well-defined
architectural boundaries.
Our work addresses the tussle by providing a mechanism that allows Internet users
to overcome location-based limitations. Many Internet services use network location
as an intrinsic basis for determining what resource to provide, and the network itself
often chooses the set of resources that are available to clients. As a result, providing
location-independent access to resources is sometimes inherently impossible. Further-
more, it is not possible for a user to know whether she is viewing a resource from a
“neutral” perspective or not. The only way to provide consistent access to resources
is to allow clients the ability to send and receive Internet traffic from the specific lo-
cations that provide access to the desired resource. We propose a Perspective Access
Network (PAN), an overlay network that allows users to specify not only the resources
that they want to view but the perspectives from which they want to view them. Per-
spective Access Networks provide a clear boundary in which parties on opposite sides
of the tussle can use a consistent interface to make their own policy decisions. By
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separating the argument about policy from the argument about architecture, we hope
to facilitate the development of policies that more appropriately address the needs of
parties with conflicting interests.
Later in the same discussion, Clark et al. suggest that in an ideal world, cus-
tomers would be able to use a paradigm akin to source routing to select the paths
(and, implicitly, the network carriers) that their packets take en route to particular
destinations. The authors argue that overlay networks could provide a useful tool for
customers by allowing them to avoid undesirable paths imposed by their providers.
Since providing discriminatory access to resources is often in the best interests of
providers (137), having a tool that allows circumvention of undesirable routes may
be in the best interests of customers. PANs provide an architecture that can poten-
tially allow these customers to avoid undesirable access restrictions imposed by their
providers. Customers may use PANs not only to avoid suboptimal paths to their
desired destinations but also to access destinations that they cannot access directly
as the result of mechanisms imposed by the network. Providers could respond by
restricting access to Perspective Access Networks, although such a response could
ultimately lead to more overt conflict between providers and their customers. Indeed,
we view Perspective Access Networks largely as counterbalance against fragmenta-
tion that could happen in the future; the existence of technical ways of overcoming
fragmentation might make fragmentation less attractive as a method for regulating
the behavior of Internet users.
Naturally, since network location is often used for purposes of identification and
authorization, the ability for clients to mask their actual point of attachment as they
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connect to Internet services raises important concerns about trust, identity, abuse,
authentication, and incentives to deployment. We will address these points in later
chapters.
1.1 Motivation
Recently, new threats to Internet consistency have received media attention. The
issues fall into two categories: conflict concerning naming and the use of geolocation to
restrict access to resources. First, a number of nations have raised formal objections to
oversight of ICANN by the United States, and a number of private organizations such
as UnifiedRoot have emerged to offer alternative namespaces (111). Global agreement
on Internet governance is becoming increasingly difficult (146) which means the po-
tential for inconsistency in naming resulting from multiple DNS roots or addresses
that are not globally unique will only increase. To a significant extent, the Internet
depends upon everyone having access to the same set of names. The threats, there-
fore, are as follows: (a) the same name does not exist in both of two locations (lack
of global consistency), and (b) the same name refers to different resources in different
locations (lack of global uniqueness).
Second, a perceived increase in online criminal activity has created viable business
models for businesses that provide geolocation services marketed for their benefits in
fraud resolution and digital rights management1. For example, a number of companies
use these geolocation services to obtain information about how a user is connected
1CyberSource, http://www.cybersource.com/; NatGeo http://www.natgeo.com/; Quova,
http://www.quova.com/
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to the Internet (such as IP address and ISP data) to determine whether the user is
likely to be fraudulent. This has caused a number of legitimate online transactions
to be denied when users are not connected at their usual point of attachment (80).
Finally, various governments and service providers around the world have deployed
network technology that (accidentally or intentionally) restricts access to certain In-
ternet content (100; 48).
Combined with the various well-known sources of fragmentation that we will de-
scribe in detail later in this section, these new concerns provide ample motivation for
development of a technique that affords users the ability to specify not only the net-
work location of Internet resources they want to view but also the perspectives from
which they want to view them. In this thesis, we present the design, implementation,
and evaluation of a Perspective Access Network, an overlay infrastructure for sharing
perspectives. Our prototype, called Blossom, consists of an unstructured, peer-to-
peer overlay of forwarders carrying TCP traffic that act as intermediaries between
nodes that cannot communicate directly.
1.1.1 Fragmentation Defined
We use the term fragmentation to refer to the manner in which access to Internet
resources is inconsistent with respect to network location.
There are many causes of fragmentation, ranging from accidental (routing failures,
misconfigured policies, unreliable network elements) to deliberate (content filtering,
network address translation, firewalls, malicious service providers). We are interested
primarily in:
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• (a) purposeful, data-specific or content-specific fragmentation resulting from
middleboxes that take action, such as filtering or redirection, based upon the
traffic it encounters,
• (b) routing policies implemented by particular network access providers, includ-
ing policies derived from limitations in business and trust relationships between
BGP peers, and
• (c) DNS names that are not globally available or not globally unique, perhaps as
a result of political disputes over the role of ICANN, the organization responsible
for provisioning Internet names and addresses.2
Above all, we believe that fragmentation is inevitable: the address isolation af-
forded by NAT devices is commercially precious, and global agreement on Internet
governance will only become increasingly difficult as the number of participants grows.
Various aspects of network design contribute to fragmentation. First, prevailing
Internet architecture allows for the existence of points of control within the net-
work. Specifically, it is possible to leverage network infrastructure such as routers
and switches to manage access to resources; policy is often explicitly determined by
mechanisms applied at the network layer. Second, despite attempts to regulate and
provision Internet activity, the core of the Internet is non-hierarchical. In particular,
the lack of central authority allows for the possibility that regions of the network
under different management may have conflicting interests; the result is that while
providing access to a particular resource may be of interest to one network, it may
not be of interest to another.
2Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, http://www.icann.org/
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Our view is that fragmentation itself is not intrinsically desirable or undesirable.
Instead, it is a naturally occurring consequent of the decentralized nature of large
networks. As the Internet continues to grow in size, scope, and significance to world-
wide economic activity, it seems natural that disputes among local authorities and
service providers will become more contentious.
The Internet is neither a perfect hierarchy nor a uniform set of equal partners (97).
Reality lies somewhere in the middle: each Internet service provider manages some
number of autonomous systems (ASes), and autonomous systems are arranged into
general tiers, such that providers within each successive tier tend to offer service
to customers who exist within the next tier. The result is that a small handful
of providers form a loosely-defined “core” of the Internet. The term default-free
zone describes the set of autonomous systems within this “core” who do not use
default addressing to identify an upstream service provider. Instead, such autonomous
systems use specific interfaces for specific ranges of destination addresses (prefixes)
without systematically assigning some substantial proportion of traffic as unclassified,
ready for delegation to some other autonomous system. While the Internet today is
arranged such that the autonomous systems that are part of the default-free zone
form a single (if hard to define) cluster, this arrangement will not necessarily always
be the case.
For example, Microsoft and Nokia applied for an additional top-level DNS do-
main for use by wireless devices.3 Similarly, China has proposed additional DNS
roots, managed by servers under the control of the Chinese government. There is
also some speculation that China might introduce its own address space and separate
3Mobile Data News, http://www.mda-mobiledata.org/mda/documents/MDNAPR04.pdf
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default-free zone. If implemented, such a network would effectively become a second
Internet, connected in various places to the “core” Internet, but existing indepen-
dently. Reasons for establishing sovereignty might include (a) the ability to wholly
manage allocation of names, addresses, or routing infrastructure.
In both cases, there exist economic or socio-political arguments for why an organi-
zation may want to use a walled-garden strategy of separation from the main Internet
“core” in order to capture control. It is, therefore, useful to consider a system for
ensuring universal access to resources in an Internet divided in such a manner.
Throughout this discussion, we refer to names and identifiers. We use the term
identifier to refer to a symbol that establishes the identity of a particular entity in
a particular context, and we use the term name to refer to a sequence (possibly
one) of identifiers used to refer to a particular entity. DNS names as conceived
in the present Internet may be fully-qualified, identifying an entity with respect to
a categorically acknowledged root. All names are fully qualified within any given
perspective. However, if a Perspective Access Network spans two environments that
do not share a common root, then there is no sense by which a single name can be
considered fully qualified throughout the network.
1.1.2 Causes of Fragmentation
Next, we characterize several of the various ways in which fragmentation occurs.
While our system should be capable of addressing fragmentation generally, it is more
well-suited to certain kinds of fragmentation than to others. Table 1.1 provides an
overview of the various forms of fragmentation and specifies those that we address.
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Type Addressed by PANs?
Interdomain Routing Policy Yes
Interdomain Routing Misconfiguration Partially
Interdomain Routing Instability No
Firewalls Yes*
Network Address Translation Yes
Content Filtering Yes*
Explicit Address Filtering Yes*
Transparent Proxies and Caches Yes
Anycast Yes
DNS Manipulation Yes
Table 1.1: Causes of Fragmentation. (*To regulate Internet use, network access
providers may block access to Perspective Access Networks.)
• Interdomain Routing Policy. Each autonomous system that uses BGP
for interdomain routing is responsible for establishing its own policy specifying
from which peers to accept particular advertisements and to which peers to
send particular advertisements. Generally such policy is dictated by indepen-
dent decisions on the part of individual Internet service providers. However,
it is important to recognize that policies restrict the advertisement of routes
in general, and there are no guarantees that routes to all prefixes will be re-
ceived by all autonomous systems. Nearly all agreements between providers to
exchange BGP routes fall into one of two categories (77):
– The customer relationship, in which a provider advertises to a customer
(a) its internal routes, (b) routes from all other peers, and (c) routes from
its other customers.
– The peering relationship, in which each peer advertises to a peer (a) its
internal routes and (b) routes to its customers.
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Thus, the customer relationship consists of a provider offering either a full rout-
ing table or a default route to its customer, and the peering relationship consists
of a link between two directly connected providers arranged such that their re-
spective customers can communicate via that link. Internet service providers
may not engage in the right set of relationships with the right set of peers and
providers to obtain access to all networks throughout the Internet.
• Interdomain Routing Misconfiguration (Accidental). Misconfigura-
tion of routers that participate in the BGP protocol is a significant cause of
observed routing failures. A routing failure occurs when a BGP speaker ad-
vertises something that should not be advertised or suppresses something that
should be advertised. Mahajan et al. organize classes of BGP misconfigura-
tion into two main categories: origin misconfiguration, which consists of the
advertisement of a prefix that a BGP speaker is not authorized to advertise,
and export misconfiguration, which consists of the advertisement of a route in
a manner inconsistent with the policy of the exporter (82; 59). Accidental mis-
configuration may result from simple data entry errors, or it may result from
misunderstanding about the implications of certain BGP policy decisions. Ac-
cidental misconfiguration has resulted in unreachability and suboptimal routes
in a few cases.
• Interdomain Routing Misconfiguration (Purposeful). To our knowl-
edge, accidental misconfiguration accounts for most large-scale failures of BGP
routing, but the potential for malicious misconfiguration exists as well. Both
external hackers and malicious employees could potentially introduce rout-
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ing policies inconsistent with the policy of the ISP. While interdomain rout-
ing security is a serious problem with a number of proposed solutions (74;
54), malicious advertisements have so far not substantially posed an active
threat to the infrastructure. We describe some of the specific vulnerabilities in
Section 5.2.3.
Indeed, both accidental and purposeful configuration of policy can lead to frag-
mentation. For reasons of trust, quality of service, sorting priorities, or political
reasons, providers may or may not opt to accept, advertise, or use routes offered
by their neighbors. The result is that not all networks actually have access to all
other networks, even if all have Internet connectivity. Additionally, providers
tend not to have agreements about filters in general; inconsistent filtering may
result in incomplete access to available Internet resources. Providers may fail
to provide perfect connectivity because they do not consider all of the ramifi-
cations of their policy choices, or because the process of verifying that policy
choices provide full connectivity is prohibitively difficult or expensive. Indeed,
border routers sometimes contain up to hundreds or even thousands of lines
of BGP policy statements. However, providers sometimes fail to provide full
connectivity with full knowledge of the decision as well; such providers may
know that a particular network will be unreachable to their customers but de-
cide that the costs of providing that connectivity outweigh the inconvenience
to their customers.
Perspective Access Networks do not entirely resolve interdomain routing mis-
configuration concerns (accidental or purposeful), since they are susceptible to
Chapter 1: Introduction 12
similar misconfiguration. Nevertheless, the ability to view the Internet from
different perspectives may provide a useful resource for debugging purposes.
• Interdomain Routing Instability. Researchers have observed that in-
teractions between BGP policies often lead to persistent interdomain routing
oscillation (138; 56), and that interdomain routing oscillation in turn leads to
degraded network performance (59). The problem is endogenous to the nature
of the policies themselves and the way in which routes are propagated through
the network (58). Methods such as route-flap dampening are commonly used to
mitigate the adverse effects of policy-driven oscillation, but such methods are
inherently imperfect and can themselves contribute to extended periods of net-
work fragmentation. We briefly describe the causes of BGP routing instability
in Section 5.2.3.
Perspective Access Networks do not represent an attempt to mitigate inter-
domain routing instability among autonomous systems, nor do they intend to
address transient network failures. Resilient Overlay Networks (RON) serve
this purpose; refer to Chapter 2 for more information.
• Firewalls. A firewall is a device for filtering traffic according to a set of rules.
Typically the rules specify a set of patterns such that IP packets with transport-
layer headers (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP) that match one or more of the specified
patterns (e.g., a prefix that is a known source of spam) are simply dropped.
Most commonly, firewalls are used to block inbound requests for services (e.g.,
filter inbound traffic with the TCP SYN flag set) or particular services them-
selves (e.g., filter based upon TCP or UDP port number). There are many
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well-known methods for circumventing firewalls, including establishing tunnels
using allowed protocols, binding services to nonstandard ports, or setting up
additional gateways.
Firewalls are sometimes used to enforce legal policy. For example, various reg-
ulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (133) and the Gramm-Leach-Billey
Act (132) have encouraged accounting departments and financial institutions
seeking legal compliance to (a) maintain archives of traffic traversing the bor-
ders of their networks or (b) generally limit all traffic except for a small set of
services. More commonly, however, firewalls are deployed for security reasons.
Since most remote attacks consist of random, automated probing for services
with particular vulnerabilities over an address range, systematically blocking
these probes at the network layer serves as a practical, though imperfect, line
of defense. However, this comes at the cost of effectively enacting a policy, even
when such policy is not required by organizational goals. Many organizations
that use firewalls misunderstand the threat models; studies have shown that
up to seventy percent of hacking activity within corporate environments are
knowingly instigated or facilitated by insiders (106). Also, there is a well-
established premise that in many environments, firewalls stifle innovation by
disallowing the deployment of services not explicitly sanctioned in advance.
PANs can be used to address fragmentation resulting from firewalls.
• Network Address Translation. Suppose that a network administrator
wants to connect one existing network to another without requiring that the
individual networks have mutual knowledge of the addresses contained within
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the other network.4 In this case, there are two separate address spaces arranged
such that peers in one address space cannot communicate directly with peers
in the other address spaces. Network address translators are essentially routers
with interfaces in both address spaces; they systematically rewrite headers of
packets to allow communication between both address spaces, maintaining state
for individual connections, usually with a table that maps individual TCP con-
nections to port numbers.
One might think that widespread deployment of NAT devices is primarily the
result of fears that available address space is insufficient, but Classless Inter-
Domain Routing (50) allows sufficient flexibility that a suitably large organiza-
tion can obtain sufficiently many addresses to satisfy its needs quite inexpen-
sively. Indeed, organizations often deploy NAT devices or enable NAT functions
in firewalls for the same “security reasons” used to justify the deployment of the
firewalls themselves. NAT devices are even more pernicious than some firewalls
in the sense that NAT devices must store connection state, violating the end-to-
end principle (114), making systems at the ends of the network dependent upon
the reliability of systems in the interior of the network. Also, because resources
to identify individual connections are finite, NAT devices typically recycle en-
tries in their tables. Since NAT devices have no way of knowing whether a
particular conversation is still active or whether both hosts have abandoned the
connection, the process of recycling entries often leads to disconnected sessions.
4The most common example is an individual or organization that reserves one IPv4 address from
an upstream Internet service provider and intends to use this single address to connect an entire
network to the Internet.
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PANs can be used to address fragmentation resulting from NAT.
• Content Filtering. Some firewalls are configured to filter packets based
upon application-layer content; this technique can be used for large-scale cen-
sorship of sensitive content. For example, British Telecom recently deployed
a system to restrict access to certain web pages (16); one way of implement-
ing this restriction is to filter HTTP packets based upon the URL specified
in the request. Certainly this approach is not immune to false positives (116;
85). Regardless, however, the scale at which governments and providers are
considering deployment of such technologies indicates the potential for misuse.
Many large corporations purposefully use some form of content filtering to limit
the use of company-administered machines to access certain kinds of Internet
content.
A substantial number of governments around the world use filtering to restrict
access to Internet resources on the basis of the content that their citizens might
be able to access. For example, regimes have been known to filter access to
news stories, political discussion, pornography, hate speech, religious speech,
and other categories of content. Different regimes have different policies that
involve filtering different content categories, and the technology used determines
the extent to which these regimes are successful. The Open Net Initiative
(ONI) periodically publishes a series of reports describing these policies and
cataloguing the extent to which filtering actually occurs around the world (100).
One of the most important uses of Perspective Access Networks is the circum-
vention of content filtering; we discuss the technique in greater detail in Chapter
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5.
• Explicit Address Filtering. Providers of Internet service may also config-
ure their firewalls to explicitly block packets based upon their source or desti-
nation addresses. Technically, the implementation of such filtering rules may be
no different from ordinary firewall rules specified by local networks at the edges
of the Internet. However, deploying such filtering technology in the middle of
the network suggests greater distance between those subject to the policy and
those enacting it. Consider the Pennsylvania state statute (no longer in effect)
that specified that traffic to and from certain hosts must be filtered by service
providers (84). It may have been nontrivial for providers to deploy government-
mandated filtering on a large scale, but the result was an infrastructure for
systematically preventing access to Internet resources. The existence of NAT,
hosts running more than one service, and web servers hosting more than one
page suggest that this method would have been even more prone to false posi-
tives than filtering based upon application-layer content. PANs can be used to
circumvent filtering of this sort.
• Transparent Proxies and Caches. Transparent proxies are routers con-
figured to either (a) redirect, or (b) intercept and forward, requests for a par-
ticular resource (e.g., an HTTP request for a web page) to a proxy. The proxy
subsequently issues the request on behalf of the original sender, receives the
response, and then forwards the response to the original sender. Often, trans-
parent proxies also cache replies: in cases when many users of a local network
request the same web page, such caching can sometimes decrease the load on
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an Internet uplink by allowing the page to be requested only once, serving the
same cached copy to all requesters. Recently, the IETF proposed a natural ex-
tension of this technique called Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES), which
allows intermediaries to customize a data stream as part of a service (7). For
example, OPES could be used to transparently insert advertisements specific to
particular networks or geographies into Web content.
The technique of transparently mutating Internet traffic has several complica-
tions, however. For example, a client whose request is intercepted by a trans-
parent proxy may fail to issue cache-control directives that could be used to
specify that the source of the request does not want the copy (1) to be cached.
More generally, such systems pose a threat to network transparency by inject-
ing intelligence into the center of the network (127; 10). PANs can be used for
circumvention of proxies and caches.
• Anycast. Sometimes a single service is provided by multiple hosts, and when a
user or application wants to locate the service, it does not matter which of these
hosts actually provides the service. The term anycast refers to a system that
allows the user or application to specify the service without requiring a response
from any one server in particular: the network is responsible for determining
which host actually provides the service (103; 2). By using anycast to determine
which DNS server receives a particular query, some service providers are able to
usefully balance load across multiple servers or even allow the requester of the
service to find a server topologically proximate to itself. While there are clear
efficiency benefits, we observe that the requester is unable to specify the server
Chapter 1: Introduction 18
specifically—the network must choose on behalf of the requester. A requester
might want to access a specific server within an anycast group. Today, anycast
is used primarily for DNS servers (75). PANs may conceivably be used to allow
clients to request a specific member of an anycast group.
• DNS Manipulation. The Domain Name Service determines to which IP ad-
dresses a host sends a request for a resource identified by a particular hostname.
DNS can be used to provide different IP addresses for the same hostname based
upon the location of the requester in the network. For example, Google has
distributed servers throughout the world to handle requests, and the popular
search service uses DNS to direct peers to particular servers in the network
based upon the location of the peers in the network. On 26 July 2004, an in-
sidious worm launched a multitude of messages at Google servers, but since not
all servers received the same number of requests, some servers were effectively
disabled while others remained functional (113). Since DNS continued to di-
rect some peers to nonfunctional servers, some users were unable to access the
resource. If there had existed a way of specifying which server to use, then it
may have been possible for such users to access the unaffected servers. If we
presume that each PAN forwarder uses some particular domain name server,
then PANs may be used to indirectly select which server to use.
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1.2 End-To-End System Design
At the core of our argument lies a sense that the fragmentation problem is the re-
sult of the network itself interfering with communication between hosts. For decades,
researchers have argued in favor of the normative notion that the network ought to
be a transparent medium, providing connectivity but not interfering with its traffic.
The end-to-end principle states that the costs of providing special functionality at
low levels of a system generally outweigh the benefits. As originally described, the
end-to-end principle refers to special network functions, including delivery guaran-
tees, secure transmission of data, duplicate message suppression, guaranteeing FIFO
message delivery, and transaction management (114).
Implementing these functions at the network layer leads to a design that is (a)
less flexible, since the parties with an interest in using the functions have no con-
trol over how they are implemented; (b) more intrusive, since parties without an
interest in using the functions are subjected to their provisions; (c) more brittle,
since additional functionality in the network means additional opportunity for fail-
ure; and (d) more cumbersome, since upgrading entire infrastructures so that a few
nodes on the edges can take advantage of a new protocol feature might be pro-
hibitively expensive. Furthermore, technical solutions that violate end-to-end princi-
ples may stifle innovation by unnecessarily constraining the set of assumptions that
devices on the edges of the network can make about how the network will behave (51;
11).
As technology became more sophisticated, networking experts extended the argu-
ment to encompass higher layers in the protocol stack and issues involving connection
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state, authentication, and host mobility (72). As the set of Internet users continued to
grow, the end-to-end argument also expanded to serve as a rallying point for network
neutrality, the general principle that the networks of which the Internet is composed
should not impose restrictions on the traffic that they carry. So, the argument goes,
the network ought to be transparent: a collection of neutral pipes that promiscuously
convey all traffic from potentially any source to potentially any destination.
Indeed, conflicts of interest have emerged along with the “tussles” described ear-
lier (28). In particular, as the Internet population expanded, the interests of its users
began to diverge. Security became an issue, and implicitly trusting the set of all
users was no longer practical. Technology that differentiated hosts based upon their
network location demonstrated a certain effectiveness in mitigating attacks, despite
the fact that such technology (a) violated network transparency by interposing be-
tween interlocutors (for example, in the case of transparent proxies), and (b) violated
important abstractions (for example, the idea that the Internet is globally consistent)
by intrinsically binding policy to low-level mechanisms. The emergence of the Virtual
Private Network (VPN) is testament to the crudeness of approaches that rely upon
network isolation. Trust boundaries within organizations often do not map directly
to underlying network topologies, either because the relevant sets of people change
frequently or because the relevant sets of people are not physically collocated. As
a result, some organizations adopted a “trust envelope” paradigm, in which some
combination of network boundaries and special-purpose authentication are used to
determine whether a given user is permitted to access a particular resource. Some of
these organizations have deployed increasingly complex infrastructure to extend their
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trust envelopes in arbitrary ways (27).
Perspective Access Networks allow the extension of the trust envelope in a general
way that is expressive, uniform, and architecturally stable; this is accomplished by
adding authentication as described in Section 3.5.
1.3 Addressing Fragmentation
We assert that the amorphous nature of the Internet facilitates its growth and that
fragmentation is part of this amorphous nature. Hence, our approach seeks to harness
the benefits of fragmentation rather than stifle fragmentation entirely. We design
Perspective Access Networks around four central objectives: locality, access through
obstructions, decentralized resource allocation, and deployability. We describe each
of these goals in detail in Section 1.4, and we demonstrate that one infrastructure
can be used to provide all of these advantages.
This thesis characterizes ways in which systemic fragmentation occurs today, ex-
amines why existing architectures fail to avoid fragmentation, and considers the design
of existing systems created to mitigate aspects of the phenomenon. Our analysis pro-
vides a better understanding of what characteristics are required by a general-purpose
system for facilitating communication in a fragmented network, which in turn allows
us to argue in favor of particular design choices. We provide a proof-of-concept im-
plementation and provide design guidelines for other implementations. We conclude
with an exploration of the impact and benefits of such a system.
Note that our system design achieves its seemingly conflicting goals of locality
and access through obstructions without depending upon universal naming. Indeed,
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one of the key features of the Internet today is that names used to identify resources
are universal: they depend only upon the resource and are not defined by who is
requesting the resource. We argue that universal naming is not indispensable, and we
believe that by relaxing this constraint we can achieve a considerably more flexible
network.
The architecture that we present does not require all Internet users to have the
same notion of what region of the Internet constitutes the “core” or which set of
real-world organizations are responsible for Internet governance. Perspective Access
Networks allow us to consider a heterogeneous Internet whose management reflects
the management of the real world rather than imposing organizational structure where
hierarchy need not exist.
Previous work on overcoming network fragmentation to facilitate end-to-end con-
nectivity requires extensive changes to operating systems (such as deployment of new
protocol stacks), requires the explicit participation of ISPs and content providers, or
imposes a global hierarchical organization of the Internet. We relax these constraints
to provide ease of deployment and have built a system we have deployed on the
Tor anonymity network (38) and on PlanetLab (66). Our approach does not require
changes to the operating system or protocol stack, does not require active partici-
pation of ISPs, and does not require special configuration of in-band network-layer
elements such as routers or middleboxes.
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1.3.1 Primary Contributions
We use a multi-faceted approach to construct an argument for the relevance and
usefulness of Perspective Access Networks:
• Solution Space. We consider the set of existing solutions offered by the net-
working and systems communities to address problems similar to those that we
address. We observe that the existing approaches fall into four main categories.
Some systems, including RON (5), concern themselves primarily with providing
improved robustness against transient network failure. Other systems, includ-
ing Mobile IP (104) and Unmanaged Internet Protocol (46), seek to provide
mobility, allowing end hosts to move around throughout the network without
losing their ability to communicate with peers. A third class of systems, includ-
ing TRIAD (23) and DOA (142), assert the inevitability of middleboxes and
seek to provide a network architecture that allows such middleboxes to operate
in accordance with the fundamental tenets of the original Internet design ob-
jectives. A fourth class of systems, including Platypus (121), seek to provide
a means by which Internet service providers can define or negotiate a richer,
more effective set of filtering policies.
• Architectural Objectives. We define a set of central architectural objec-
tives for an infrastructure capable of routing traffic to an appropriate location
for viewing a resource. At a high level, we are concerned with how to propagate
metadata about perspectives through the network in a scalable way. In particu-
lar, to provide to clients the benefits of locality and access through middleboxes,
we propose a language sufficiently expressive to describe the perspectives from
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which they want to view the network and a process by which those perspectives
can be reached. We also provide a policy framework for configuring PAN ele-
ments so that the policy needs of all players involved in the tussle are adequately
satisfied.
• Implementation. We present Blossom, our realized prototype implementa-
tion of a Perspective Access Network. We outline a set of desiderata for a
source-routing infrastructure that can be used as a transport layer for PAN,
and we show how PAN can take advantage of such infrastructures.
• Analysis. We carefully examine Perspective Access Networks to assess the
scalability, deployability, and usefulness of our design. We consider system
scalability from both technical and policy standpoints, and we argue that our
policy framework can be used to assure that incentives of those deploying PAN
infrastructure are adequately satisfied. We provide a method by which the PAN
directory infrastructure can manage the tradeoff between client performance and
volume of routing information within the control plane, and we argue that there
are important and significant uses of PANs that exist within the limits of what
that method can handle. To inform our discussion and theoretical analysis,
we provide quantitative results from a series of experiments that evaluate the
behavior of PANs in a real-world environment.
• Incentives for Deployment. We consider a set of real-world scenarios
that fall within the limits of what our system can handle. For example, users in
China may seek unfiltered access to BBC News. Users in one branch office of an
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enterprise my seek perspectives within an internal network segment of another
branch office. Users may have an interest in geographically customized search
results or the ability to view the Internet as seen from home while travelling.
Network administrators may want to perform security audits from afar. Re-
searchers, government agencies, and political organizations may want a means
of quantifying political filtering. (Section presents a detailed discussion of these
scenarios.)
1.3.2 A “Coreless” Internet
PAN allows us to study what the world would be like with a “coreless” Internet,
i.e., an Internet without globally assigned names or addresses. A client using the PAN
overlay can access a remote resource, provided that it can build a tunnel through the
network, across fragments, to a remote forwarder that can access that remote resource.
Like popular peer-to-peer filesharing networks, PAN allows end users to participate
directly, but PAN users are sharing their perspectives rather than their content.
PAN also does not depend on global hierarchical organization of the Internet. Cur-
rently, both the addresses and the names used to identify resources on the Internet are
allocated by a collection of governance organizations that are arranged hierarchically
with a single organization at the top having overall “control.” Our approach allows
for an Internet without hierarchically ordained names and address spaces—that is,
an Internet consisting of (possibly overlapping) network fragments, each with its own
local naming and addressing scheme.
If we assume that we can build such an overlay network and that it can scale
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“reasonably,” we find a number of interesting benefits to the deployment of such a
system as well as potential red herrings. The purpose of this work is to outline the
issues and consider the tradeoffs.
Many previous approaches to providing end-to-end connectivity across middle-
boxes assume a core to which all forwarders are attached (46; 47; 142) or recognize
that fragments can have their own address space allocation, but assume a globally
unique DNS-like name for resources (23). Like Plutarch (34), PAN achieves truly
separate naming and addressing in different fragments. However, unlike Plutarch,
PAN does not require the boundaries between fragments to be well-defined.
1.3.3 Contrasting PAN and VPN
At a superficial level, Perspective Access Networks provide functionality quite
similar to the functionality offered by Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). In par-
ticular, VPNs allow users to appear to be on a remote network, generally for the
purpose of accessing resources only accessible to hosts on that network. Perspective
Access Networks provide this, but they provide two other useful features as well: a
directory service that allows users to specify the perspectives that they want by their
characteristics and a routing infrastructure that can deliver traffic to the desired per-
spective even if the network is fragmented in a manner that prevents the user from
communicating directly with the server providing the perspective.
First, the directory service provides a general method by which users can request
perspectives. Users need not know in advance the particular server that provides the
perspective but only a means of describing the perspective to the directory service.
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As long as a means of reaching a perspective matching the specified characteristics
exists, the client system will be able to use the directory service to gain access to
that perspective. If we consider individual hosts that provide perspectives to be
VPN servers, then even if a single VPN server or its network ceases to be accessible,
the user will be able to use the same description to seamlessly build a circuit to a
different VPN that provides a perspective with the same characteristics. In this way,
Perspective Access Networks address the fragility that individual VPN servers may
have. To some extent, the directory service may also provide some robustness against
adversaries; we explore this possibility in Chapter 5.
Second, the routing infrastructure allows clients to access perspectives that they
cannot access directly. Deployed VPN servers generally rely upon the assumption that
they are accessible to everyone in the “core” of the Internet; VPN servers to which
access has been filtered and VPN servers behind firewalls or NAT devices may not be
accessible. In addition to providing a means of advertising perspectives throughout
the network, the routing framework allows network participants to be arranged in
arbitrary topologies. Though we describe some scenarios that necessitate routing
in Section 3.6, we believe that most uses for Perspective Access Networks today do
not require routing. Routing will become more important, however, when network
filtering and fragmentation become more widespread.
We revisit the distinction between PAN and VPN in Section 5.4. In Section 5.4.1,
we compare PAN to VPN in the context of practical applications, and in Section 5.4.2,
we consider PAN in the context of powerful adversaries.
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1.4 High-Level System Overview
We give a brief overview of the PAN architecture including a description of its
components and a description of how a client uses the PAN overlay to access a remote
resource.
To construct a general-purpose system that satisfies our requirements, we pro-
pose overlay networks consisting of forwarders that act as intermediaries between
nodes that cannot communicate directly. We discuss the role of forwarders and their
capabilities in Chapters 3-5.
A PAN forms an overlay network for transport-layer traffic. The human users of a
PAN interact with ordinary Internet-aware applications, which in turn interact with
a PAN client via a proxy interface. Applications treat the PAN client as a generic
transport-layer proxy; this proxy may use the SOCKS (78) protocol. The PAN client
uses the PAN directory service to determine a path through forwarders in the overlay
network and then sends data from the application along that path.
1.4.1 Components
The PAN system consists of the following components:
• Resources. Resources are simply hosts that offer (possibly legacy) services to
which the PAN overlay enables access.
• Forwarders. Forwarders are the nodes that make up the peer-to-peer overlay
network, working to establish virtual circuits through which TCP streams flow.
• Clients. The PAN client consists of two components: (a) a proxy that serves
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as an intermediary between client applications and the overlay network, and (b)
a mechanism for choosing paths and establishing circuits through the overlay
network.
• Directory Servers. The directory servers obtain information about the
individual forwarders. Clients contact the directory servers in turn to obtain
information necessary to route traffic to the forwarders of interest.
1.4.2 Accessing Resources
Suppose that the forwarders have organized themselves into an overlay that can
forward transport-layer traffic. We stipulate that each forwarder independently gen-
erates a self-certifying identifier (83), and forwarders throughout the system refer to
other forwarders using these identifiers. The key insight underlying self-certifying
identifiers is that as long as the size of the identifier is sufficiently large and the
sources of randomness are sufficiently effective, then the chance of a namespace col-
lision among these identifiers within the system will be negligible.
Figure 1.1 depicts how Blossom enables an Internet host to access resources out-
side its local fragment. Suppose that the source (labeled foo.source.net) wants to
communicate with a host known to forwarder F4 as bar.target.org. Suppose that
the source knows how to talk to F1, and that the self-chosen ID of F4 is 79f72ae5.
5
Then, the source will tell F1 to open a TCP session to bar.target.org as seen
from F4. The control plane (consisting of directory servers) provides F1 with rout-
ing information indicating that F2 is the next hop en route to F4, so F1 knows how
5We chose four bytes to create an illustrative example; actual IDs would be longer. Also, in
practice we use human-readable names, mapped to self-certifying IDs by a third party.
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Figure 1.1: Accessing a Resource. The source establishes a connection to
bar.target.org from the perspective of F4. DNS requests and TCP sessions are
both tunneled through the infrastructure.
to forward packets through the overlay to F4. Next, F1 forwards the request for
bar.target.org through the overlay to F4, who uses DNS to resolves it to an IP
address. At this point, F1 can tunnel the entire TCP session through the overlay to
F4. Note that this involves segmenting the TCP session—the conversation between
the source and F1 will have a different pair of source and destination addresses than
the conversation between F4 and the target resource. This means that Blossom will
not work with end-to-end address-based security systems such as IPSec; we describe
the policy implications in more detail in the following section.
Suppose that there are two forwarders, A and B. If some middlebox such as
a firewall or NAT creates a “unidirectional link” between A and B such that A can
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establish a TCP connection to B but not vice-versa, then A may establish a persistent
connection to B that allows new paths to be built by clients in both directions.
Observe that the combined name “bar.target.org as seen from F4” is globally
unique, but the name was not apportioned by any authority of global scope. Also,
there is no requirement that each resource be associated with exactly one forwarder;
multiple forwarders may be able to reach the same resource, possibly using different
names.
1.4.3 Directory Functionality
Figure 1.2: Advertising PAN Forwarders. PAN directory servers use a path-
vector algorithm to propagate contact information for forwarders. Black lines indi-
cate the path taken by an advertisement initiated by the directory server labeled d1.
PAN relies upon a directory service that keeps track of how to reach the various
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perspectives available in the overlay network. The directory service is implemented
as a set of directory servers that publish various different kinds of entries; we provide
a conceptual overview:
• Forwarder Descriptor. PAN directory servers provide forwarder descrip-
tors that can be used by the PAN client to establish circuits through the forward-
ing network. Descriptors are self-signed statements published by forwarders that
contain contact information, including IP address, port, and RSA key, as well
as salient information about the capabilities of the forwarder, including exit
policy and bandwidth measurements.
• Forwarder Path. Suppose that a PAN forwarder publishes its descriptor to
some particular directory. The PAN architecture allows forwarders to publish
their descriptors in directories in locations from which those forwarders are
not directly accessible. If the forwarder is not directly accessible by nodes
that receive descriptors from this directory, then the forwarder must provide
instructions by which some client can reach it. These instructions appear in
the form of a path, listing a particular sequence of nodes to which to connect to
establish a circuit including the target forwarder. If, in the context of Figure 1.2,
F1 had published to d5 directly, then there would be a forwarder path entry for
F1 describing how to get to F1 from the vicinity of d5.
• Directory Table. Directory servers publish a list of other directory servers
in the system, as accrued over time through routing advertisements. Entries
for directory servers that are directly reachable are trivial, containing only the
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name of the server. Other entries include a path through the set of directory
servers via which the remote directory service may be reached. The first four
entries in the box corresponding to d5 in Figure 1.2 represent directory table
entries.
• Perspective Attributes. Not all PAN directories publish descriptors for
all PAN forwarders; however, given a set of attributes that define a perspective,
a PAN directory may store information that a client can use to determine a
source route to a forwarder that matches the perspective it seeks.
The directory servers propagate reachability information about individual entries
(both forwarders and directory servers) in their respective databases to other directory
servers throughout the system. In this manner, any client using any of the directory
servers throughout the system will have a measure of assurance that its data will
be routed to the requested forwarder. Figure 1.2 abstractly illustrates the process
in which route information is propagated through the system. Entries are propa-
gated using a BGP-like path-vector protocol, which includes a simple route selection
protocol run at each of the directory servers.
The storage and aggregation of the multiple different kinds of attributes that
describe individual perspectives makes routing in Perspective Access Networks fun-
damentally different from Internet routing. We describe these differences in greater
detail in Chapter 4.
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1.5 Design Considerations
By providing a means for bridging fragmented networks in a clear and consistent
way, we hope to reduce the need for ad hoc, one-off mechanisms designed to circum-
vent policy restrictions. With respect to this design point, our objectives are similar
to those of other overlay-based systems that we will examine in the next chapter (46;
142). Like many systems, the system we propose has potential to be used maliciously
(refer to Chapter 6 for a description of the political and legal risks). While we do not
wish to condone malicious use, we believe that in many cases, the circumvention of
filtering mechanisms may be necessary since network access decisions are sometimes
made implicitly, for practical reasons, rather than explicitly, for policy reasons.
For example, the value of the decrease in the number of requests received by call
centers might be a strong incentive for a network access provider to institute a fil-
tering rule (e.g., filter all incoming TCP connections so that everyone is protected
by default). However, the value of implementing a system that allows exceptions
for particular users or services may be insufficient to justify the cost of such a sys-
tem, even though such exceptions may be entirely consistent with policy (e.g., there
may be no policy reason why people should not be allowed to opt-out of the filter-
ing). Perspective Access Networks may be used to defray the cost of implementing
exceptions.
We do not intend Perspective Access Networks to present a means by which end
users can abuse remote Internet services blocked by their network access provider,
even though abuse via Perspective Access Networks is possible. Quite the contrary,
we seek to make it easier for network access providers to implement reasonable policies
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that are less tightly integrated with routing and filtering mechanisms. We achieve
this by providing infrastructure that allows providers of PAN services to determine
which resources to offer to PAN users.
PAN allows individual Internet peers to provide policy-compliant access to services
without requiring modification to the configuration of the network infrastructure. We
believe that our work is a testament to the ineffectiveness of network-based (walled-
garden) strategies in achieving security, and we believe that the existence of such a
tool encourages more widespread deployment of end-to-end security systems.
1.5.1 Objectives
Perspective Access Networks are designed to achieve several design objectives:
Objective 1: Locality
Since Perspective Access Networks allow users to specify a particular location
from which to view Internet resources, it becomes possible to create resources whose
content is tailored to particular locations.
Additionally, the existing Internet paradigm intends for there to exist a global
namespace in which centralized authorities allocate names hierarchically and uniquely.
Conversely, in the real world, the meaning of a name is dependent upon its context
(unless economics dictates otherwise). That is, there can exist two companies named
Olympic, each selling a different service (e.g., a global airline service and a pizza
service in Watertown, Massachusetts). In the context of the Internet, this means:
• (a) from some locations, an observer might not be able to see a particular
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resource because the observer is blocked, and
• (b) from some locations, while the observer might be able to see a particular
resource, the resource itself may appear different because the service is location-
specific.
A system that facilitates communication across network fragments may allow for
the development of distinct local namespaces, in which names have local meaning,
while also allowing access to objects in other namespaces that happen to bear the same
name. This may afford businesses the opportunity to protect their trademarks, avert
some Internet namespace arbitrage, and generally lead to relaxation of an unnatural
constraint on naming.
Some trademarks like “Xerox” prevent others from re-using the name but only
because lawyers have determined it reasonable to uphold the validity and universality
of the particular trademark; for many smaller organizations, name re-use is allowed
and unchallenged. Why assume that all names must be unique just because a few
organizations insist that their names be unique everywhere? We would rather not
take a position on this; quite the contrary, we believe that technology should not get
in the way of reasonable legal process. A technology that requires global uniqueness
takes the courts (and thus society) out of namespace decisions.
Thus, we abandon global uniqueness of names in favor of flexibility. For example,
in Figure 1.3, there are two resources named www.google.com in the left and right
fragments. The service provided by each resource should not be required to be the
same. Instead, a host in the left fragment should be able to access the www.google.
com resource in the right fragment via the PAN forwarder F2.
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Figure 1.3: Locality. Multiple services with the same name may coexist within
different local namespaces. (Meaningful names within a local space.)
Objective 2: Access Through Obstructions
Sometimes, open communication between networks is compromised for architec-
tural convenience rather than policy reasons (e.g., a firewall that errs on the side of
filtering rather than allowing certain traffic might be deployed for convenience, and
instituting exceptions for some small proportion of systems behind the firewall may
be prohibitively difficult). Policy decisions must be made at some level, but technical
limitations should not dictate policy.
PAN provides an architecture that facilitates the use of intermediaries to allow
communication between entities that for whatever reason cannot communicate di-
rectly. In Figure 1.4, hosts on the right-hand side requesting resources located in the
private network on the left-hand side should be able to access the resources, provided
forwarders F1 and F2 can communicate and maintain a persistent connection to each
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Figure 1.4: Access Through Obstructions. If two hosts can both access for-
warders within the same forwarding infrastructure, then those two hosts can use the
infrastructure to communicate. (Circumvent technical barriers.)
other. We believe that technical barriers should not implicitly set policy: we intend
to circumvent these technical barriers, not barriers established for policy reasons.
Objective 3: Decentralized Resource Allocation
Contrary to popular belief, the Internet is not entirely a distributed network.
While its management is somewhat decentralized, many aspects of its structure and
governance are hierarchical in nature. Autonomous systems engage in peering rela-
tionships in a manner that promotes the set of “tiers” that characterize the organi-
zation of Internet service providers today. Both the addresses and the names used to
identify resources are allocated by a collection of governance organizations, arranged
hierarchically. Such an arrangement is contrary to the underlying relationships among
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organizations interested in using the Internet to communicate.
PAN seeks to provide a means by which the Internet can grow without requiring
the consent of third parties such as Internet service providers and DNS registrars. In
particular, we want to afford users the ability to add an arbitrary namespace outside
the hierarchy and then connect it to the rest of the Internet.
In Figure 1.5, a new network fragment on the left is set up to deploy a PAN
forwarder called F . Adding this fragment to the existing PAN infrastructure requires
only that a persistent connection be established with an existing PAN forwarder. In
this case, forwarder F1 might be chosen initially, but if F3 becomes reachable or more
convenient later, then forwarder F can set up a persistent connection with F3 instead.
Figure 1.5: Decentralized Resource Allocation. Adding a network and its
abundance of resources to the system need not require specific allocation of names,
addresses, or routing from centralized authorities.
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Objective 4: Deployability
Any complex system of sufficiently large scale that cannot be deployed incremen-
tally will never amass enough interest to overcome the economic hurdles to deploy-
ment. PANs must provide substantial benefit even if their rate of adoption is quite
limited, and PANs must be able to coexist and function without modification to
existing Internet infrastructure components. In particular, both clients and servers
should be able to simultaneously access both regular Internet resources and resources
available through a PAN. To this end, we have developed a prototype that leverages
the Tor overlay network (38) and is immediately usable by any client with no changes
required to the operating system running on the host. (We suspect that a typical
user of a PAN will use the normal Internet to access most resources.) An interesting
consequence of running this prototype is that we can detect subtle differences in the
service provided by some resources (such as Google), depending upon our choice of
last-hop forwarder.
1.5.2 Tradeoffs
The deployment of Perspective Access Networks carries technical costs as well as
functional benefits, as we make a number of tradeoffs to achieve our various goals:
• Loss of Control. PAN can be used to circumvent purposeful barriers, so
parties with an interest in implementing purposeful restrictions might be in-
clined to oppose the deployment of PAN forwarders.
• New Discovery Constraints. With PAN, we will need a way to find the
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forwarder that can access the remote resource that we want. We propose a
global distributed directory service that has some of the characteristics of DNS,
although it is not explicitly hierarchical. One significant business concern is how
the provider of an Internet resource accessible from only some locations will refer
to the resource when describing its location to arbitrary people. Potentially,
providers of online services must use both the name of the resource as well
as a description of a perspective that can reach the resource (though the set of
adequate perspectives may be intrinsically defined by the nature of the service).
• New Scalability Constraints. By giving up a global unique namespace
for resources, we need some way to uniquely identify a resource. For this reason,
we require forwarders to generate unique, self-certifying identifiers and concate-
nate these identifiers with the local names of resources to uniquely identify the
resources, and these identifiers of forwarders must be propagated with directory
entries through the PAN overlay. Also, there seems to be an inherent trade-
off between the ratio of forwarders to directory servers and the frequency of
updates for particular directory entries.
Regarding “reasonable” scalability, consider that there are serious limits to the
theoretical scalability of BGP4 (109), the de facto protocol for interdomain
routing, and nonetheless this system is quite functional and useful on a global
scale. The propagation of routing updates through PAN follows a similar pat-
tern. Note also that one clear alternative to propagating routing updates is
performing queries (and possibly caching results); this approach introduces a
different set of scalability concerns and also complicates connection setup.
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The granularity with which PAN clients describe perspectives also affects scal-
ability. If clients are allowed to specify perspectives very precisely and the
network grows large, then directory servers will not be able to handle the num-
ber of entries or volume of control plane traffic. Section 5.5 presents a detailed
discussion of the tradeoff between query expressivity and table size.
• New Namespace Challenges. We argue that we do not really need globally
unique identifiers across all components that want to talk with the outside world,
but only a way to uniquely identify resources.
1.6 Outline
The aforementioned design tradeoffs frame the discussion of our architecture and
implementation. We continue this discussion in Chapter 5. We organize the remainder
of the thesis into six chapters, as follows:
• The second chapter provides necessary background, including a survey of related
work, an examination of the thesis in the context of extant literature, and an
exploration of literature that addresses problems associated with overcoming
fragmentation and providing locality.
• The third chapter conveys the design of the overlay network, including argu-
ments supporting the design, a discussion of both technical and non-technical
aspects of its applicability, and a characterization of what kinds of perspectives
can be propagated through the network. We also present Blossom, our real-
ized PAN prototype, we characterize the requirements for the transport-layer
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tunnelling infrastructure upon which it relies.
• The fourth chapter describes the directory service, including its discovery mech-
anism, the interaction between forwarders and directory servers, and the manner
in which perspective data are propagated through the network. We present a
policy framework for specifying which perspective attributes and forwarder de-
scriptors to propagate, and we argue that this framework is sufficient to meet
the requirements for deployability and provider incentives.
• The fifth chapter presents an evaluation of Blossom, including both experimen-
tal results and some theoretical reasoning about performance tradeoffs. The
experimental results provide insight into the central scalability tradeoffs as ob-
served by clients, the directory service, and the network itself. In addition,
we describe some strategies for implementing filtering policies and using ag-
gregation to improve scalability. We provide evidence that the routing tables
in directory servers are manageable for a set of practically useful perspective
queries. We conclude this section with a discussion of factors contributing to
the socioeconomic impact of Perspective Access Networks.
• The final chapter concludes by re-examining the costs and benefits of Perspec-
tive Access Networks in the context of the Internet of today. We consider the
technical, social, and political implications of this tool in the context of the
tussle spaces (28) and end-to-end arguments (27) presented earlier. We spec-
ulate about how the landscape might change, and we provide the groundwork
for future research projects in related areas.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter provides a literature search to position Perspective Access Networks
in the context of prevailing work in the field. In general, we consider systems from
the following areas:
• Routing: the process of moving traffic around in a network so that it reaches
the correct destination, including methods for robustness against transient net-
work malfunctions, accidental misconfiguration, or shortcomings related to slow
routing convergence.
• Indirection: the method of communicating indirectly by using proxies or
waypoints to circumvent systemic reachability problems.
• Interoperating with Middleboxes: either providing a means by which ex-
isting middleboxes can function without violating central Internet design prin-
ciples or providing a more versatile Internet architecture in which the benefits
of middleboxes can be achieved less intrusively.
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• Decoupling Policy from Mechanism: approaches to improve the ability
for network mechanisms to incorporate, exchange, or negotiate policy. Mech-
anisms sometimes implicitly dictate policy, even when actual (stated) policy
differs from that which is implemented by the mechanism.
• Anonymity Networks: networks that allow participating users to obfuscate
their identities or network locations.
• Covert Communication: a method of disguising traffic so that it blends in
with existing traffic in a network or channel.
• Embracing Heterogeneity: the principle that an appropriate way to man-
age inconsistency is to create useful bridges between inconsistent components
rather than impose some kind of universal organizational framework.
• Distributed Directories: any of a number of methods to improve the
performance or functionality of distributed data stores, including caching and
delegation.
Various systems from the literature address problems related to network fragmen-
tation, and the design of PAN adapts aspects of their approaches to the problem
of accessing content within a fragmented network. From a network standpoint, the
goals of Perspective Access Networks are most similar to FARA (Section 2.4.1) and
Plutarch (Section 2.7.2). From an end-to-end standpoint, the goals of Perspective
Access Networks are most similar to Platypus (Section 2.4.2) and Tor (Section 2.5.1).
In the sections to follow, we differentiate PAN from these systems. Table 2.1, located
at the end of the chapter, provides a summary.
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2.1 Routing
Routing is essential to a Perspective Access Network, since the data sent by a client
must find its way through the network to a forwarder whose perspective matches the
requirements specified by the client. First, we consider interdomain routing, a large-
scale, policy-driven system implemented by the Border Gateway Protocol. Then, we
consider routing within overlay networks.
2.1.1 Interdomain Routing
There are tens of routing protocols; they can be broadly split into two cate-
gories: intradomain, or internal, routing protocols, and interdomain, or external,
routing protocols. Organizations under cohesive administrative control (companies,
universities, Internet service providers) use intradomain routing protocols to ex-
change information about how to reach machines within their own purview. In-
terdomain routing protocols are used to exchange and propagate reachability in-
formation between such organizations. This split reflects the coarse structure of
the Internet: many networks connected to each other. It also reflects the differ-
ent needs and requirements for routing protocols for use in intra- versus interdomain
routing. While there are several internal routing protocols in use today, there is
only one interdomain routing protocol: the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (109;
124).
BGP views the Internet as a collection of interconnected autonomous systems.
An autonomous system (AS) is a portion of the network under single administrative
control (at least as far as routing is concerned). Each AS connects to other ASes; the
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routers in each AS that connect to their counterpart in other ASes are called border
routers. These neighboring border routers connect directly to each other, that is,
there are no routers between them. (This is not strictly true, nor is the assertion that
only neighboring routers speak BGP to each other, but the details are beyond the
scope of this discussion.) Over this direct connection, border routers establish BGP
sessions; there may be many BGP sessions over each link, but there are (almost) never
BGP sessions between non-neighboring routers. BGP sessions are used to exchange
network reachability information—each router tells its neighbor what address ranges
(also known as address prefixes, or just prefixes) to which it knows how to route
traffic, along with ancillary information that is used to make the decision of whether
this router will actually be used to route that part of the address space.
As BGP provides information for controlling the flow of packets between ASes,
the protocol plays a critical role in Internet efficiency, reliability, and security.
Two of the most significant concerns facing modern interdomain routing are pro-
tocol oscillations and security vulnerabilities (43). Section 5.2.3 describes how the
PAN directory service compares to BGP with respect to these issues.
Like the distribution of routing information within BGP, the distribution of reach-
ability information within Perspective Access Networks may potentially grow to large
scales, and distribution points for such information will be operated by parties with
an interest in specifying policy. Chapter 4 illustrates a means by which individual
PAN directory servers may specify local policy, and Chapter 5 describes a number of
approaches for promoting scalability and resource management.
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2.1.2 Overlay Routing
Andersen et al. (5) propose the use of Resilient Overlay Networks (RON) to ad-
dress certain limitations of the interdomain routing protocol BGP (109), including (a)
slow recovery from failures, (b) insensitivity to specific requirements of applications,
and (c) insufficient flexibility in supporting policies.
RON has three goals: (a) provide additional robustness in the event of localized
network malfunction, specifically recover from malfunctions faster than BGP, (b)
provide tighter integration with applications to allow them some control over the
underlying routing, and (c) provide the ability to express more complex policies than
those that can be expressed via BGP. RON provides an overlay infrastructure that
participating nodes within the Internet can use to attain these additional benefits.
Like PAN, RON aims to overcome network obstructions. However, its purpose is
essentially limited to finding alternate routes more effectively than BGP. Thus, it
does not address our interest in locality or decentralized management.
In essence, RON is a response to several of the shortcomings of BGP, namely (a)
slow recovery from failures, (b) insensitivity to specific requirements of applications,
and (c) insufficient flexibility in supporting policies. As the RON authors note, BGP
avoids providing these benefits in the interests of scalability. The scalability of RON
is fundamentally limited by its design, but the question remains whether it will have
benefit to smaller communities who want to achieve robustness and policy benefits
within their local group.
Like our proposed system, RON aims to overcome network obstructions. However,
as described in Section 1.1.2, Perspective Access Networks do not (in general) attempt
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to handle the transient routing failures addressed by RON. While RON may compen-
sate for the shortcomings associated with slow BGP convergence, PAN compensates
for long-term unreachability, such as that imposed by policy or filtering mechanisms.
In addition, we believe that PAN is more scalable than RON; we provide evidence for
its scalability in Chapter 5.
2.2 Indirection
The PAN architecture is designed to create a general means of providing access
to services that are not accessible directly. There exist a few approaches to bridging
regions of the network that are not directly connected that have been proposed.
2.2.1 Internet Indirection Infrastructure
The Internet Indirection Infrastructure (I3) (125) provides a “rendezvous-based
communication abstraction” in which providers of services advertise to a particular
location in the network, and those peers requesting services communicate with that
location rather than with the provider directly. Indeed, services like anycast (103),
multicast (37), and mobility (119; 120) all require some measure of “indirection”.
I3 offers a standard substrate upon which all of these can be built and provides
mechanisms for achieving composition of services, scalable multicast, etc., which have
tangible benefit in the real world. The authors present how the functionality of various
existing systems for providing these services can be achieved with I3.
Finally, I3 provides useful delegation primitives that serve as inspiration for DOA,
which we discuss in Section 2.3.
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Services in I3 are registered with the infrastructure, whereas in PAN, only the
perspectives are registered with the infrastructure, and a client can use a perspective
to access any resource that a perspective can contact directly (provided that the host
offering the perspective allows such access).
2.2.2 TRIAD
Systems for “content routing” often employ overlays to organize content logically
and providing suitable naming infrastructures to enable a means of accessing arbitrary
resources (20; 60). TRIAD (23) characterizes the Internet as a set of regions with
local addressing, arranged such that some peers have access to multiple regions. The
authors justify this characterization by noting the preponderance of NAT boxes. Peers
with access to multiple address spaces use a protocol called WRAP to relay content
between different regions of the network in a stateless manner. As packets pass
between different address spaces, a middlebox bridging the two spaces modifies the
addresses in the packet headers.
TRIAD uses globally unique hierarchical, DNS-style names to identify networks,
and the authors propose a modified BGP to propagate suffixes for these names, rather
than prefixes for IPv4 addresses. This modified interdomain routing system provides
support for aggregation based upon names (by “suffixes” rather than “prefixes”).
The system raises questions about scalability, since the physical location of domains
within the network topology of the current Internet is arguably correlated much more
closely with address ranges than with domain names, and the number of distinct
domain names immediately descended from top-level domains far exceeds the number
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of prefix entries in existing BGP routing tables.
TRIAD could potentially provide a means by which networks could be connected
to each other in arbitrary topologies independently of a central authority to govern ad-
dresses. However, TRIAD still relies upon the idea that resources must be universally
named, and to this end the authors propose a complex protocol to facilitate routing
according to these names. A later paper by the same authors analyzes the feasibility
of TRIAD (60). The empirical analysis ignores hardware performance inside TRIAD-
enabled routers, presuming that network bandwidth is the limiting factor. Also, the
argument for the degree to which aggregation of names is possible and efficient seems
insufficiently strong.
TRIAD uses globally unique, hierarchical names to identify networks; these names
are propagated throughout the system via BGP-like advertisements among TRIAD
nodes. In PAN, names of resources need not be globally unique, and names of PAN
forwarders are non-hierarchical. TRIAD also requires the middleboxes themselves to
participate in the bridging infrastructure; the PAN architecture does not.
2.3 Interoperating with Middleboxes
Network-layer intermediaries (that is, middleboxes) exist for important reasons
and we have every reason to believe that these reasons will continue to prevail in
the future. Middleboxes are used to solve three problems, and these problems are
unlikely to change substantially in the foreseeable future: (a) bridge IP address spaces
(e.g., NAT/NAPT), (b) discard unwanted packets (e.g., firewalls), and (c) improve
performance (e.g., caching, load balancing). The authors argue that it is difficult and
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costly to administer a network host, and middleboxes help alleviate some of the risks
and complexities.
This section prevents various approaches to the problem of identifying and access-
ing resources through middleboxes.
2.3.1 Host Identity Protocol
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) (90) provides unique identifiers for each commu-
nication endpoint, thus creating an endpoint identifier that is independent of network
location. The idea that every Internet entity can be specified by a unique network
identifier forms the basis for numerous other projects, including DOA (described in
Section 2.3.2).
HIP does not provide a sufficient means of actually locating the endpoints: without
some sort of directory infrastructure, we are left with querying and broadcasting, both
of which are inefficient. We believe that building the directory services constitutes an
interesting technical challenge, which is a key focus of our work. Also, since HIP does
not provide a means by which we can name existing, “legacy” services, every service
that can be designated using HIP must itself be an active participant in HIP. Finally,
since the content of each packet must be encapsulated within a HIP datagram, we need
to either (a) change the protocol stacks at the edges or (b) establish an infrastructure
for tunnelling.
Unlike PAN, HIP creates new identifiers for the transport-layer endpoints, requir-
ing modification to the protocol stack.
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2.3.2 Delegation-Oriented Architecture
The goal of Delegation-Oriented Architecture (DOA) is not so much to argue that
policy should be pushed to the edges of the network, but rather to describe how to
create an Internet architecture that allows middleboxes to perform their functions
without violating two fundamental principles of Internet design. , stated much more
clearly than in the earlier Balakrishnan et al. paper: (a) every Internet entity can be
reached via the use of a unique network identifier, and (b) network elements should
not violate the principles of layering (in the context of this paper, this principle is
essentially the end-to-end argument).
The authors argue in favor of inserting into every packet the globally unique iden-
tifier (such as that offered by HIP) corresponding to the source and target endpoints;
the authors presume that the network will be able to forward replies to the source
by the same method used to forward the original message to the destination. The
authors also argue in favor of using delegation to allow nodes to express how they
can be reached by others. Nodes wanting to access other nodes identify them by an
endpoint identifier (EID), which resolves to either another EID, a list of EIDs, or
an IP address. Such resolution requires an infrastructure, and the authors propose
using a distributed hash table (DHT) for this purpose. Clearly, this choice introduces
a number of concerns in the area of scalability, overhead, complexity, management,
and flexibility, and it might be interesting to consider alternative solutions. Refreshes
to the DHT must occur with a certain regularity, which constitutes overhead that
may be unreasonable for routers. Also, the authors suggest the use of hint fields
to improve performance, but they do not explain the extent to which such use will
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be necessary in order to achieve the desired goals. As with TRIAD, IP addresses
are modified in the headers as packets pass between IP networks with incompatible
address spaces. However, because DOA allows resolution of EIDs to other EIDs,
the authors argue that the advertisement problem observed in TRIAD (for which a
modified name-oriented BGP is proposed) is essentially abstracted away.
One of the interesting observations made by the authors is that today, users are
“typically stuck with whatever middleboxes lie on their path.” DOA would allow
users to choose their middleboxes and know when middleboxes are in use. Firewalls
could become a tool that end users can explicitly configure; for example, perhaps
firewall information could be auto-configured using DHCP. The most interesting im-
plication is that functionality of a firewall will become orthogonal to topology: for
example, a node could choose to use a firewall by using an EID that would address
packets to the firewall, which could process them and pass them along to the ultimate
destination. From this principle, one could even imagine deriving business models for
firewall service; the authors included a section describing such a service. It would
be interesting to examine whether, given that out-of-band firewalls could exist, or-
ganizations would still have valid reason to impose restrictions on hosts within their
networks.
Unfortunately, there are some substantial deployability concerns with DOA. First,
modifying the TCP and UDP pseudo-checksums as advised to support DOA would
require significant modification to the IP stacks of both clients and servers. The au-
thors spend a section describing an architecture of Network Extension Boxes (NEB),
which would replace NATs in the DOA paradigm. This is one of the most essential
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applications of DOA, and it relies upon a potentially complex set of messages in the
control plane and some (not fully specified) global lookup service. Similarly, the DHT
functionality central to DOA relies upon all DHT nodes being in the same transport
domain, which implicitly requires a well-known core. This raises questions of whether
nodes in the core have to be specially configured, whether they know that they are
in the core, and of course whether the Internet needs to have an inherent hierarchy
in order for NEBs to function. (The authors proceed to analyze three different ap-
proaches to implementation, optimizing for different tradeoffs in the space of sender
computation, NEB computation, and NEB state.)
There are a number of important differences between PAN and DOA. In particular,
PAN aims to provide access to remote resources without the need to modify protocol
stacks. Furthermore, PAN explicitly avoids requiring either all-pairs reachability or
making any assumptions about designation of a particular transport domain as the
well-known core.
2.3.3 Unmanaged Internet Protocol
A position paper introducing Unmanaged Internet Protocol (UIP) (46), which
aims to restore end-to-end connectivity to the Internet by establishing a system for
routing based upon globally unique names chosen by the hosts themselves rather
than assigned by a central authority. The system leverages distributed hash tables
to provide routing based upon the names, which are chosen to be self-certifying and
topology-independent.
The authors acknowledge the fundamental problem associated with naming: while
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a hierarchical assignment of addresses effectively provides efficiency and scalability,
the same hierarchy creates inflexibility at the edges of the network. Specifically, there
exist problems with mobility (i.e., changing location in the topology requires changing
address), allocation (i.e., obtaining an address requires special dispensation from the
management of the hierarchy), and consistency (i.e., everyone must believe in the
same hierarchy), among others.
The DHT that UIP uses requires all-pairs universal connectivity among nodes,
but the authors want to support any topology. The solution they propose involves
using a recursive technique to effectively generate a source route to any possible the
destination, thus allowing universal connectivity. The details of this argument are not
fully clear, and it remains to be seen whether this approach to maintaining universal
connectivity as required by the DHT is actually efficient and functional in practice,
particularly when the topology changes frequently and many nodes are unreliable.
While UIP provides a step in the direction of universal access and distributed
management, its goals are different from those of PAN. First, UIP concerns itself only
with identification of UIP-enabled resources, rather than accessing existing resources
using UIP. Second, UIP does not address locality issues as we define them; it aims to
create a single, flat Internet space rather than promote the idea of separate views of
the space.
2.3.4 IPNL
IPNL (47) adds an overlay layer above IPv4 that would be routed by NATs and
makes use of Fully Qualified Domain Names as end system identifiers in packets. Like
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PAN, IPNL intends to provide end-to-end connectivity across NATs. Unlike PAN,
IPNL allows its routers to remain stateless. However, IPNL is site-centric, requir-
ing special configuration and deployment of “frontdoors” that connect independently
managed networks to an established core. PAN makes no such assumptions, instead
requiring only that there exists a forwarder capable of reaching the target network and
that that forwarder has the ability to bidirectionally communicate with another for-
warder in the PAN overlay. Also, PAN does not require any changes to the operating
systems of end hosts.
2.4 Decoupling Policy from Mechanism
Policy and mechanism are often tightly intertwined, and sometimes mechanism
itself imposes policy. For example, the inability for a client to identify a resource by
name may prevent the client from accessing the resource. Overly-broad firewall rules
might be easy to implement while exceptions and the concomitant accounting infras-
tructure might be difficult, even if stated policy allows such exceptions. We consider
a few projects that incorporate approaches to separating policy from mechanism.
Separating filtering policy from filtering mechanism is a central design objective for
Perspective Access Networks.
2.4.1 FARA/NewArch
The FARA proposal (26; 27) specifies a general framework for decoupling iden-
tity from network location. FARA aims to provide associations between peer nodes
without requiring that all entities share a common, global namespace; in this sense,
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its goals are similar to ours. FARA makes use of “forwarding directives” to establish
rendezvous points through the infrastructure between a source and a destination; a
shim protocol between IP and the transport layer used to support this functionality
is reminiscent of TRIAD. FARA is structured so that discovery may be handled by
higher layer services; the location of an entity is defined by the forwarding directive,
which may be obtained via the rendezvous mechanism or a FARA directory service,
for example. By not requiring all entities to share a common, global namespace, one
can argue that FARA takes a step toward our goals of distributed management and
locality. However, the authors do not seem to envision this possibility in their test
implementation, M-FARA, which avoids the “complexity” associated with dealing
with an unstructured Internet by relying upon a well-known Internet core.
In addition to being largely unspecified, FARA requires modification to existing
protocols and applications. The circuit discovery process in PAN may be considered
a natural extension of the FARA forwarding directive.
2.4.2 Platypus
Snoeren and Raghavan (121) argue that routing policy should be enforced on the
forwarding plane rather than on the control plane, as it is done today with BGP4.
The authors propose a new routing architecture, Platypus, which uses loose source
routing (LSR) to allow fine-grained, policy-aware route selection by the sender.
In Platypus, autonomous systems advertise all available routes, irrespective of
policy, along with “network capability” metadata. Loose source routing information
would be included in each packet, allowing end users to take advantage of Platypus
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directly. Also, routers within the network could use the metadata to improve route
selection. Most notably, this work presents a major paradigm shift: instead of requir-
ing that local policies dictate all routing, propagate advertisements deeper into the
network so that hosts and networks can make more informed decisions. Let those who
need to use the route make the routing decisions, and rely upon filtering techniques
to guarantee that routes incompatible with policy are not used.
However, there are a number of serious flaws with this approach. First, we have
the fundamental question of whether such measures are actually useful. The authors
claim that certain desirable end-to-end polices “require the composition of multiple
local policies,” but they fail to provide an example, let alone an empirical description
of the nature and prevalence of such situations in the Internet today. Are there actu-
ally any cases in which ISPs could benefit substantially from deriving richer policies
via composition? What’s more, it ultimately depends upon ISPs being on board,
willing to advertise routes that they themselves would prefer not to use. Perhaps the
justification is that ISPs can filter non-compliant traffic, but ultimately, if an ISP
does not want to forward traffic in a particular direction, it has no reason to advertise
such a possibility.
Another problem with the Platypus approach is that it does not take into consid-
eration the computational and storage constraints facing routers. The authors argue
that export of all possible routes could provide more alternatives, but exporting all
possible routes (a) increases network overhead by expanding the set of advertised
routes, (b) increases storage constraints at each router by prescribing that it should
store (and forward) the advertised routes, and (c) increases computational constraints
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at each router if it is required to make decisions based upon network capabilities meta-
data or dynamically choose among several possible routes on a per-packet basis.
The authors’ intended scheme for authentication of routes and capabilities relies
upon many secrets – which means some sort of key infrastructure. Arguably this
is complex and is difficult to scale. Also, present billing systems may be unable to
handle the complexity of arrangements associated with charging particular principals
for use of capabilities; the authors do nothing to describe the business implications
of the management constraints. Even more striking is the fact that the proposed
cryptographic system used allows replay attacks; the authors acknowledge this but
provide only a weak solution.
Unlike PAN, Platypus relies upon cooperation from intermediary ISPs. In PAN,
we assume that if an ISP does not want to forward traffic in a particular direction, it
has no reason to do so and no reason to advertise such a possibility either. However,
PAN presents an argument for separating network access policy from technical deci-
sions made at the network layer. If two PAN forwarders are both connected to the
same PAN overlay, then technically speaking, each could have access to whatever the
other can see, regardless of what lies between.
2.5 Anonymity Networks
Anonymity networks seek to separate routing information from identity, with the
following goals in mind: (a) communicating parties will not be able to identify each
other based upon their network location, and (b) the network itself will not be able
to determine that two parties are communicating. In the examples we consider, these
Chapter 2: Related Work 61
goals are achieved by the deployment of an overlay network that carries traffic along
a multi-hop path between the source and the destination.
Since the PAN architecture also requires an overlay network that carries traffic
along a multi-hop path, there are important structural similarities between Perspec-
tive Access Networks and anonymity networks.
Anonymity networks can be used for anti-censorship purposes, specifically to cir-
cumvent local restrictions on access to resources. However, since the Internet is not
entirely flat, the resources to which a user of these networks (or of Psiphon) has
access may vary as a function of the particular overlay node (or Psiphon host) that
is used as the last-hop proxy. For example, requesting a particular web page from
an anonymity network might yield content that has been tailored to the particular
local network or geographic region in which the last-hop proxy resides. If anonymity
is the goal, then a larger anonymity set may be worth the cost of some probabilis-
tic variation in content reachability. PAN takes the opposite approach, choosing to
use an overlay proxy network to tailor content reachability, possibly at the expense of
anonymity. In particular, PAN clients require the ability to specify a path based upon
what resources they want to access; obfuscation of their identities is not required.
2.5.1 Tor
Tor (38) is an anonymity network derived from the original Onion Routing project
sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory (53). Onion routing works by having
a sender specify a chain of n proxies within the network, such that data will traverse
each of the n proxies in sequence en route to the specified recipient. To ensure
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that datagrams take the correct path, the client encrypts the message several times,
starting with the most distant proxy in the chain, each time including the address
of the next hop along with the ciphertext created in the previous iteration. The
successive layers of encryption shape the “onion” analogy: each successive proxy
“unravels one layer of the onion” to expose the identity of the next proxy to which to
forward the datagram. The result is that, in theory, each proxy in the chain knows
nothing about the chain itself other than the identities of the previous proxy and the
next proxy in the sequence.
Tor operates as a transport-layer proxy, providing some enhancements over onion
routing as originally described. In particular, Tor forwards entire TCP streams, not
individual IP packets, through its overlay network. Tor manages this by having clients
construct circuits, one hop at a time, using a method with security properties similar
to conventional onion routing. Once a circuit has been established, TCP streams may
be “attached” to the circuit. More than one TCP stream can share a circuit, and
individual links between proxies in the overlay may carry traffic for multiple circuits.
Figure 2.1: Client Perspective Diagram: Tor. How the components of Tor
are organized, from the perspective of a client.
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Tor uses SOCKS (78) as an interface to its network of forwarders that carry
arbitrary TCP traffic as well as DNS requests. Tor uses a set of directory servers
that publish descriptors for individual forwarders. A descriptor carries all of the
details that a client needs to make use of a forwarder in building circuits, including
its identity, its public key, its IP address, its TCP port number, and some statistics.
The descriptor also provides the exit policy, which specifies the set of IP address
and TCP port ranges to which a forwarder is willing to provide access as an exit
node. Client applications send datagrams to the SOCKS proxy interface of the Tor
client, and the Tor client uses descriptors obtained from the directory server to build
a random path through the Tor network to the application server it wishes to contact
(refer to Figure 2.1).
OR  1Alice OR  2
"HTTP GET..."
. . . . . .. . .
(TCP handshake)
website
{X}−−AES encryption
E(x)−−RSA encryption
Legend:
(link is TLS−encrypted)
Relay c1{Extend, OR2, E(g^x2)}
Relay c1{{Begin <website>:80}}
Relay c1{Extended, g^y2, H(K2)}
Relay c2{Begin <website>:80}
Relay c1{{Connected}} Relay c2{Connected}
Relay c1{{Data, "HTTP GET..."}} Relay c2{Data, "HTTP GET..."}
(link is TLS−encryped) (unencrypted)
cN−−a circID
Relay c1{{Data, (response)}}
(response)Relay c2{Data, (response)}
Created c2, g^y2, H(K2)
Create c2, E(g^x2)
Create c1, E(g^x1)
Created c1, g^y1, H(K1)
Figure 2.2: Circuit Establishment in Tor. Circuits in Tor are extended one
hop at a time, with a single end-to-end round-trip required for each extension. (This
diagram is reprinted with permission from the authors of Tor.)
Tor clients manage the construction of circuits, randomly selecting source routes
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through the overlay network and extending individual circuits one hop at a time
according to the chosen source routes (Figure 2.2 provides an illustration). When
the Tor client receives a TCP stream from an application, it “attaches” the stream
to an appropriate circuit by having the last hop (the “exit forwarder”) of the circuit
perform a TCP handshake with the remote server. Once the handshake has been
completed, the client may communicate with the remote server via the circuit.
Tor also provides hidden services, which are location-hidden servers that can be
accessed by clients via self-certifying identifiers.
The ability to have traverse a path through the network to a specified exit point is
an essential requirement of PAN, so the Tor architecture presents a useful framework
upon which to build a PAN implementation. Our test implementation, Blossom, uses
Tor for circuit-building and data transport; the details of how Blossom uses Tor are
presented in Section 3.4.
2.5.2 ANON
ANON (76) is similar to Tor in that it too uses onion routing to separate network
location from identity. However, unlike Tor, ANON operates at the network (IP)
layer, so individual packets (rather than entire end-to-end streams) are forwarded in-
dependently through the infrastructure. Unlike Tor, ANON uses link-padding tech-
niques to provide some protection against timing attacks and rate-limiting to pro-
vide some protection against denial-of-service. This approach significantly reduces
the throughput capacity of ANON, so it can only be used for signalling and other
low-bandwidth applications. The potential to support low-latency, high-bandwidth
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applications makes Tor a more appropriate choice for the kinds of applications that
interest us, but it is entirely conceivable to build a Perspective Access Network that
uses ANON as a forwarding substrate.
2.6 Covert Communication
Sometimes, disguising the identities of the communicating parties is insufficient;
evading discovery may require hiding the fact that communication is taking place at
all. Traditionally, this is the realm of steganography, the practice of ensuring that
the existence of a message is known only to the intended recipient. We refer to a
medium capable of carrying a secret message without exposing its existence as a
covert channel. We do not provide a treatment of steganography or covert channels
here; refer to the whitepaper by Johnson and Jajodia for an introduction (70).
2.6.1 Psiphon
Psiphon (68) is a proposed1 single-hop proxy application used to circumvent con-
tent filtering. A host outside the filtering regime installs the Psiphon proxy software,
and remote hosts that are connected to the Internet via networks controlled by the
filtering regime can use the proxy to access blocked web sites. Psiphon is a personal
(rather than general-use) circumvention tool, which means that while Psiphon users
must establish out-of-band trust relationships with parties on the other side of the
filtering regime, Psiphon offers some degree of protection against the threat of an
adversary enumerating the list of proxies.
1Psiphon (Frequently Asked Questions), http://psiphon.civisec.org/
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While PAN provides no explicit means of establishing social networks and au-
thenticating parties based upon reputation or status within the social network, PAN
forwarders certainly have the option of refusing to extend circuits for any reason,
and failure to authenticate via some out-of-band mechanism could potentially be a
perfectly valid reason.
2.6.2 Infranet
Infranet (44) is an anti-censorship system in which various web servers distributed
throughout the Internet cooperate to provide a covert channel through which users
can access censored web resources. The idea is that traffic sent through the covert
channel will appear to be ordinary web traffic, and users of the channel will have
plausible deniability about their participation.
Perspective Access Networks do not provide covert channels. In theory, PAN
traffic could be sent over covert channels, and doing so may enhance the usefulness
of PAN. For example, certain PAN instances (e.g., those designed to allow dissidents
to access content from deep inside oppressive regimes) may benefit from the secrecy
that covert channels provide.
2.7 Embracing Heterogeneity
Much of the literature about middleboxes and network fragmentation focus upon
means of mitigating the problems associated with middlboxes, working around in-
consistencies among networks, and generally incentivizing Internet participants to
play by the rules of some global system in which consistency prevails. However,
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some projects present intriguing arguments in favor of the principle that perhaps the
Internet should not be totally flat after all.
2.7.1 Semantic-Free Referencing
Semantic-Free Referencing (141) stipulates that resources have globally-unique
“semantic-free tags”, high-entropy bit strings perhaps generated as self-certifying
names by the resource provider. A client would use the semantic-free tag rather
than a hostname to identify the website, and a Reference Resolution Service (RRS)
would map human-readable names to semantic-free tags. The goal is to decouple
the name of a resource from its content; note that this is subtly different from the
naming locality goal of PAN. The possibility of having multiple different RRS servers
suggests that this approach could lead to a form of locality, since different local
regions or classes of organizations could use different RRS servers to canonicalize
human-readable names. The authors provide little discussion of how multiple RRS
servers could conceivably exist in practice, or why a single RRS infrastructure similar
to DNS would not emerge, other than to suggest that there could be a competitive
market.
Indeed, the value of DNS hostnames is apparent from the many costly disputes
associated with namespace contention. (Parenthetically, use of HTTP virtual hosts
is one way in which web servers separate their content from their network-layer ad-
dress; the HTTP Host field allows the same server to house websites corresponding
to multiple DNS hostnames, each with its own distinct set of files and configuration
parameters.) The Web is undoubtedly a contributor to this phenomenon, since in-
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dividual websites are identified by their DNS hostnames. It may be useful for Web
content providers to separate their websites from their DNS names, and it may be
useful for owners of DNS hostnames to be able to separate the names from Web
content in order to avoid expensive disputes.
To address this problem, the authors propose “semantic-free referencing” (SFR),
which is a means of providing globally unique names in the form of “semantic-free
tags”, high-entropy bit strings perhaps generated as self-certifying names by the web-
site owners themselves. It is possible to imagine a “search-engine only” world without
DNS, in which a client might obtain a semantic-free tag for a website from a search
engine and subsequently use this tag rather than a hostname to identify the website,
and a field for this tag could be used in place of the HTTP Host field. Since these
tags would not have semantic meaning to humans, the authors propose a Reference
Resolution Service (RRS) to map human-readable names to semantic-free tags.
The possibility of having multiple different RRS servers suggests that this ap-
proach could lead to a form of locality, since different local regions or classes of
organizations could use different RRS servers to canonicalize human-readable names.
The authors provide little discussion of how multiple RRS servers could conceivably
exist in practice, or why a single RRS infrastructure similar to DNS would not emerge,
other than to suggest that there could be a competitive market.
Not only does PAN aim to provide locality to Internet services in general rather
than exclusively the web, but the approach PAN takes to locality is quite different.
PAN still relies upon regular DNS, but allows the DNS hierarchy to be different from
the perspective of each forwarder. While this does not provide the same flexibility as
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SFR, it mitigates some of the same concerns.
2.7.2 Plutarch
Plutarch (34) takes the leap of considering network fragmentation as the inevitable
result of political or economic forces rather than some technical obstacle to be over-
come. The authors convincingly argue that avoiding global management would pro-
mote innovation. Like PAN, Plutarch does not require a well-defined Internet core
or global names. Plutarch “contexts” are similar to the “fragments” that we de-
scribe. However, like IPNL and unlike PAN, Plutarch requires these contexts to be
well-defined and non-overlapping. Moreover, Plutarch requires special configuration
of middleboxes that serve as the boundaries between contexts. Plutarch also resolves
names via a peer-to-peer search, which PAN avoids that approach in favor of reducing
overhead and improving connection setup time.
2.8 Distributed Directories
The directory in PAN is distributed among a potentially large number of individ-
ual directory servers, which perform not only a routing function analogous to BGP
participants but also a lookup function by which they provide information to clients
so that they can select a path through the infrastructure. Delegation and caching
methods can improve scalability and performance, so we consider how these methods
are applied in the context of existing systems.
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2.8.1 Domain Name System
The Domain Name Service (87; 88) is the widely used directory service for res-
olution of hostnames and IP addresses in the Internet. DNS names are constructed
and resolved, and updates are propagated across DNS servers in a hierarchical man-
ner. The PAN forwarder ID space is flat because forwarders use self-generated, self-
certifying identifiers. This means PAN directory servers can neither take advantage
of the hierarchical approach of DNS nor can perform aggregation of forwarder iden-
tifiers as they propagate forwarder information through the directory service. The
latter approach is that used by BGP (124), which aggregates prefix information to
reduce the number of entries BGP has to carry and store. We explore the design
tradeoffs that arise from our approach in Chapter 3.
2.8.2 Filesharing Networks
Peer-to-peer file sharing systems dominate Internet traffic today. These systems
require functionality that allows peers to resolve files (or file attributes) of interest to
IP addresses of hosts that store the files. Some peer-to-peer systems use a centralized
approach to providing this lookup functionality. For example, Napster placed the
entire index of (filename, IP address) mappings on a single host. Apart from the
potential scalability concerns, this approach assumes clients can access the centralized
index. In PAN, we build our directory service taking into account that the Internet
is fragmented and not all clients can necessarily reach one single directory server.
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) (such as CAN (107) and Chord (126)) distribute
this load across the participating peers. DHTs tightly control both the placement
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of mappings on peers and the overlay topology which allows the efficient lookup of
mappings. DHTs also assume that peers will be able to bidirectionally communicate
with the peers that have been assigned to be their neighbors barring transient network
partitions. Finally, unstructured peer-to-peer file sharing networks, such as Gnutella2
provide an “ad hoc” directory lookup service in that lookup queries flood the network
in search of a peer who may have the mapping of interest. PAN is designed with
the goal of minimizing connection setup latency for clients connecting to arbitrary
services. Thus, clients do not request forwarder information via flooding because
connection set up latency would grow quickly with population size. In contrast, file-
sharing networks, minimizing the lookup time is not of priority because file download
time dominates lookup time.
2.8.3 Cooperative Web Caching
Various systems been proposed to allow groups of participating caches to track
what web objects are cached at what proxies and to exchange cached web content
amongst themselves. The overall goal is to bring a particular web object to the
cache that is closest to the clients requesting that web object. Previous proposals
include hierarchical cache schemes (e.g., (21; 71; 143; 31)), hash-based schemes (71;
136), directory-based schemes (42; 86; 130), and multicast-based schemes (e.g., (131)).
All of these schemes assume that any proxy participating in the cooperative caching
scheme can communicate bidirectionally with any other proxy; PAN does not have
this option.
2Gnutella Protocol Specification, http://www9.limewire.com/developer/gnutella protocol
0.4.pdf
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BGP × × × × ×
RON × × × × ×
I3 × × × ×
TRIAD × × × × × × ×
HIP × × × × ×
DOA × × × × × ×
UIP × × × × × ×
IPNL × × × × × ×
FARA/NewArch × × × × × × × ×
Platypus × × × × × ×
Tor × × ◦ × ×
ANON × × × × ×
Psiphon × × × ×
Infranet × × × ×
SFR × × × ×
Plutarch × × × × ×
DNS × × × ×
P2P Filesharing ◦ ◦ × ×
Web Caching × × ×
VPN × × × ×
PAN × × × × × × ×
Table 2.1: Summary of Related Projects. A marked cell indicates that the
system has the given property: a cross (×) denotes always, and a circle (◦) denotes
partially, optionally, or under some circumstances.
Chapter 3
Network Architecture
In this chapter, we address the technical aspects of the approach used by Perspec-
tive Access Networks to overcome Internet fragmentation. Our central argument is
that we can build an overlay network to bridge fragmented portions of the underlying
network, and we show that a single set of interconnected forwarders can be used for
this purpose. We presume that each part of the fragmented Internet is visible from
at least one of these forwarders. There are three aspects to constructing the overlay
network:
• Aspect “A”: Construct a system for identifying perspectives such that clients
can identify and describe the perspective from which they want to access Inter-
net resources.
• Aspect “B”: Construct a system for advertising perspectives through the net-
work so that a path through the network from a client to a perspective can be
determined.
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• Aspect “C”: Construct a system for transporting the application messages
from the client to the application server once the path through the overlay
network has been determined.
Chapter 4 addresses aspect “B.” This chapter, which addresses aspects “A” and
“C,” is arranged into six sections. The first section gives an overview of the architec-
ture and describe the principal architectural challenges. The second section describes
some of the challenges to deployment. The third section carefully defines a language
for describing perspectives and defines how requests for particular perspectives are to
be formed. The fourth section provides details describing our prototype implemen-
tation, including requirements for the system that we use for the control plane. The
fifth section describes how to extend PAN to incorporate authentication of clients
by the forwarder offering the chosen perspective. The final section offers a detailed
description of some practical uses of PAN.
Throughout the remainder of our discussion, we use the term transport domain
to refer to a set of hosts S for which the network provides full transport services to
all pairs (a, b) ∈ S × S. In particular, for our purposes, S is a transport domain if
and only if all pairs of hosts (a, b) ∈ S×S can mutually establish and maintain TCP
sessions to each other.
3.1 Design Challenges
Next, we present the challenges associated with designing the protocol to be used
by Perspective Access Networks. We consider the essential infrastructure components,
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the forwarding of traffic through the network, privacy, identification of resources, sep-
aration of roles, and design of the control plane. These topics are covered, respectively,
in the subsections of Section 3.1.
PAN itself consists of a peer-to-peer overlay network of forwarders, each of which
has access to some set of Internet resources. Before a client can establish a connec-
tion to a forwarder, it must first have possession of a descriptor for that forwarder,
which contains reachability information (for example, the IP address and TCP port
of the service) and its public key. (The descriptors used by Tor (38) as described in
Section 2.5.1 are sufficient for this purpose.)
To achieve universal access, we must provide a means by which all resources can
be named. To this end, we stipulate that names of forwarders are globally unique
within a PAN, and we identify some target resource R as a combination of the name
of a forwarder that can reach R and the name of R as seen by that forwarder. Unlike
Internet hosts, whose addresses are determined by location within the topology and
whose names are apportioned by hierarchical DNS, a PAN forwarder chooses its own
name by generating a self-certifying identifier (defined later) and using that as a
global name. In this sense, each resource accessible via PAN is associated with at
least one unique name, specifically the name resulting from the combination of the
name of the forwarder and the name of the resource as seen from that forwarder. The
novelty of this aspect of PAN is that it allows resources to be globally specified in
the absence of hierarchy. However, the resources themselves are not responsible for
guaranteeing global uniqueness—instead, all that is required is that some particular
forwarder has the ability to identity the resource uniquely.
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The PAN design does not require global agreement about apportionment of names
in favor of allowing different regions of the Internet to have their own namespaces;
a client can implicitly specify the relevant namespace by specifying the perspective
from which it seeks to access a particular resource. This means that PAN allows us
to relax the assumption that all names for Internet resources are globally unique.
The overlay network that connects all of the forwarders to each other consists of a
data plane that carries tunnelled DNS requests and TCP sessions, as well as a control
plane that carries routing information.
3.1.1 Infrastructure Components
The first design challenge involves determining the set of elements that compose
Perspective Access Networks. PAN forwarders identify themselves in two ways, first
by the self-certifying identifiers that they generate for themselves, and second by a
set of characteristics that describe the perspectives and services that they offer. We
describe the mechanical details of perspectives in Section 3.3.
Propagation of Perspectives
We seek to avoid requiring that clients query directories arbitrarily to learn about
how to reach a perspective, so if a client uses a distributed directory service to find
out more about some perspective with some set of characteristics S, then an entry
describing how to reach a perspective matching S should exist in any particular
directory that the client contacts. This means that routing information about S
should propagate all the way from its source (see Figure 3.1). Clients must accept
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Figure 3.1: Propagation of Perspectives. Forwarders propagate their perspec-
tives through the network of directory servers so that they can tell clients how to reach
their desired perspectives. (Perspectives may not propagate to all directory servers.)
that information about a perspective might be filtered out and not propagated via
the directory service (in which case they will either fail or fall back to querying), but
generally, a directory will have the requisite knowledge to assist a client in routing its
packets toward a perspective that suits the request.
Propagation of Forwarder Names
The self-certifying identifiers that specify individual forwarders are determined by
applying a function to a value that the forwarders choose randomly. As a result, the
names of two forwarders do not provide any indication of whether they are proximate
to each other, and there is no way to aggregate forwarder names.
Therefore, if X is a PAN forwarder and we require that any user of the entire
PAN network can identify this particular forwarder explicitly and uniquely by name,
then the name X must propagate to all directory servers used by all clients wishing
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to access a resource via X. This poses a significant challenge to scalability; for
example, BGP routers can only handle a limited number of prefixes and still operate
efficiently. For comparison, as of 23 January 2006, BGP routing tables contained a
total of 179 thousand unique routing prefixes, and even if the maximum possible prefix
aggregation is considered, then a BGP listener might expect to have 100 thousand
unique entries in its table (118). In addition, the hardware present in BGP routers
is designed with routing in mind; we expect that PAN forwarders will ordinarily run
on general-purpose, commodity hardware. Similarly, PAN forwarders may lack the
bandwidth available to BGP routers. So, for small communities with relatively few
forwarders, the ability for directory servers to refer to each forwarder explicitly is
feasible. In sufficiently large PAN networks, we expect that while a client might
be able to refer to some subset of the forwarders explicitly by name, the client will
be unable to refer to the vast majority of forwarders except by characteristic or
membership in some sort of collection. We explore the scalability tradeoffs in detail
in Section 5.5. Refer to Section 3.6 for some practical deployment scenarios for PAN.
PAN clients contact directory servers to obtain information necessary to route
traffic to the forwarders of interest. Each directory server contains some routing in-
formation about perspectives. We do not assume that all directory servers share all
routes with all other directory servers: if the operator of directory server D1 does not
want to share some perspectives with directory server D2, then D2 will not receive
those perspectives from D1. D2 may also receive routes from another directory server
that provides the perspective instead, just like in interdomain routing. An impor-
tant difference is that while interconnection relationships between BGP autonomous
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systems may involve some investment in physical infrastructure, interconnection re-
lationships in PAN require only that peers can use the Internet to connect to each
other. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the majority of the barrier to entry into
such relationships is due to business decision process rather than infrastructure.
Directory updates in PAN are analogous to updates in BGP. Propagating a per-
spective is analogous to propagating a long IPv4 prefix: the advertiser provides the
next hop for data to take en route to the destination. The path-vector algorithm
propagates only one advertisement per forwarder per directory server, thus filtering
undesirable routes and creating a tree rooted at the directory server to which the
forwarder initially published. A client in any transport domain could use a local
directory server to deduce an entire path in this fashion.
Since PAN provides access to perspectives in a meaningful way, we posit that the
relationship between PAN and Virtual Private Networks is analogous to the relation-
ship between the Internet and actual private networks. Extending the analogy, PAN
forwarders are analogous to Internet routers, and PAN directory servers are analogous
to BGP speaker-listeners.
While advertising entire routes for each forwarder to each directory server indi-
vidually may be sufficient from the perspective of clients, it is also inefficient, since
it would require all directory servers throughout the entire network to maintain path
information for all forwarders. The process of propagating and maintaining consis-
tent replicas of forwarder reachability information throughout the entire system could
yield both excessively large tables as well as substantial network and processing over-
head. We apply two techniques to address this problem: semantically meaningful
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perspectives and forwarder summaries.
Semantically Meaningful Perspectives
A perspective is the view of the Internet that a particular forwarder provides.
Rather than propagating individual forwarder information explicitly to its neighbors,
directory servers may choose to propagate only attribute sets, which are semantically
meaningful perspective metadata associated with individual forwarders or aggregates
of such data. These metadata describe the salient characteristics of a perspective,
such as location, policy, and functional capabilities. Metadata about individual per-
spectives are propagated in the same manner as forwarder information. Propagating
perspectives rather than the names of forwarders carries two main advantages:
• Individual directory servers can implement policies that take advantage of these
metadata to determine what kinds of perspectives should be propagated.
• Information stored at directory servers to describe what is available and how to
reach it (henceforth we use the term route to refer to availability information for
a single perspective) carries semantically meaningful information that is more
useful to clients.
• Propagating routes for perspectives rather than for individual forwarders allows
multiple forwarders with sufficiently similar perspectives to be grouped into a
single category. Directory servers can store routing information for categories
rather than the individual members, thus improving scalability.
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Section 3.3 provides a detailed description of the several ways in which PAN
represents individual perspectives. Propagation of metadata, including perspective
data, is covered in Chapter 4.
Forwarder Summaries
Even if we stipulate that clients must be able to specify individual forwarders
explicitly when building circuits, the PAN architecture allows directory servers to
store and forward only next-hop reachability information for individual forwarders, so
that a client seeking a particular forwarder will have enough information to determine
and access another directory server along the propagation path to that forwarder.
Suppose that Alice is a forwarder who advertised her perspective to her local
directory server, and Bob is a client who wants to be able to find Alice starting with
a regular directory lookup. If PAN were arranged hierarchically, then we could use
a DNS-like technique: either Bob or a directory server acting on behalf of Bob could
ascend the tree and descend correspondingly to find Alice. However, PAN is not
hierarchical, so the system must propagate information about the existence of Alice
from her directory server to the directory server used by Bob. Refer to Chapter 4 for
details.
Querying Directories
If Alice wants to talk to Bob from the perspective of Carol, then she will ask her
local directory server for a means of reaching Carol. A successful response from the
directory server will take one of two forms:
Chapter 3: Network Architecture 82
• The name of a directory that Alice can use to build a path to Carol, along with
information for how to reach that directory.
• A list of forwarders through which data can be sent from Alice to Carol.
Details of the query protocol are covered in Chapter 4.
3.1.2 Forwarding Traffic
The second design challenge involves forwarding traffic and providing infrastruc-
ture to link perspectives together. In general, this means using a proxy, i.e., an
intermediary willing to handle requests by forwarding traffic in both directions, to
forward requests from one perspective to another. These requests in turn can be
interpreted by the forwarder providing the perspective sought by the client.
For proxies at the network layer, we will need an encapsulation format that al-
lows IP packets to be unwrapped and reconstructed at each forwarder. IP Address
Encapsulation (IPAE) (32) provides a useful tool for implementing a new protocol
close to the network layer while minimizing deployability concerns.
For proxies above the network layer, there are a number of well-known solutions.
Perhaps foremost is the popular and versatile SOCKS protocol (78), a transport-layer
proxy that provides a general framework for traversing firewalls. For our purposes,
using SOCKS, it is possible to forward requests for any application protocol that uses
TCP. Other popular proxies are application-specific, including HTTP proxies Squid1
1Squid, http://www.squid-cache.org/
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and Privoxy2. Our prototype implementation, described in Section 3.4, uses both
transport-layer and application-layer proxies.
Perhaps the most significant question surrounding our use of forwarders to provide
access lies in the distribution of connection state. Even if we design the service to act
below the transport layer, packets must be able to travel between the client and the
resource in both the forward and reverse directions. There are several general ways
of achieving this goal, including but not limited to the following:
• Option 1. Require that applications have knowledge of the specialized forward-
ing infrastructure. Applications would be able to manage the process of identi-
fying and specifying resources, finding forwarders, and encapsulating datagrams
to be forwarded. The provider of a resource would be responsible for directing
replies back to the requester; perhaps the client application or intermediary for-
warders could modify the application-layer header to provide hints that allow
responses from the application server to propagate back to the client.
• Option 2. Build support for the forwarding infrastructure into the operating
system of both the clients and the servers. As with TRIAD (23), use a protocol
that encapsulates IP and contains a field for specifying forwarders between the
source and the destination of a packet. Either have the original requester spec-
ify the set of forwarders explicitly, or allow this field to grow as each successive
forwarder passes the datagram toward the application server. The application
server or its operating system may use the list of forwarders to direct the re-
sponse.
2Privoxy, a web-scrubbing HTTP proxy that can export traffic via SOCKS4A, http://www.
privoxy.org/
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• Option 3. Maintain connection state within the network. Each forwarder func-
tions in a manner similar to a traditional NAT, maintaining a mapping for indi-
vidual connections that allows them to correctly route replies. Transport-layer
proxies allow this system to be implemented incrementally, without requiring
substantial change on the part of clients, servers, or network infrastructure, but
with the added costs associated with violating the end-to-end principle. An-
other point to consider is that maintaining state means that such state can be
recovered. The core issue with maintaining state is node failure. Specifically,
there are three potential exposure risks: (a) stored connection state may be
suitable for subpoena in a way that ephemeral traffic is not; (b) Internet ser-
vice providers may be given legal authority to collect stored connection state
for their own purposes (cf. the 2004 Massachusetts case affirming the right of
an ISP to monitor the email of its customers that was later overturned (135));
and (c) governments may require Internet service providers to keep records of
traffic entering and leaving their networks (cf. European Union data retention
directive (41)).
Since our objective is to provide perspectives from which current Internet resources
can be accessed (and not to build an overlay network that happens to provide its own
content or services), we choose Option 3, which entails maintaining connection state
at forwarders within the network, even though this violates a central tenet of the
end-to-end principle. We believe that the value of our network in circumventing
existing technical barriers justifies our willingness to rely upon network elements to
store connection-specific data.
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Next, we must determine how much state we should maintain at individual for-
warders and which forwarders should carry which aspects of the connection state. We
must consider the implications of what happens when forwarders crash or lose state,
not to mention whether individual forwarders might sometimes be forced to drop ta-
ble entries to accommodate new connections, and the risk of a denial-of-service attack
that exploits such an approach. Might it be possible to design a way of recovering
connection state even if a forwarder along the path fails? Would there be a way
to replicate state through the system in a manner that mitigates dependency upon
one particular route through the set of forwarders for each connection? Industry re-
searchers have devoted substantial effort to solving the problem of stateful failover
techniques to provide redundancy to network address translators (25).
Our approach must also assure bidirectional communication between application
clients and application servers. It is useful to look to anonymity systems for tech-
niques, since such systems have an intrinsic need to address this problem: commu-
nicating with a party whose identity is hidden is similar to communicating with a
party not reachable from the local perspective. One approach is to have the client
explicitly provide a means by which the exit forwarder can route replies back through
the infrastructure to the client. Mixminion (35) uses specialized reply blocks for this
purpose. Other systems, like Tor (38) and ANON (76) explicitly establish circuits
between a client and a forwarder. I3 (125) allows for the specification of rendezvous
points that allow the client and server communicate indirectly. Architectures designed
to accommodate indirection offer substantial benefits in achieving host mobility (148).
Ultimately, we believe that the most effective means of maintaining connection
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state for individual requests is to build source-routed circuits. Our principal support-
ing arguments are as follows:
• Bidirectional Communication. By establishing circuits, we provide a re-
turn path by which datagrams received from the application server can be for-
warded to the client. Forwarders do not need to know how to reach uniquely-
identified clients, since the system effectively uses the same pipes for both for-
ward and return traffic.
• Ordered Delivery. Most Internet traffic is TCP, so we will want the for-
warder providing the perspective to send its messages in order if possible. This
means that there is a high value for receiving datagrams in order from the client;
having packets take a single path through the overlay facilitates this.
• Performance. Connection setup is expensive; either clients or forwarders
must determine, through a series of lookups, how to forward datagrams through
the overlay. By constructing circuits, we allow clients to bear this burden as
a one-time cost; once the circuit is built it can be reused for the remainder
of a potentially long session. Also, the public-key cryptographic handshakes
necessary to authenticate forwarders along the path are expensive relative to
the symmetric-key operations needed to carry data; by building circuits, we
can establish a session key once for a circuit that can be reused over and over.
(An important disadvantage of the circuit-building approach is susceptibility to
denial-of-service attacks that take place after an application has committed to
using a particular circuit).
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• Security. Source routing allows a client to specify the entire path through the
overlay to the exit forwarder, and onion routing using a system like Tor allows
clients to verify each hop along the path that individual datagrams take. This
verification is particularly important when a client wants to ensure that the
system is providing a perspective that meets the specified criteria. (Note that
it would be possible, though perhaps more cumbersome, to use onion routing
in a network-layer forwarding system like ANON (76), yielding similar security
advantages.)
3.1.3 Privacy
The third design challenge is determining what information to expose, both to ob-
servers and within the network. Unlike some distributed proxy networks, PAN does
not intend to provide anonymity, though it may be used to address the natural con-
flict between anonymity and the unpredictability that occurs from choosing randomly
from a set of different perspectives. Since our system provides connectivity between
end hosts in a manner that may prove incompatible with the interests of operators
providing service between the end hosts, we must choose whether the overlay network
of forwarders is to be secret or public. In a secret network, the identities of partici-
pating forwarders are deliberately obscured, so that while a participant in the system
must know the identities of a small number (possibly one) of other participants, it has
no way of ascertaining the identities of other forwarders. Also, eavesdroppers have no
means of determining whether a given host is participating in the network. In a public
network, the identities of participating forwarders are exposed to public view, such
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that any party may determine the identities of all of the participating forwarders, or
whether any given host is a participant in the network.
One might argue that it is difficult or even impossible to create overlay networks
that are truly secret. There are two essential reasons for this. First, encoding network
traffic in a manner that looks like other traffic is difficult. This is essentially the
steganography problem, which research has demonstrated to be an arms race (8). It
would be possible to encrypt the traffic to look like SSL connections, for example,
but a disproportionate quantity of SSL connections on any given link would arouse
reasonable suspicion. Second, even if it were possible for a system to encode its
traffic such that it is indistinguishable from other traffic on the link, numerous timing
attacks and attacks on various links in the system could be used to determine the
identities of the forwarders.
Furthermore, if forwarders can know each other’s identities, they may be able to
optimize communication through the overlay in ways that would not be feasible if they
were denied access to each other’s identities. The authors of Tor provide some good
arguments for why a public system is both more economical and more practical than a
secret system (38), and we intend for our overlay network to be public as well. There
are several consequences of this decision; in particular, consider the case in which one
user has an upstream Internet service provider who wants to filter communication
between that user and some particular end host.
Like overlay networks that provide anonymity, overlay networks that provide users
with the ability to select their perspectives take a clear position in the tussle between
users demanding greater liberties and the governments and service providers who seek
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to limit or otherwise constrain their activity (28). A secret system aspires to allow
end hosts to communicate even in the event that powerful intermediaries intention-
ally deny direct access, and a public system makes its participants known, allowing
adversaries who control network infrastructure to deny access to the entire overlay
network as a whole (we will return to this point in Chapter 5).
One solution to this problem is “multiplexing” traffic that an adversary has an
interest in filtering with traffic that an adversary has an interest in not filtering.
Suppose that there are two kinds of resources: resources to which the intermediary
is for some reason compelled to provide access, and resources that the intermediary
would prefer to filter. While it may be possible to combine the two in an encrypted
channel, the benefits offered by obfuscation of this sort may be difficult to measure.
Moreover, ease of filtering is important to those offering online services, providing
them with a way of blocking access originating from the overlay network if they so
choose. Finally, a public system stands a better chance of being embraced by Internet
service providers.
Generally speaking, choosing to design a public system means not being able to
provide guaranteed service through networks whose operators are interested in delib-
erately filtering content. Thus, network operators like the government of China could
easily configure border routers surrounding networks in China to disallow contact with
known forwarders in our overlay, and an enterprise interested in controlling the set of
hosts with which its internal users may communicate could use a similar technique.
For these reasons, we consider the space of the problem that we intend to address
to include the following areas: BGP misconfiguration, network malfunction, policy
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decisions of network operators controlling areas of the network on the critical path be-
tween two hosts who want to communicate, policy decisions based upon convenience
or incomplete information, and policy induced by the use of in-band mechanisms to
address access-control problems (refer to Section 1.1.2 or examples of these forms of
fragmentation). We do not intend to address adversaries who control critical path
infrastructure between forwarders, or between users and forwarders, and who intend
to explicitly restrict the use of the forwarding infrastructure. (Nevertheless, we do
consider some adversary models that involve weak adversaries who lack the means or
the intent to efficiently block all nodes in the overlay; refer to Section 3.6 for details.)
3.1.4 Identification of Resources
The fourth design challenge is determining a method for identifying resources
accessible via a Perspective Access Network. The decisions in this space are vital to
defining the scope of compatible implementations, since they define the method by
which users can specify resources outside their local purview.
We first consider the abstract problem of how to refer to resources. The current
Internet refers to resources by either (a) IP addresses unique to the network, which
provide a description of the location of a resource and a local identifier, or (b) DNS
names, whose allocation is the subject of much contention (141). An alternative might
be to use a system like intentional naming (3), in which each resource is known to
applications by some descriptive name (which may be a function of its characteristics,
for example) rather than its location within the network. In Perspective Access
Network, we use a combination of both: by using semantically meaningful descriptions
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of perspectives, we extend the meaning of “location” to potentially make it more
relevant to businesses and end users, while still preserving some notion of referring to
resources by location.
Second, we assert that the names of forwarders must be unique within a PAN. By
requiring global uniqueness, we have assurance that two requesters who refer to the
same network location as viewed from a forwarder with a given name are interested
in the same service. Enforcing global uniqueness is generally difficult, and part of
our goal is to avoid the requirement of a central authority. However, there are ways
of achieving an approximation of global uniqueness (within a PAN) even if strict
global uniqueness (within a PAN) is impossible. One way is for each peer to choose a
random integer from a certain interval. If the interval is sufficiently large, then we can
be assured that there are no conflicts with high probability. One way to provide some
guarantee of uniqueness is to use self-certifying keys (52; 105), a method of implicitly
verifying the holder of a key by using the key. Self-certification allows us to embed
into the identifier of a resource a string that specifies the public key corresponding to a
private key known only by the peer in possession of that resource. The Self-Certifying
File System (83) applies this technique to certify path names, and the technique may
be used to allow providers of resources to authenticate themselves without the need
for a central authority.
Use of public-key technology to provide long-term authenticated identities is not
strictly necessary. After all, most authentication of services in the modern Internet,
virtual private networks and IPSec (73) notwithstanding, is performed at the appli-
cation layer. In this case we may still want to establish a means by which individual
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peers can know that they are communicating with the same party with whom they
had communicated at some earlier time. For this purpose, we consider the use of
Purpose-Built Keys (PBK) (15), which allow the initiator of a conversation to prove
its identity in the future. PBK works by having the initiator generate a public/private
key pair during its first conversation with the receiver, associates it with an ID, and
sends both the ID and the public key to the receiver. Subsequently, when the initiator
needs to prove its identity to the receiver, it sends the ID to the receiver and receives
a challenge, by which it demonstrates knowledge of the associated private key. We
envision the possibility of using a combination of short-term self-certifying identities
and PBK to authenticate forwarders to clients, though our prototype implementation
does not use this approach.
Perhaps the most important problem of naming is the question of how resources
describe themselves to an eager public. If we assume that the Internet is not frag-
mented, and that everyone can access everything made available to the “public”
Internet core, then DNS names are sufficient to describe resources. However, as the
Internet becomes fragmented, naming becomes more difficult. While a DNS name is
still useful if the perspective is known or assumed, providers of Internet resources in
a fragmented world need a means of characterizing the set of perspectives that would
be sufficient to allow access to the resources.
A related problem is that of how to identify connection endpoints, given that
clients may not be able to determine whether two resources are the same given
that they are viewed from two different perspectives. The unique, long-term, self-
generated, self-certifying endpoint identifiers proposed by Balakrishnan et al. (6) may
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address this problem. The details are developed further in the design of DOA (142).
Figure 3.2: Accessing a Resource. The source establishes a connection to
bar.target.org from the perspective of F4. DNS requests and TCP sessions are
both tunneled through the infrastructure.
3.1.5 Separation of Roles
The fifth design challenge lies in determining how the system should be organized
and which roles are played by the individual components. Suppose that the forwarders
have organized themselves into an overlay that can forward TCP traffic. Each for-
warder independently generates a self-certifying identifier, and forwarders throughout
the system refer to other forwarders using these identifiers (see Figure 3.2). As long
as the size of the identifier is sufficiently large and the sources of randomness are suf-
ficiently effective, the chance of a namespace collision among these identifiers within
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the system will be negligible.
Figure 3.3: Multiple Names. A resource need not have only one DNS name within
a PAN. In this example, the target host is known to F3 and F4 as bar.target.org
and to F5 as baz.other.com. Meanwhile, bar.target.org from the perspective of
F6 describes an entirely different resource.
Observe that the combined name “bar.target.org as seen from F4” is glob-
ally unique, but the name was not apportioned by any authority of global scope.
Also, there is no requirement that each resource is associated with exactly one for-
warder; multiple forwarders may be able to reach the same resource, possibly using
different names. See Figure 3.3. In the example provided, the source host may use
any of “bar.target.org as seen from F3,” “bar.target.org as seen from F4,” or
“baz.other.com as seen from F5” to refer to the target server. Another useful feature
of this design is that if the network-layer address or name of a forwarder changes, its
PAN name does not, thus promoting mobility of forwarders.
3.1.6 Control Plane
The final design challenge is designing the control plane. PAN requires clients
to build source-routed circuits to the exit forwarder, which provides the requested
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perspective. Thus, the objective of routing in PAN is to provide clients with a means
of learning how to build a source route to the exit forwarder specified by its PAN
name. There are two fundamental approaches to executing this task, advertisement
and querying.
In the advertisement approach, each forwarder announces its availability to the
entire overlay network using a path-vector flooding protocol similar to BGP. The
primary constraints to this method are that directory servers must be adequately
apprised of changes to availability, and each directory server must maintain entries
that collectively describe all of the currently available forwarders in the system. Scal-
ability of the network is a serious concern with this approach, since (a) all hosts need
to know about all perspectives, (b) self-certifying identifiers cannot be aggregated in
any meaningful way, and (c) even semantically significant perspective metadata may
be difficult to aggregate.
An alternative approach is querying, in which a client who wants to find a route
to some perspective issues a request that is propagated through the network. To
reduce the cost associated with this operation, we may stipulate that each directory
server should maintain cached entries corresponding to recent queries. Scalability is
a concern for this approach as well, but in a different way: as the network grows, the
process of querying takes longer, and many low-latency Internet applications such as
web browsing require short connection setup time. Generally, we seek to minimize
connection setup time, so that users can establish new circuits in real-time.
We believe that a combination of advertisement and querying provides the best
results: aggregation strategies can alleviate some of the burden associated with prop-
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agating advertisements throughout the network, and targeted querying can be effi-
cient, provided that clients have enough information to know which directory servers
to query. In Chapter 4, we describe the roles of advertisement and querying in the
PAN directory service.
Another challenge lies in associating meaningful attributes with individual for-
warders. For example, a user of the system may want a means of accessing a resource
via a forwarder in the Netherlands, but it need not matter which forwarder specifically.
Similarly, a user may want a means of accessing a resource via any forwarder that
provides access to politically-themed blogs. In Section 3.3, we describe a means by
which a requester can specify a set of attributes rather than a particular destination
forwarder.
3.2 Deployment Challenges
Now that the architecture is in place, we focus upon the principal technical prob-
lems related to PAN deployment, which include a number of questions about service
discovery, network organization, and the overall usefulness of the system. Foremost
are the concerns involving how clients learn of the existence or availability of resources
and how forwarders know how to connect themselves to the network and advertise
themselves properly. This section addresses the following questions:
• How does a forwarder discover the resources that it can access?
• How does a forwarder discover other forwarders?
• How does a client discover forwarders?
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• How does the system ensure that forwarders can mutually reach each other?
• How does the system handle namespace collisions?
3.2.1 Resource Discovery
How does a forwarder discover the resources that it can access? This
is essentially a question of self-identification: should we require that forwarders learn
about their environment prior to advertising their existence to the network? If we
assume this requirement, then we can envision several solution candidates:
• Autoconfiguration. A forwarder learns about its perspective by observing
the network-layer configuration of the operating system upon which it is run-
ning. For example, it might learn about the address range of its local network,
whether that range is public or private, whether there are multiple network
interfaces, the physical layer media on each interface, etc.
• Active Probing. A forwarder could learn about its perspective by actively
scanning its environment. For example, it could launch random port scans to
determine what sites it can reach and what ports are unfiltered. At a higher
layer, it might contact individual application servers to determine either (a)
whether the content provided by a particular application server matches what it
expects to find, or (b) whether the application server presents a valid certificate.
• Service Registration. A forwarder could learn specifically about various
services to which it has access using a registration process. This might mean
either (a) stipulating that providers of services explicitly register the services
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with the forwarder in a manner similar to that employed by I3 (125), or (b)
stipulating that forwarders use some underlying autoconfiguration protocol such
as Universal Plug-and-Play (134) or Zeroconf (144; 61) to discover resources
within its local area. Specifically, there are several existing protocols designed
with network browsing in mind, including DNS-Based Service Discovery (24).
On the other hand, perhaps having forwarders actively discover resources within
their local area is not strictly necessary; forwarders could certainly be entirely passive
instead. Consider, for example, the possibility of on-demand discovery via DNS
lookups. A client could request a resource from a forwarder by first sending an
ordinary DNS request. The forwarder would then issue the request on behalf of the
client, and if there is a negative response or no response, then it knows that it is unable
to fulfill the request. Of course, this particular approach means additional delay for
the client, though clients could sometimes benefit if results are cached within the
directory.
A far simpler solution might be to require people deploying forwarders to configure
them with appropriate reachability information, but this might sometimes be overly
burdensome from a usability standpoint. For now, we require only that the directory
service have some uniform description of the perspective provided by an individual
forwarder. While we do not specify explicitly how that description is obtained, we
provide a means by which forwarders can self-identify by providing metadata to the
directory service.
One of the salient features of PAN is that it provides access to existing, legacy
resources, i.e., resources agnostic of PAN itself. The PAN architecture does not
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provide a means of tracking these resources. For example, while it may be possible
to determine that certain URLs yield substantively different websites when viewed
from Germany than when viewed from the US, trying to track all such discrepancies
would be little short of impossible. That said, it would certainly be possible to use
PAN to discover and catalogue such discrepancies.
3.2.2 Network Arrangement
How does a forwarder discover other forwarders? This is the fundamental
question of how forwarders organize. We might imagine an infrastructure in which
forwarders are completely incognizant of each other. Requests to forwarders may be
encapsulated in other requests to forwarders in a manner similar to onion routing,
and clients could describe resources not by particular perspectives, but by explicit
chains of forwarders that happen to lead to the desired perspectives. The problem
with this approach is that requesters of services are then faced with the responsibility
of performing all network discovery, a task that undermines all of the benefits of a
routing infrastructure.
Alternatively, we might implement all forwarders as equal peers, all configured
to function as directory servers that receive the global routing table, all sending and
receiving network reachability updates that affect the global routing table. This is
impractical for several reasons. First, we imagine that most forwarders in a functional
PAN will be leaves, meaning that while they will act as exit forwarders to provide
access to resources, they will not route traffic to other forwarders. The argument
for why leaves should not participate in the global routing table is analogous to the
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interdomain routing argument for why single-homed autonomous systems should not
use public autonomous system numbers: the additional overhead is both costly and
superfluous.3 Second, we can exploit hierarchy by having some forwarders act as
directory servers to speak for large sets of forwarders that share some characteristic
such as physical proximity or access to specific kinds of services. Finally, different for-
warders will have different network connectivity. Some will have Internet connections
that make them suitable as forwarders or directory servers, while others will not.
Therefore, we stipulate that a forwarder that participates in this network need not
perform all functions. Individual forwarders should not be required to forward traffic
to other forwarders, nor should they be required to participate in the directory service.
Similarly, we do not require forwarders to provide perspectives to clients: for example,
individual forwarders may be configured to participate in the global directory and to
route datagrams to other forwarders but not to send data to application servers
external to the PAN. By decoupling the various functions, we allow greater flexibility
for deployment.
At the same time, directory servers tell clients to which directory servers to extend
their circuits next, and directory servers need to be in-band to correctly detect service
interruption. So, just as BGP speaker-listeners are also routers, all directory servers
are forwarders, though some (probably most) forwarders are not directory servers.
Forwarders that are not directory servers publish their perspective information to
directory servers; each forwarder may publish to any number of directory servers.
Another paradigm that uses inequality to improve the scalability of overlay net-
3ARIN (http://www.arin.net/) no longer assigns autonomous system numbers to autonomous
systems that are not multi-homed.
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works is landmark routing, which takes advantage of knowledge of the underlying
network. Brocade (147) uses this technique to dynamically form “supernodes” that
provide substantial performance benefits; perhaps a similar technique could be ap-
plied to our system as an optimization.
3.2.3 Forwarder Discovery
How does a client discover forwarders? Ultimately, to discover forwarders, a
PAN clientmust know the address of at least one directory server. If a single directory
server provides access to a PAN that provides access to all resources to which a client
requires access, then that directory server alone is sufficient. We choose to deploy a
set of well-known directory servers for this purpose; however, we do not require any
sort of central administrative structure for the directory servers. For clients in regions
of the network without direct access to any of the directory servers, we stipulate that
they must find reachable directory servers by some other means. Perhaps the network
location of directory servers can be distributed out-of-band, possibly via DNS.
3.2.4 Unidirectional Links
How does the system ensure that forwarders can mutually reach each
other? In some cases, Internet fragmentation occurs because two hosts cannot com-
municate with each other: forwarder Alice cannot talk to forwarder Bob, and for-
warder Bob cannot talk to forwarder Alice. The solution that we have described thus
far provides a means by which they can talk with each other, provided that forwarder
Alice and forwarder Bob can each initiate conversations with each other via the same
Chapter 3: Network Architecture 102
PAN. However, this presumes bidirectional communication, and several forms of In-
ternet fragmentation are the result of links that can be considered unidirectional: new
conversations can be initiated from one side only. In particular, forwarder Alice may
be able to initiate a connection to forwarder Bob, but not vice-versa. Both network
address translators and firewalls that block inbound TCP connections to protected
networks create unidirectional links. In both cases, forwarder Alice from our example
is on the side of the private network, and Bob is somewhere on the outside.
We presume that for every interface between transport domains A and B, one
forwarder TA exists in transport domain A, one forwarder TB exists in transport
domain B, and, without loss of generality, TA can open a conversation with TB. If
we want to build a “bridge” between transport domains A and B, then TA must
open a persistent connection to TB. A detailed description of this process along with
illustrative diagrams are provided in Section 3.4.3. We define any tunnel from X to
Y as a persistent connection from X to Y if it meets the following criteria:
• X and Y can communicate freely and bidirectionally through the tunnel.
• If X notices that the connection has been severed for whatever reason, X es-
tablishes a new connection to Y , creating a new tunnel.
Given the preponderance of unidirectional links in the Internet today, the ability
for individual forwarders to establish persistent connections is vital to PAN.
3.2.5 Namespace Collisions
How does the system handle namespace collisions? Since PAN allows
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different resources with the same name to exist within the context of different per-
spectives, we are left with a number of questions about how the world will respond
to the resulting namespace collisions.
If we assume that all names are universal, then no two organizations can choose
to use the same name to identify their respective services, even if such services exist
within different localities and do not compete. One result is that the organization that
fails to procure the name may be accused of failing to preserve its own trademark.
Burgeoning litigation surrounding domain name disputes has become increasingly
expensive, leading to the implementation of the ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy4 (ICANN UDRP) (64). One solution to this problem might be to have one
organization reserve the name and transparently redirect clients based upon their
geographic location to services provided by another organization. However, generally
speaking there is no way to guarantee cooperation among organizations.
Since PAN architecture provides a means of avoiding the constraints associated
with universal names, we are able to provide a workaround that achieves some of the
goals sought by semantic-free references (141), though competition within individual
perspective spaces may continue to exist.
3.3 Managing Perspectives
In a Perspective Access Network, forwarders offer a set of characteristics, or per-
spectives, that allow clients to specify from which location they want to view the
Internet (or other networks). Next, we address the problem of describing perspec-
4ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, http://www.icann.org/udrp/
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tives (design aspect “A” identified at the beginning of this chapter).
When PAN directory servers are informed of the availability of certain perspec-
tives, they propagate the perspectives through the network according to their locally-
configured policies. A client requests a perspective matching a set of characteristics,
and receives instructions for constructing a source route through the network that
provides a perspective meeting the specification.
This section defines the characteristics inherent to individual perspectives by iden-
tifying the essential ways in which network locations differ. In Chapter 4, we argue
in favor of a flexible design for propagating perspective information through the net-
work, with consideration for both local policies and the tradeoffs inherent to balancing
query latency, query expressivity, and scalability goals. Using RPSL (4), the industry-
standard policy description language used for BGP, we create new route-set and
filter-set classes to accommodate our scheme for representing perspectives.
3.3.1 Defining Perspectives
Defining the set of perspectives available to clients first requires an assessment
of which aspects of network location information are most salient. We specify six
methods by which individual perspectives can be described.
• 1. Political Location. (hierarchical) This field provides the location of
a perspective in terms of political jurisdictions. (e.g., US.Massachusetts.-
Cambridge)
• 2. Network Name. (hierarchical) This field provides the location of a per-
spective in terms of organizational boundaries. This field is useful for describing
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private networks (including ISPs). (e.g., Harvard.EECS)
• 3. Implicit Environmental Filtering. (categories) This field provides
the names of broad categories of content filtering, with the goal of characteriz-
ing filtering policies by references to the nature of what is filtered rather than
its effects (such as threats to open or democratic society). One example might
be to include well-known names for the categories described in previous ONI
reports, e.g., “News Outlets,” “Sex,” “Blogs,” “Hate Speech,” “Government,”
etc. (100). Another example might be to assume well-known names for filter-
ing performed by certain organizations, e.g., “China,” “Saudi Arabia”, which
could be shorthand for some set of more specific characteristics. So, this field
contains a list of categories, each prefixed with a ’+’ character, meaning that
the environment “accepts” this category, or a ’-’ character, meaning that the
environment “rejects” this category. All characteristics are considered ’+’ by
default, indicating no filtering. (e.g., "pro-democracy")
• 4. Explicit Environmental Filtering. (address ranges) This field speci-
fies particular network address ranges to which the perspective allows or restricts
access. As an example, we use a list of CIDR prefixes, combined using ’+’ and
’-’ notation as described above. (e.g., 212.58.226.0/25)
• 5. Geolocation. (latitude-longitude coordinates) This field provides the geo-
graphical (latitude and longitude) coordinates of the perspective to some degree
of accuracy. We use degrees of arc to measure both the coordinates and the
degree of accuracy. The field is a triplet consisting of (1) north latitude, (2)
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east longitude, and (3) accuracy. Negative coordinates refer to southern and
western hemispheres, respectively. (e.g., 42.3, -72.1, r:3km)
• 6. Functional Capabilities. (categories) This field is a set of special
attributes succinctly describing the functional advantages and disadvantages
of this network location. For example, this field may include an indication of
whether the perspective is behind a NAT, whether voice-over-IP data traffic pat-
terns are allowed, and other policies and functional features specific to the net-
work in which the perspective is situated. (e.g., "no-long-term-connections")
field name format
Geolocation FORMAT = ORD "," ORD "," ORD
ORD = ["-"] *DIGIT "." *DIGIT
Political Location FORMAT = *ALPHANUM *("." (*ALPHANUM / "*"))
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Network Name FORMAT = *ALPHANUM *("." (*ALPHANUM / "*"))
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Environmental Filtering FORMAT = RULE *("," RULE)
(explicit) RULE = ("+" / "-") ADDR "/" 1*2DIGIT
ADDR = 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT
"." 1*3DIGIT
Environmental Filtering FORMAT = ("+" / "-") *ALPHANUM
(implicit) *("," ("+" / "-") *ALPHANUM)
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Functional Capability FORMAT = ("+" / "-") *ALPHANUM
*("," ("+" / "-") *ALPHANUM)
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Table 3.1: Route-Set Field Formats.
Just as prefixes describe individual routes in the context of BGP routing, per-
spectives describe individual forwarders in the context of PAN. Our policy language
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extends the RPSL route-set class to include perspectives; each perspective contains
a set of fields consisting of either zero or one of each of the six fields identified above.
Table 3.1 provides the ABNF format for each field.
Individual forwarders propagate the information about themselves as metadata to
the directory servers, which in turn propagate these metadata (optionally with aggre-
gation) to other directory servers according to locally-configured policy. Section 3.3.2
describes the mechanism by which clients may formulate queries using metadata from
some subset of the aforementioned categories. The directory servers interpret queries
as well as they can and respond to clients appropriately.
3.3.2 Selecting Perspectives
Clients select perspectives by issuing metadata queries, which match data from
the perspective fields described above. For each perspective, an individual metadata
query returns either true or false depending upon whether the perspective matches
the query. Metadata queries take the following forms:
• 1. Political Location. (Query format: prefix) The query returns true if
and only if the prefix specified is a prefix of the perspective, e.g., a query a.b.c
would match a.b.c.d but not a.b.
• 2. Network Name. (Query format: prefix) Same as for Political Location.
• 3. Implicit Environmental Filtering. (Query format: +/- bit, category
name) The query returns true if and only if the category name is listed (either
implicitly or explicitly) as accepted by the perspective (if ’+’ is specified) or
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not accepted (if ’-’ is specified).
• 4. Explicit Environmental Filtering. (Query format: address) The
query returns true if and only if the query address is included within the set of
addresses accepted by the perspective.
• 5. Geolocation. (Query format: modal-operator, position, and range.) The
query returns true if and only if a given perspective is (may or must be, as
determined by whether possibly or necessarily is indicated) within the number
of degrees of arc specified by range of the coordinates specified by position.
The difference between possibly and necessarily is that possibly is “liberal,”
allowing the inclusion of any perspective that is within the degrees specified by
range plus its indicated error, whereas necessarily is “conservative,” requiring
a perspective to be within the degrees specified by range minus its indicated
error.
• 6. Functional Capabilities. (Query format: +/- bit, category name) Same
as for Implicit Environmental Filtering.
Metadata queries are used to filter perspectives. Our policy language extends
the RPSL filter-set class to include these queries; each perspective contains a set
of fields consisting of some number (possibly zero) of each of the six query types
identified above. Table 3.2 provides the ABNF format for each query type.
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query type format
Geolocation FORMAT = "geo:" ("possibly" / "necessarily")
":" ORD "," ORD "," ORD
ORD = ["-"] *DIGIT "." *DIGIT
Political Location FORMAT = "loc:" *ALPHANUM
*("." (*ALPHANUM / "*"))
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Network Name FORMAT = "net:" *ALPHANUM
*("." (*ALPHANUM / "*"))
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Environmental Filtering FORMAT = "eef:" ADDR
(explicit) ADDR = 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT
"." 1*3DIGIT
Environmental Filtering FORMAT = "ief:" ("+" / "-") *ALPHANUM
(implicit) ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Functional Capability FORMAT = "cap:" ("+" / "-") *ALPHANUM
ALPHANUM = (DIGIT / ALPHA)
Table 3.2: Filter-Set Field Formats.
3.4 Implementation (Blossom)
In this section, we describe the special characteristics of Blossom, our prototype
implementation of PAN. Blossom makes use of the onion-routing system Tor (38) for
constructing circuits and transporting data. However, Blossom uses an alternate net-
work discovery algorithm and its own directory servers. Unlike Tor directory servers,
Blossom directory servers construct routing tables, using a path-vector protocol with
an expressive policy framework.
The most interesting aspect of Blossom is how it interacts with other systems in
the real world. This section describes those interactions, and through our description
of the interaction between Blossom and Tor, we address design aspect “C” identified
at the beginning of this chapter. Since Blossom directory servers generally do not
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interact with systems outside Blossom, we were free to implement them according
to the directory service that we describe in the next chapter. The current status
of the Blossom directory service is that peering directives are fully implemented,
metadata queries for perspectives are partially implemented, and policy directives are
unimplemented. (Thus, we were able to conduct tests and demonstrate Blossom as
a proof-of-concept implementation, but we continue to work with the Tor developers
to improve its usefulness to the general public.)
3.4.1 Transport Layer Requirements
It is possible to implement Perspective Access Networks using a variety of systems
that provide transport for client datagrams; however, not all data planes are created
equal. PAN has a number of specific desiderata for its transport layer; we list the
more important requirements below. It turns out that Tor provides a convenient
controller interface that satisfies most of the requirements; the interface is the most
significant factor in our decision to choose Tor for the substrate of our prototype
implementation.
The following capabilities of Tor make it particularly suitable as a substrate for
Blossom:
• Access Existing Internet Resources. Tor provides generic forwarders
that are capable of acting as a proxy to access Internet resources agnostic of
PAN on behalf of clients.
• Require No Special OS Configuration. Tor runs without special privi-
leges, kernel hacking, or OS-level configuration, and it must be portable to all
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sufficiently popular operating systems.
• Interpret SOCKS Requests. Tor affords Blossom the ability to inter-
pret SOCKS requests (hostname and port information) directly. Among other
things, this capability provides the flexibility to allow users and applications to
embed perspective-specific instructions in the hostname field.
• Direct the Construction of Circuits. Given a set of descriptors and
instructions to build a circuit, Tor is able to establish a secure, authenticated
tunnel. In general, a substrate for PANmust afford PAN clients the ability to (a)
provide their own descriptors, (b) define the circuits to be constructed, (c) know
when circuits succeed and fail, and (d) open multiple circuits simultaneously.
The substrate should also allow a PAN client to extend or cut the length of a
circuit on demand.
• Attach TCP Streams to Circuits. The Tor Control Protocol provides
a means by which PAN can (a) know when a TCP stream has become ready
and (b) allow PAN to attach TCP streams to specified circuits on demand. In
general, a PAN substrate should not close circuits built by the PAN client until
authorized. The substrate should provide a means by which the PAN client (a)
knows when a stream closes, (b) knows when a stream attaches successfully, and
(c) can change the circuit to which a stream that has not yet been successfully
attached is assigned.
• Establish Persistent Connections. Tor provides a means by which a
PAN forwarder can establish persistent connections to other PAN forwarders of
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its choosing. This capability is essential in allowing PAN forwarders to construct
bidirectional tunnels.
• Manage Circuit Extensions.5 It is possible to modify Tor to allow PAN
forwarders to mediate the construction of circuits as they choose. This ca-
pability allows PAN forwarders to implement policy that limits or forbids the
extension of circuits from one particular neighbor to another.
3.4.2 Integrating Blossom and Tor
Both Blossom networks and Tor networks consist of interconnected proxies, but
where Tor chooses to optimize for anonymity, Blossom chooses to optimize for perspective-
specific reachability instead. Tor achieves its anonymity goals by having clients build
source-routed circuits at random using the deployed network of roughly 600 servers6
around the world: the choice of exit forwarder, i.e., the last hop of a circuit and the
perspective from which clients view the Internet, is left to chance. If the chosen exit
forwarder happens to be in Germany, then Google search results will be skewed to
assign German-language pages a higher rank by default. If the chosen exit forwarder
happens to be in China, then clients will not be able to access all of BBC News.
These discrepancies may appear small, but ultimately, the Internet has no neutral
locations; both the network and application servers may ascribe different semantic
meanings to different network locations. Different locations mean different access,
and Blossom provides a system for selecting, in a uniform way, which location to use.
5Tor does not yet have this functionality as of version 0.1.1.20, June 2006.
6as of June 2006
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Blossom achieves this goal by sacrificing many of the stronger anonymity benefits of
Tor: indeed, a user’s anonymity is degraded if her choice of circuit reveals information
about her preferences or interests. But, choice has value in itself, and Tor provides a
useful general-purpose substrate upon which higher-level services may be built, even
services that do not include anonymity as a goal. For an overview of how Tor works,
refer to Section 2.5.1.
Blossom networks have other advantages over the Tor network as well. For exam-
ple, the Tor network assumes that all forwarders are mutually reachable, while the
Blossom network makes no such assumption. In fact, the Blossom overlay network
supports arbitrary topologies.
Blossom uses Tor descriptors, since they are necessary to build circuits using
the underlying Tor system. Like ordinary Tor forwarders, each Blossom forwarder
pushes its Tor descriptor to directory servers. However, Blossom directories carry
some additional reachability information that make routing possible by describing
the network topology, in which possibly not all forwarders can directly reach all other
forwarders. We describe the Blossom directory service in Chapter 4.
A single client can be used to access both Blossom and Tor networks, though
the client will need to know about both Tor and Blossom directory servers. Blossom
directory servers are integrated into the Perspective Access Network, and the Blossom
client itself uses the Tor Control Protocol7 to exchange information with Tor and issue
instructions. Also, since Blossom encodes perspective requests in the hostnames that
are sent to the SOCKS proxy, use of Blossom may require an additional application-
7TC: A Tor Control Protocol, Version 1, http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/control-spec.
txt
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Figure 3.4: Establish Persistent Connection. If F1 wants to provide access to
resources otherwise not accessible to clients in the vicinity of F2, and if clients in the
vicinity of F2 cannot reach F1 directly (as shown by the black unidirectional arrow),
then F1 must first establish a persistent connection to a forwarder that the clients can
reach directly.
layer proxy, which we describe in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Advertising Perspectives
Suppose that a Blossom forwarder wants to provide access to resources to which
it has access but the rest of the Internet does not. For example, a NAT device may
stand between the forwarder and the global Internet. The first task of the forwarder is
to establish a persistent connection to a forwarder on the outside, so that bidirectional
communication across a tunnel will be possible (see Figure 3.4).
Next, the forwarder must advertise its existence to the Blossom directory server(s)
in the remote transport domain. The forwarder can accomplish this in one of two
ways:
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Figure 3.5: Publish to Remote Directory Server. Once a persistent connec-
tion has been established, F1 may publish to a directory server in the vicinity of F2
indicating that clients in the vicinity of that directory server should use F2 to reach
F1.
• Approach 1. Directly push the descriptor to a directory server in the other
transport domain. This approach works particularly well if the other transport
domain is “the Internet” and if there are hard-coded, well-known directory
servers in “the Internet.” The forwarder has the responsibility to inform the
directory server about which forwarders can be used to reach it, i.e., to which
forwarders it has established a persistent connection (see Figure 3.5).
• Approach 2. Push the descriptor to a directory server in the same transport
domain. This is the easiest solution for the forwarder, but it requires the ex-
istence of a directory server in the same transport domain that is capable of
communicating with directory servers in the remote transport domain. For this
to work, some individual Tor forwarders (possibly the directory servers them-
selves) must have published their descriptors in remote transport domains (i.e.,
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Figure 3.6: Publish to Local Directory Server. If a directory server exists in
the vicinity of F1, and that directory server exchanges records with a directory server
in the vicinity of F2, then it may be sufficient for F1 to publish to its local directory
server rather than directly publishing to the directory server in the vicinity of the
clients.
followed the first option) to provide a link by which the directory servers can
communicate bidirectionally (see Figure 3.6). That is, in Figure 3.6, some for-
warder in the left-hand transport domain would need to publish its descriptor
to a directory server in the right-hand transport domain so that the directory
server in the right-hand transport domain can use that forwarder to contact the
directory server in the left-hand transport domain.
Once the directory servers have received reachability and perspective information
from the forwarders, the clients can then contact the directory servers to learn how
to build paths to the resources (see Figure 3.7).
If all directory servers are within the same transport domain, then Approach 1 is
sufficient: forwarders can exist within multiple transport domains, and as long as the
Chapter 3: Network Architecture 117
Figure 3.7: Clients Can Now Access Resources. Once F1 and F2 have pub-
lished their descriptors successfully to the directory service, the clients can use the
bidirectional tunnel to access the resources from the perspective of F1.
network of transport domains is fully connected by cross-domain links, any forwarder
will be able to access any other forwarder in a foreign transport domain simply by
extending along the path specified by the directory server. However, we want the
system to be truly decentralized, which means not electing any particular transport
domain to be the master domain in which entries are published.
3.4.4 Transport Layer Interface
Blossom forwarders are effectively Tor forwarders specially configured to take ad-
vantage of the Blossom directory infrastructure. The fact that Blossom clients may
enjoy some degree of anonymity by virtue of the fact that Tor provides access to a
powerful anonymity tool is certainly beneficial, but it is not strictly necessary to the
goals of Blossom. In fact, there are many possible implementations of Blossom, and
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the Tor-based implementation seems to be the most reasonable because (a) Tor is
a convenient, well-designed, fully-implemented overlay network that is adaptable to
many goals, (b) Tor meets more of the requirements outlined in the previous section
than any other system, and (c) Tor has real-world users and traffic, which means
fewer bugs and the ability to perform live tests.
Figure 3.8: Client Perspective Diagram: Blossom. How Blossom components
are integrated with Tor components.
Clients
Blossom allows users and applications to specify perspectives by appending a
metadata query (see Section 3.3.2) to hostnames. Consider the following example
(refer to Figure 3.8). Suppose that a user wants to access a web server from a
perspective in Greece. The user interacts with a web browser configured to use an
application-layer proxy (e.g., Privoxy, or Privoxy enhanced to rewrite application-
layer headers), which in turn passes the traffic to the Tor client via the SOCKS
protocol. The Tor client passes the SOCKS request to the Blossom client, which
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parses the SOCKS request to separate the hostname from the perspective request.
The Blossom client then uses Tor and the directory servers within the Perspective
Access Network to construct a circuit to an exit forwarder in Greece. Once the circuit
has been built, the Blossom client instructs the Tor client to attach the application
stream to the newly constructed circuit. Then, the client application may carry out
a complete TCP session with the web server via the circuit (from the perspective of
the web server, the exit forwarder in Greece is the client).
One of the Blossom diagnostic tools is a dynamically-generated web page catalogu-
ing the various Tor forwarders by country8 and exit policy9. We have also constructed
a web interface that allows a user to specify a URL and a country from which she
wants to view the URL.10
Blossom is a process that manipulates Tor, and it is implemented as a Tor Con-
troller, according to the specification provided in the Tor documentation included
with the source package.
Forwarders
A Blossom forwarder needs several capabilities that Tor forwarders generally lack:
• the ability to open persistent connections,
• the ability to know whether to use a persistent connection to reach another
forwarder,
8Geolocation data are derived from the WHOIS database and are not perfectly reliable.
9Tor Network Status, http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/exit.pl
10Blossom Web Interface, http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/blossom.pl
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• the ability to define a set of forwarders to which to establish persistent connec-
tions,
• the ability to tell a directory server that it has Blossom functionality,
• the ability to tell a directory server that it can be reached via some specific
path, and
• the ability to define and enforce policy to manage the set of circuits in which it
participates as a forwarder.
Application-Specific Proxies
Some applications require application-specific proxies to take advantage of Blos-
som. Applications in this category include any applications that send network-layer
identifiers inside the transport-layer payload. Web browsing is one such application,
so we implemented an HTTP proxy to insert between a web browser and Tor that
allows us to use Blossom to browse HTTP.11
Our proxy has three primary functions:
First, the proxy parses HTTP requests from the client. The HTTP Host field (45)
contains the hostname specified by the client. Since Blossom uses the hostname to
express queries, this field contains a string that incorporates the query as well as
the name of the host to be requested by the exit forwarder. So, the proxy removes
the query component of the string, leaving only the hostname. This is important
functionality, since not doing this would confuse many HTTP servers that use vir-
11HTTP proxy that rewrites headers and HTML, http://afs.eecs.harvard.edu/user/
goodell/etc/edgeproxy
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tual hosts. The proxy handles both GET and POST requests, which are functionally
different.
Second, the proxy parses HTTP headers in the response and rewrites any redirec-
tions to include the metadata query provided in the original request.
Third, the proxy parses HTTP responses received from the server (via Tor and
Privoxy in our setup). If the MIME type of the response is anything but text/html,
it just returns them to the web client. If the MIME type is text/html, then it
parses the HTML (145) and appends the appropriate metadata query (if one was
specified in the request) to each A, FORM, FRAME, IMG, and LINK tag that contains a
hostname that does not include a metadata query suffix. This functionality is useful
because (a) images and some redirections refer to content that should be viewed
from the same perspective, and (b) most humans browsing web pages like to be
able to click on links that should be viewed from the same perspective. Unless the
links incorporate the metadata query, there is no guarantee that Blossom will attach
those requests to circuits with the correct perspective. In particular, the circuit
may break between successive requests, or there may be multiple circuits available
simultaneously, possibly offering different perspectives.
The proxy is essentially a proof-of-concept implementation, but it is entirely usable
for casual browsing and seems to be generally functional and stable.
3.5 Authentication
Next, we describe a general way of supplementing Perspective Access Networks
with a client-to-perspective authentication scheme that can be used as a basis for
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access control. This extension to PAN allows a host offering a perspective to require
that clients authenticate themselves, just as VPN hosts might similarly require clients
to authenticate.
Indeed, in the core of the Internet today, names used to identify resources are uni-
versal: they depend only upon the resource and are not defined by the name, physical
location, or logical location of the entity requesting the resource. An expectation of
universal naming is inappropriate for the Internet; it is both inevitable and beneficial
for names of local significance to emerge. We believe that by relaxing the universal
naming constraint we can achieve a considerably more flexible network.
However, another way to view Blossom is to consider that it provides a means of
describing resources not generally considered to be part of the Internet because they
cannot be named, e.g., network services running behind a NAT or firewall. Blossom
may introduce some risks in an environment that exhibits a dependence upon a lack
of universal naming (or network-layer access) for security.
The benefit of Blossom is its separation of access policy from network-layer mech-
anisms. Consider an organization whose core IT staff makes network policy decisions
regarding external access to internal resources or internal access to external resources.
Without Blossom, specific managers and groups have three choices:
• Convince the core to make specific provisions for access policy changes affecting
services in their area,
• Convince the core to work with them to deploy special infrastructure allow-
ing partial delegation of the management of network access privileges, creating
added complexity, or
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• Break network access mechanisms (e.g., punch holes in firewalls, use additional
ISPs to provide network uplinks to the core network), potentially undermining
the goals of the core administrators.
Blossom provides organizations the opportunity to delegate responsibility for net-
work access policy to a broader set of managers capable of making policy decisions.
By providing a mechanism that can be managed locally but verified centrally, we
alleviate some technical barriers (e.g., firewall configuration mechanisms) to defining
policy. Ultimately, technology should be used to facilitate management decisions, not
encumber them. Individual managers can make executive decisions about whether
allowing access to a particular resource is consistent with the stated objectives of the
organization or not. We seek not to answer the question of whether such empower-
ment is appropriate in each individual case, but only to ensure that the requirements
of particular network technologies do not prevent such questions from being asked.
Many enterprises use end-to-end authentication for some services, but there are a
number of popular services that rely upon the assumption that the only hosts that
have access to the service are physically on the same LAN or have particular network-
layer addresses. For example, the market for secure fileservers is small. We suspect
that this means that most distributed filesystems used by most businesses base their
security upon assumptions about how clients are connected. We do not seek to create
new risks for organizations that rely upon firewalls; we seek to provide a means by
which firewalls need not unnecessarily constrain access to services. This is a problem
that bridges the gap between IT and management, and our solution must respect the
interests of both sides.
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Figure 3.9: PAN Client Authentication. To authenticate clients, stipulate a
restrictive exit policy that exclusively allows access to a local authentication service
running on the same host as a PAN forwarder. Upon successful authentication, open
a tunnel through the authentication service to a private SOCKS proxy. The client can
now use this SOCKS proxy directly to access resources local to the PAN forwarder.
Ultimately, we seek to provide a means by which businesses can extend the trust
envelope to include not only hosts who happen to be situated on the local network
but also authenticated parties from the outside as well, in a similar manner to a VPN
but with the semantic features of a perspective. The openness of a PAN does not
conflict with good security practice, and we propose a simple strategy for integrating
PAN into environments in which some services rely upon the presumption that local
users are legitimate:
• For secure services, we simply configure our Blossom forwarder to exit to the
corresponding IP address(es) and port(s).
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• For services that are insecure because they potentially send or receive sensitive
data in the clear, providers of the service may derive benefit from running the
Blossom forwarder on the same machine with the service. Using onion routing,
we get an end-to-end encrypted tunnel from the client to the machine with the
service at no additional cost.
• For services that are insecure because they do not provide authentication, we
provide authentication on the side with the Blossom exit forwarder via the
following technique. The Blossom forwarder provides access to only a single
TCP port on an authentication server collocated on the Blossom forwarder itself.
Listening on this port is a service that provides cryptographic authentication
(e.g., via SSH or SSL), and we use the resulting secure channel to open a secure
tunnel from the client to a SOCKS proxy running on the authentication server.
The client can then use SOCKS to communicate with arbitrary TCP services in
the network containing the Blossom forwarder (refer to Figure 3.9). This style
of authentication is useful only to exit forwarders, since only exit forwarders
provide access to application servers.
3.6 Practical Applications
In this section, we catalogue some potential applications for Perspective Access
Networks. We argue that present-day scenarios are sufficient to make use of the
various features of PAN, including both its path-vector routing infrastructure and its
support for circuits that contain multiple forwarders.
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Figure 3.10: Direct Access to Server Restricted. PAN forwarders located
behind NAT devices must “reach out” to establish persistent connections with other
PAN forwarders.
First, consider Figure 3.15, which illustrates a case in which an enterprise uses the
Internet to connect its various offices. Note that resources within one network can
implicitly use PAN to refer to resources accessible via a PAN forwarder in a remote
office, even if such resources are not available directly.
In each of these examples, the functionality that PANs provide is similar to the
functionality that VPNs provide, except that PANs also provide a directory service
and a routing infrastructure. Section 1.3.3 elaborates upon the distinction.
3.6.1 Circuits with Multiple Forwarders
Figure 3.10 illustrates a scenario in which the PAN exit forwarder resides behind
some sort of NAT (or firewall). The NAT imposes a unidirectional link in which
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Figure 3.11: VPN Server. Most deployed VPN servers are directly accessible by
clients in most locations.
hosts on the “outside” of the NAT cannot initiate communication with hosts on
the “inside” of the NAT. Since clients cannot access the exit forwarder directly, the
forwarder itself must first establish a connection to some other PAN forwarder on
the outside, creating a bidirectional link through which new TCP connections can be
carried in either direction. In effect, the PAN forwarder outside the NAT becomes
a rendezvous point that clients can reach. The connection must be persistent and
must be re-established from the inside out in the event of NAT failure, or else the
bidirectional link will be severed and it will no longer be possible for new connections
to the internal forwarder to originate from outside the NAT. Note that this scenario
requires a two hop path: the first hop is the rendezvous point, and the second hop
is the target forwarder. Note that this is different from the case of the directly
accessible VPN, in which the VPN server itself does not need to reach out to be
directly accessible by clients (refer to Figure 3.11).
Figure 3.12 illustrates a scenario in which an active adversary prevents a client
from accessing a certain subset of the PAN forwarders. This subset may possibly
contain PAN forwarders that the client wants to use as exit forwarder in its circuits.
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Figure 3.12: Adversarial Filtering. Adversaries may eliminate the ability for
clients in particular regions of the network to connect to certain forwarders.
If a client cannot access a particular forwarder directly, then the client must build a
circuit consisting of multiple forwarders. If we assume that there is only one adversary,
and that this adversary acts in the vicinity of the client, then a two-hop path will be
sufficient. However, if we assume a more powerful adversary, or multiple adversaries,
that block communication between arbitrary pairs of forwarders, then a path of length
greater than two may be necessary.
Note that Figure 3.12 implicitly presumes one of two possible adversary models,
both of which necessitate a multi-hop path. In the first model, the adversary wants
to block PAN forwarders but is insufficiently powerful to do it effectively, and may
only block some subset of the forwarders at one time, perhaps because of the costs
of updating routers to block PAN forwarders, perhaps because of the costs involved
in maintaining an up-to-date list of PAN forwarders, or perhaps because of the costs
involved in blocking PAN forwarders that offer other important services are too much
to bear. In the second model, the adversary is quite powerful but does not want to
block PAN forwarders in particular. Specifically, the adversary blocks networks (for
whatever reason, including blacklisting, objectionable content reports, accident, etc.)
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Figure 3.13: Routing by Policy. Locally-configured policies maintained by indi-
vidual PAN forwarders may constrain the construction of circuits.
without intending to block PAN, but the PAN forwarders are blocked as “collateral
damage.”
3.6.2 Routing
Neither of the examples described in Section 3.6.1 require a particularly sophisti-
cated routing infrastructure; in both cases, we could assume a central directory server
that serves as an index, mapping particular forwarder names or metadata entries to
ordered lists of forwarders that could be used as circuits that provide access to the exit
forwarders in question. However, there are a number of reasons why a general-purpose
routing framework is a critical feature of Perspective Access Networks:
• Scalability and Robustness. PAN provides a flexible infrastructure that
allows clients to learn how to construct circuits of arbitrary length, contain-
ing arbitrary forwarders. In this manner, paths from a client to a particular
forwarder may be dynamically changed in the event that some individual links
are broken. Also, a general routing infrastructure alleviates dependence upon a
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Figure 3.14: Multiple Adversaries. Network constraints imposed by adversaries
in different regions of the network may necessitate the creation of longer circuits.
single authority for ordaining all paths used by clients throughout the network.
• Routing by Policy. Figure 3.13 illustrates a scenario in which policies con-
figured on individual PAN forwarders force the client to build a multi-hop circuit
through a set of PAN forwarders. Individual forwarders may be configured such
that they do not accept connections from particular clients. Also, individual
forwarders may be configured such that they can only extend circuits to other
forwarders from a specific set or such that particular pairings of prior and sub-
sequent forwarders in a circuit are disallowed.
• Multiple Adversaries. Figure 3.12 presents a situation that makes use of
a two-hop path in the presence of a single filter that restricts access to some
part of the network. However, large-scale networks may contain many potential
adversaries with complex interests, and various parties controlling different parts
of the network infrastructure may have deployed filters in such a manner that
the only legitimate circuit from a client to a particular forwarder may require
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more than two forwarders. Figure 3.14 illustrates a network with several control
points at which different filtering mechanisms are enforced: regime A only allows
outbound traffic to regime B, and regime B does not allow outbound traffic to
the particular forwarders that a client wishes to use. The resulting situation
requires the client to use a three-hop path to reach its chosen forwarders.
• A “Coreless” Internet. All of our discussion in this section has been
predicated upon the idea that there is some part of the Internet that is central,
in the sense that everyone can agree about its role as “core,” and in fact with
strikingly few exceptions, the Internet today does have a fairly well-defined
core. Despite regimes in Asia that filter access to democratic speech, regimes in
Europe that filter access to hateful paraphernalia, and regimes in America that
filter access to intellectual property, Internet users do have an expectation that
for the most part, the filters are close to the edges, and the core of the Internet
is mostly uniform. Nonetheless, one of the key design goals of PAN is to allow
access to resources even if the filters are in the center of the network. There are
numerous arguments that suggest that the breakdown of a common “core” may
arise in the future, and in this event, a general-purpose routing infrastructure
will be necessary to assure access across different parts of a fragmented network.
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Figure 3.15: Explicit References across Boundaries. Resources located in
one office of an enterprise can refer to resources only accessible from within other,
specific offices.
Chapter 4
Directory Service
This chapter focuses on the directory service that enables clients to access per-
spectives within Perspective Access Networks. Clients consult directory servers to
learn the paths that lead to perspectives of their choosing.
For the PAN overlay, we assume only that each forwarder has the ability to com-
municate bidirectionally with some subset of the other forwarders. A PAN client that
wishes to view a resource from the perspective of a particular forwarder F uses the
PAN distributed directory service (provided, in our prototype, by a subset of the for-
warders) to determine a path of connectivity through the forwarders to F . The PAN
client then constructs a source-routed circuit through the forwarders on the path to
F , which then performs a DNS lookup to resolve the local resource name to an IP
address from its point of view and accesses the resource on behalf of the client. The
client therefore accesses the resource from the perspective of F . (Figure 4.1 provides
a conceptual overview.)
Since we do not require a global unique naming scheme for resources, we need
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a way to uniquely identify a resource. We therefore require forwarders to generate
unique, self-certifying identifiers and a PAN client specifies a particular resource by
concatenating the forwarder ID with the resource name as resolved by the forwarder.
This design choice, however, sacrifices a certain amount of aggregation we can perform
when advertising forwarder route information within the PAN overlay.
Figure 4.1: Perspective Access Network Overview. PAN presents a peer-to-
peer network for sharing perspectives, allowing access to resources in circumstances
in which the meaning of names and addresses is a function of their context.
This chapter is arranged into four sections, as follows. Section 4.1 presents the di-
rectory service architecture in detail. Section 4.2 illustrates the most significant design
tradeoffs, including decisions surrounding client queries and perspective propagation.
Section 4.3 describes the general configuration of individual directory servers, includ-
ing peering arrangements. Section 4.4 closes the chapter with a detailed discussion of
the policy framework for managing which perspectives to accept and propagate; our
discussion includes some useful examples.
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4.1 Directory Architecture
PAN consists of a pairwise-connected overlay network of forwarders, each of which
has access to some set of Internet resources. Some resources may be available to some
nodes but not others. The overlay network that connects all of the forwarders to each
other includes a data plane that carries tunnelled DNS requests and TCP sessions,
as well as a control plane that carries routing information.
There are a number of problems with a distributed approach to assigning names
in a network. For example, two network components may have the same name, and
there are performance costs associated with choosing names that do not inherently
carry location information. However, we suggest that it is both possible and beneficial
to sacrifice universal naming by allowing access to resources whose names are locally
governed.
To address the concern about uniqueness of names used to identify forwarders,
we allow each forwarder to generate a self-certifying identity (such identities may be
mapped to human-readable nicknames by third-party certification authorities). Each
forwarder, then, possesses two names: a global name, used to identify itself within
the PAN network, and a local name, used to identify itself within its local namespace.
By considering that each forwarder provides access to resources within its own local
namespace, we avoid requiring that all names for all Internet resources be globally
unique.
To specifically identify each Internet resource, we combine the locally meaningful
name of the resource (e.g., a hostname such as www.google.com) with an identifier
specifying the name of the forwarder from which we want to access that resource (e.g.,
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the self-certifying name of a forwarder, like 89dc1c13). For the purpose of Blossom,
we assume that resources are named by hostname or IP address, so to access a resource
listening on TCP port 80 of 192.168.0.3 as seen by a forwarder named 89dc1c13,
we would represent the resource as 192.168.0.3.89dc1c13.exit:80.
Some PAN forwarders also serve as directory servers, and every PAN directory
server is also a forwarder. Each directory server provides a set of records : (a) a master
record, containing attributes describing itself, (b) a set of directory records, each
containing attributes describing directory peers, and (c) a set of forwarder records,
each containing attributes describing individual PAN forwarders. The directory server
publishes these records by responding to queries in the form of HTTP-GET requests,
and these attributes are periodically pushed to neighboring directories via directory
updates in the form of HTTP-POST requests. Figure 4.2 illustrates one possible set
of records stored in a directory server given one possible network of directory servers
and standalone forwarders.
4.1.1 Master Records
A complete PAN directory server listing includes exactly one master record, which
contains three attributes, as follows: a header consisting of the name of the directory
server and its version, a timestamp indicating when this directory listing was created,
and a status record identifying each forwarder indexed by the directory, including a
bit that indicates whether the directory believes that forwarder to be active. The bit
specifying whether a given forwarder is reachable is set to true when the directory
server receives a sufficiently recent descriptor for an individual forwarder, and it is
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set to false when the descriptor expires.
Figure 4.2: Records in PAN Directories. Given three directory servers A, B,
C and two standalone forwarders F1, F2 as shown above, the table illustrates one
possible set of records published by directory server A.
4.1.2 Directory Records
Each PAN directory server publishes a number of directory records, each contain-
ing a set of attributes that describe a specific peer directory server. A directory server
accrues a set of directory records over time via directory updates from its neighbors.
Unlike peer-to-peer filesharing services such as Gnutella or BitTorrent, PAN is de-
signed with the goal of balancing scalability with minimization of connection setup
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latency for clients connecting to services. Thus, clients do not request forwarder
records via broadcasting or heuristic searches; instead, each directory maintains a
set of directory records, each uniquely corresponding to one of its peers. Scalability
dictates that each individual directory server need not know everything about the
entire network, so there is no guarantee that each directory server contains a record
for each other directory server in the entire network.
When a client issues a query for a forwarder record, but a directory server has
no corresponding forwarder record, the directory server may refer the client to a set
of directory servers that have previously indicated knowledge of forwarder records
matching the request of the client. This referral consists of a set of directory records
and the forwarder records that correspond to the directory servers.
Since directories are not required to explicitly fetch information on behalf of their
clients, a client that queries a directory for information can expect to be referred to a
specific neighboring directory server. However, such referrals are not arbitrary: clients
seeking a particular forwarder record will be sequentially referred to some subset of
the set of directories along the reversal of the path by which the advertisement of the
forwarder propagated through the network.
We use ABNF (33) to specify the format of text fields. We specify self-certifying
forwarder names and metadata fields according to the following formats:
FNAME := 40(ALPHA / DIGIT) (4.1)
FMETA := *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") (4.2)
Each directory record contains the following attributes (refer to Table 4.1 for the
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field name format
Service Designation *VCHAR
Propagation Path *1FNAME *("," FNAME)
Summary FNAME "=" *DIGIT *("," FNAME "=" *DIGIT)
Compiled Metadata FMETA *("," *FMETA)
Table 4.1: Directory Record Field Formats.
ABNF representation of the field formats):
• Service-Designation. (required) This field tells a client how to connect to
a directory server, given that the client has already constructed a circuit to the
forwarder residing on the same machine as the directory server. In our present
implementation, this field is a TCP port number.
• Propagation-Path. (required) This field contains an ordered list of directory
servers (starting with the origin) through which this particular directory record
has propagated before reaching the directory server upon which it presently
resides. The primary purpose of this field is to avoid cycles in the propagation
of directory records.
• Summary. (optional) This field provides a list of PAN forwarders associated
with this particular directory record, indicating that the corresponding direc-
tory offers to forward traffic to the indicated set of PAN forwarders. For each
forwarder in the list, this attribute also includes one possible forwarding path
leading to that forwarder. Note that descriptors for the forwarders indicated in
this list may or may not be published at the particular directory server. See
section 4.1.4 for details.
Chapter 4: Directory Service 140
• Compiled-Metadata. (optional) Propagation of metadata is analogous to
propagation of individual forwarder descriptors. This field is a list of metadata
strings (i.e., perspective attributes) representing the union of all of theMetadata
attributes corresponding to all of the forwarders that appear in the Summary
field of this directory record. For each Metadata attribute, this attribute also
includes one possible forwarding path leading to a forwarder whose perspective
has that attribute. Therefore, directory servers may issue referrals to clients
querying for forwarder records matching some particular metadata field in the
same manner by which they may issue referrals to clients querying for specific
forwarders by name.
As an optimization, a PAN client may use the forwarder-specific or perspective-
specific forwarding path information in Summary or Compiled-Metadata fields, re-
spectively, to build circuits toward a given forwarder or perspective without querying
directory servers along the path (provided that the client has access to sufficiently
recent descriptors for the constituent forwarders). This can potentially improve cir-
cuit setup latency, but there are tradeoffs as well. First, a client choosing this option
does not receive information about possible alternative paths, thus waiving its option
to choose its path from the set of advertised possibilities. Second, the path is not
actually guaranteed to work; inconsistency resulting from slow routing convergence
may allow forwarding paths that are no longer applicable to persist for some time in
the Summary and Compiled-Metadata fields offered to clients by directory servers.
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field name format
Forwarder Descriptor (determined by substrate descriptor format)
Propagation Path *1(FNAME *("," FNAME))
Forwarding Path *1(FNAME *("," FNAME))
Metadata FMETA *("," *FMETA)
Table 4.2: Forwarder Record Field Formats.
4.1.3 Forwarder Records
When a PAN forwarder publishes its descriptor, metadata, and connection in-
formation to some directory server, the directory server in turn creates a forwarder
record using that information. Each forwarder listed in a directory has exactly one
corresponding forwarder record. In general, forwarder records are updated more
frequently and propagated less widely than directory records; see Section 4.1.5 for
details. A directory servermust publish a forwarder record for itself. Each forwarder
record contains some subset of the following fields (refer to Table 4.2 for the ABNF
representation of the field formats):
• Forwarder Descriptor. (required) PAN directory servers provide descrip-
tors that can be used by the PAN client to establish circuits through the forward-
ing network. Descriptors are self-signed statements published by forwarders that
contain contact information, including IP address and port for accepting circuit-
building connections, public key, and salient information about the capabilities
of the forwarder, including exit policy and bandwidth measurements.
• Propagation-Path. (required) This field contains an ordered list of directory
servers (starting with the origin) through which this particular forwarder record
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has propagated before reaching the directory server upon which it presently
resides. The primary purpose of this field is to avoid cycles in the propagation
of forwarder records. The value of this attribute may be empty, in which case
the propagation path for this particular forwarder record is presumed to be the
empty list (i.e., the forwarder described by this record published its information
directly to the directory server upon which this record presently resides). Note
that this path is not necessarily the same as that provided by the Forwarding-
Path attribute (described next).
• Forwarding-Path. (required) This field contains an ordered list of forwarders
indicating the circuit that a client should construct to reach the forwarder de-
scribed by this record, starting with the forwarder closest to the current direc-
tory server. Differences between this list and the list provided by Propagation-
Path attribute arise in two ways. First, directory servers through which a for-
warder record propagates are not required to add their names to the forwarding
path. Second, the PAN architecture allows forwarders to publish their descrip-
tors in directories in locations from which those forwarders are not directly
accessible; to address this, the forwarder may provide instructions by which
clients can reach it from the perspective of the directory to which it publishes
its information. These instructions appear in the form of a forwarding path,
a particular sequence of forwarders to which to connect to establish a circuit
including the target forwarder; see Section 4.1.5 for details.
• Metadata. (optional) This attribute provides additional perspective informa-
tion (e.g., geographic region, network name, connectivity information, access to
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particular resources, etc.) describing the forwarder.
4.1.4 Client Interaction
Our implementation of PAN leverages the circuit-building module of Tor (38)
to instruct a running Tor process to build a circuit through the overlay of PAN
forwarders. (Tor provides its own directory service, but PAN does not make use
of it.) To see how the various components interact, refer to Figure 4.3. The main
PAN client process itself does not interact with client applications directly; instead,
it communicates with PAN directory servers using specially-built Tor circuits, and it
uses descriptors obtained from these conversations to instruct Tor to build circuits
that client applications can use. To take advantage of PAN, client applications may
need to interact with an application-specific proxy that assures that requests for
network resources are semantically correct. For example, a proxy for a web browser
might rewrite HTTP headers to excise the PAN forwarder request from the hostname
fields. Similarly, the same proxy might rewrite HTML tags containing URLs to
ensure that all links on a page are accessed via the same PAN directives when clicked
or loaded automatically.
Issuing Queries
To establish a path to a specified exit point, PAN must first determine the path
to the exit point and obtain descriptors for each of the forwarders along that path,
including the last one. Sufficient information necessary to learn a path to a given
destination and all of the requisite descriptors may be available from the directory
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Figure 4.3: Client Perspective. Client applications communicate with PAN via
a series of proxies; PAN consists of software (a program that controls a running Tor
process) as well as a service (the perspective access network itself).
server to which the client speaks directly. Otherwise, the client will need to obtain the
missing information via a series of queries to directory servers. See Figure 4.4. Each
time that a client queries a directory server A and is referred to another directory
server B for more information, the client extends the circuit used to communicate
with A to B, thus adding a single hop to the circuit.
There are two types of queries, explicit queries and perspective queries. Explicit
queries request a path to a particular forwarder whose name matches a given string,
indicating that the client wants to build a circuit that terminates at some specific
last-hop forwarder. Perspective queries request a path to a forwarder with certain
attributes in its corresponding Metadata field, indicating that the client wants to
build a circuit that terminates at any last-hop forwarder whose forwarder record on
some directory server matches some set of criteria. Note that directories control the
content of Metadata fields within forwarder records, so, for example, a client issuing a
perspective querymay choose to reject a circuit to a specific forwarder if its descriptor
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Figure 4.4: Issuing Queries. Suppose that a client application requests a service as
seen by forwarder F2, and the PAN client is configured to use directory server A. The
client first sends a query to A, who responds with a referral to B. The client next
sends a query to B, who in turn refers it to C. Finally the client sends a query to C,
who has the descriptor. The client then uses the resulting circuit through {A,B,C}
to extend the circuit to F2 and connect to the target service via F2.
does not contain a metadata record matching the original request.
The contract between a directory server and a client issuing a query is as follows.
If a client issues a query, then a response from the directory server must include the
following:
• (a) a forwarder record for a forwarder that matches the query,
• (b) (in the event of an explicit query) some set of directory records and their
corresponding forwarder records, such that each directory record contains either
a Summary field containing an element that matches a given forwarder name,
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• (c) (in the event of a perspective query) some set of directory records and their
corresponding forwarder records, such that each directory record contains a
Compiled-Metadata field containing an element that matches a given string, or
• (d) an empty list of records, indicating that the query was unsuccessful.
Finally, a directory server may interpret a query as recursive, meaning just as
some DNS servers are configured to issue DNS requests on behalf of their clients,
PAN directory servers may issue queries on behalf of their clients, provided that
they return results that satisfy the criteria listed above. One incentive to configure
directory servers to perform recursive queries is that it reduces the amount of work
and network activity on the part of the client. However, this comes at the expense of
increasing the computational burden and network utilization of the directory server.
While such a tradeoff may be useful in an enterprise setting, it is less likely to be
useful for arbitrary directory servers accepting public queries.
A client may specify to the directory server that it intends for its query to be
non-recursive, in which case the directory should honor that request (to avoid the
chance that a cached entry might be wrong).
Building Circuits
In our prototype, once it has obtained forwarder records for the entire path to
the last-hop forwarder, the PAN client will provide the necessary descriptors to Tor
and then ask Tor to build a circuit using those descriptors (see Figure 4.5). Once the
circuit has been built, PAN will inform Tor that the TCP stream received from the
client application should be attached to the newly constructed circuit. We have used
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Figure 4.5: Accessing a Resource. After making use of the PAN directory servers,
a client system has a source route suitable for building a circuit through the set of for-
warders to the last-hop forwarder, through which the client can access the (otherwise
occluded) Internet resource.
our implementation1 to confirm that the set of web pages accessible from some ISP
in China differs from the set of web pages accessible from some ISP in Boston.
4.1.5 Directory Protocol
The directory servers propagate both forwarder records and directory records to
other directory servers throughout the system. In this manner, any client using
any of the directory servers throughout the system will have a measure of assurance
that it can build a circuit to its requested forwarder, provided that directory server
configuration permitted the propagation of routing information.
Directory records are stored as long-term state that is assumed to be up-to-date
1Blossom, http://afs.eecs.harvard.edu/∼goodell/blossom/
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unless a Directory Update request from a neighboring directory server is received. The
message volume involved in maintaining synchronicity of routing information can be
expensive, so a directory periodically pushes the changes to its neighbors. Reliability
is achieved by stipulating that if a directory server A fails to successfully send an
update to a particular neighboring directory server B, then A will consider B to be
oﬄine. When a directory comes online, and periodically over a long time interval
thereafter, it requests a burst from each of its neighbors. The burst contains all of
the directory records that the neighbor would ordinarily provide via regular directory
updates, reflecting the complete state of what the neighbor would ordinarily provide
to the directory making the request. After receiving the bursts, the requester applies a
path-selection algorithm to determine the set of records that it should propagate, and
it updates each of its neighbors with this set of records. Subsequently, the directory
will only receive directory updates from its neighbors when individual records change.
Each time the directory server receives a directory update that results in a change to
its own set of records, that directory servermust notify its neighbors about the change
within a reasonable period of time (unless filtering and aggregation rules obviate the
need to update a neighbor about the change).
Conversely, forwarder records are stored as short-term state that is periodically
refreshed, since forwarder descriptors change frequently and individual forwarders
themselves may join and leave the network frequently. Individual forwarder records
must be periodically re-issued: if a forwarder record becomes too old before it is
replaced, then directory servers should discard it.
Periodically, neighbors send empty updates to each other, even if they have no
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directory changes to send. Such empty updates are keepalive messages. If a directory
has not heard from one of its neighbors for a sufficiently long period of time, it
concludes that the link to the neighbor has been severed and responds by issuing
a withdrawal message to its peers indicating that the directory record is no longer
available. Withdrawal messages carry valid Propagation-Path attributes, and any
directory server A that currently offers a directory record whose Propagation-Path
attribute contains the name of a neighbor B from which it received a withdrawal
message must propagate to its other neighbors either a message announcing the
withdrawal of B or an ordinary directory record with a Propagation-Path attribute
that does not contain B. In this manner, all directory servers that have selected the
withdrawn route will be informed of the change (as in BGP, failing to propagate the
results of a withdrawal may constitute an attack).
Figure 4.6: Directory Propagation. Each forwarder publishes its forwarder
record to some set of directory servers, and each directory server publishes its directory
record to its neighbors. Directory servers propagate both kinds of records according to
their individual policies.
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Directory Propagation
Both directory records and forwarder records are propagated using a BGP-like
path-vector protocol that includes a simple route selection algorithm applied at each
directory server. Figure 4.6 illustrates the process by which route information is
propagated through the network. Each forwarder advertises its forwarder record to
some set of directory servers, and directory servers propagate the forwarder record
through the network as far as policy permits. Forwarders that are also directory
servers advertise only to themselves. Each directory server creates a directory record
for each of its neighbor directory servers and propagates the record through the
network. Thus, forwarders push forwarder records to directory servers, and directory
servers push both forwarder records and directory records to other directory servers.
If a directory server receives two conflicting forwarder records (e.g., two records
with different attributes for the same forwarder), then it chooses to propagate the
one whose Forwarding-Path attribute has the shorter length. Figure 4.7 provides an
overview of how forwarder information propagates in the general case. The specific
configuration of individual directory servers may cause exceptions to these rules;
Section 4.3 discusses this in greater depth.
Directory Requests
Directories address five different kinds of requests, all issued using HTTP/1.1 (45)
(refer to Table 4.3 for the ABNF representation of the request formats):
• Complete Listing. This is a request for the entire set of records, including
its master record, all directory records, and all forwarder records. The response
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Figure 4.7: Advertising PAN Forwarders. PAN directory servers use a path-
vector algorithm to propagate contact information for PAN forwarders. Black lines
indicate the path taken by an advertisement initiated by the directory server labeled
d1. The boxes represent the records stored at the various directory servers, including
Propagation-Path and Summary attributes of directory records.
to this request can potentially be quite large, but query overhead for a client
could be reduced substantially if most of the forwarders to which it desires to
build circuits have forwarder records published on the same directory server.
• Directory Burst. This is a special request sent by a directory server when
it first comes online to bootstrap its knowledge of the records advertised by
each of its neighbors. A directory server responds to this request by providing
a master record, all of its hard state (i.e., all directory records), and its own
forwarder record.
• Query. This is a query from a client or directory server for a forwarder record,
either explicitly (by name) or implicitly (by metadata or descriptor-derived data
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field name format
Complete Listing "GET /pan/ HTTP/1.1"
Directory Burst "GET /pan/burst HTTP/1.1"
Explicit Query "GET /desc/id/" FNAME SP "HTTP/1.1"
Implicit Query "GET /desc/meta/" FMETA SP "HTTP/1.1"
Publish Forwarder Record "POST /pan/ HTTP/1.1"
Directory Update "POST /pan/directory-update HTTP/1.1"
Table 4.3: Directory Request Formats.
field). See Section 4.1.4 for details.
• Publish Forwarder Record. This is an HTTP request from a forwarder to
upload a complete forwarder record (possibly including an explicit forwarding
path and metadata).
• Directory Update. This is an HTTP request from a neighboring directory
server to upload status changes (deltas) since the most recent successful update.
4.2 Design Tradeoffs
The design of directory servers and propagation of routing information is more
challenging in PAN than in BGP for several reasons:
• While BGP routing table entries consist of IPv4 prefixes, PAN routing table
entries consist of attribute sets, a richer domain describing what can be reached
using the network.
• PAN directory servers have the additional property that they provide informa-
tion directly to clients as they construct source-routed circuits.
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• While IPv4 prefixes are assigned by a central authority, there are no central
authorities dictating the allocation of perspectives.
• Managing policies in PAN is more complex than in BGP. The PAN policy
framework, described in Section 4.4, applies the techniques used to assign policy
in BGP routing to this richer PAN domain.
The performance, scalability, and effectiveness of PAN largely derives from the
design, implementation, and configuration of its directory servers. We consider the
important issues in this section.
4.2.1 Structured versus Unstructured
Perhaps the first design question about our directory service is, considering the
extensive research in distributed hash tables (DHT), whether we should implement
our directory service using a structured network with O(logn) lookup operations
rather than an unstructured network with fewer performance guarantees and more
complexity.
There are several problems with using DHT, the most important of which for our
purpose is the fact that DHTs assume a full mesh of connectivity. We want to allow
an unstructured, organic growth of our network. Imagine, for example, using DHT
to propagate BGP routing tables. This would be necessarily impossible, because
the DHT itself requires some notion of connectivity that does not exist until the
underlying network itself about which the DHT carries information is in place! Now,
there are some potential solutions to adapt DHTs to work across multiple transport
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domains (63), but these are naturally quite cumbersome, and to some extent they
obviate the arguments that might otherwise make a DHT a good choice.
One of the key characteristics of DHT systems is the use of a uniform hash function
to uniformly distribute load across servers, and the the hash function, which dictates
which servers get which load, is essential to the the O(logn) routing performance.
However, the information that PAN stores is to a large extent location-dependent,
and that location-dependence is, after all, the reason for our service. It would be
detrimental to scalability and deleterious to server incentives to store information
haphazardly throughout the network, when it makes more sense for individual direc-
tory servers to just store the information relevant to themselves.
Finally, DHT technology, as it exists today, has important security weaknesses.
For example, to our knowledge there are no existing implementations of DHT that
eliminate attacks related to influencing what a client thinks about which nodes are
part of the network. There are also a plethora of theoretical attacks, including Sybil
attacks, for which the proposed solutions are both cumbersome and unscalable (122;
36). These realities about security are among the primary reasons why Tor does
not use DHT, despite the fact that Tor makes the assumption that all nodes are
fully-connected (39).
4.2.2 Propagating Forwarder Information
Propagating the self-certifying name of each forwarder carries the advantage that
clients may explicitly specify each forwarder individually. However, this advantage
comes at a cost, since self-certifying names cannot be aggregated. The result is
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that individual directory servers must contain at least the name of each forwarder
in the entire network, so that they can appropriately respond to explicit queries
requesting any individual forwarder. But, we can further relax the assumption that
each directory server knows about each forwarder by allowing directory servers the
option of propagating only metadata, rather than entire summary records. Naturally,
metadata fields may contain the names of the forwarders themselves, but we rely
upon the discretion of the individual directory servers to negotiate which information
is propagated through the network. The effect of limited, policy-driven propagation
may be that directory servers proximate to a given set of target forwarders may be
configured to propagate their names and metadata while directory servers farther from
the forwarders may be configured to propagate metadata only, in order to improve
network scalability. The result would be that clients close to the forwarders may be
able to make their selection with greater specificity.
Figure 4.8 depicts the propagation of reachability information from a small set
of forwarders to the rest of the network. The circles illustrate how directory servers
in different regions of the network may contain different information about partic-
ular forwarders. Directory servers nearest to the forwarders each contain all of the
information needed by a client who desires to build a circuit to one of the forwarders
in question. Directory servers somewhat farther from the forwarders may not have
descriptors for the forwarders themselves, but they may possess Directory Records
containing Summary attributes that provide enough information for clients to issue
queries for the individual forwarders by name. However, directory servers in regions
most distant from the forwarders may not have knowledge of the names of the indi-
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Figure 4.8: Metadata Propagation Regions.
vidual forwarders themselves, and may only have metadata describing the forwarders
collectively. Clients using directory servers in these regions have no means of specify-
ing those particular forwarders explicitly, but may only reach them in aggregate, by
querying for attribute sets rather than explicit names.
Whether propagation of metadata is sufficient to assure reasonable scalability for
PAN depends upon how PAN is used. For example, BGP scalability is limited by
the number of independently propagated prefixes. Aggregation helps to some extent,
since each prefix may correspond to thousands or even (theoretically) millions of
individual hosts, but as we consider shorter prefixes, it becomes clear that at some
level, the hierarchy ends, leaving each individual BGP listener with a table containing
hundreds of thousands of distinct prefixes.
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If the set of PAN forwarders were arranged such that there were exactly one per
BGP prefix, with each forwarder as a directory server, and if peering relationships
among directory servers topologically corresponded to peering relationships among
autonomous systems, and if each client expected the ability to identify each PAN
forwarder explicitly, then in theory the scalability of the Perspective Access Network
would be essentially the same as that of the BGP network that exists today. However,
this pattern of deployment and usage might not be what we can expect in a future
PAN. Also, it is possible for multiple PANs to exist concurrently; private organizations
might deploy their own PANs for their exclusive use.
For example, we might imagine that PAN would be used to link private networks,
as we describe in Section 3.6, in which case we might assume that there would be one
PAN forwarder in each private network. Since there are millions of private networks
of this sort, an assumption that each would require the ability to identify each other
explicitly could seriously constrain the scalability of PAN. However, we can resolve
this by stipulating that clients who want to access specific destination forwarders know
a priori how to reach directory servers that contain the necessary information for
learning how to construct circuits that terminate at those specific forwarders. (Such
instructions could be preconfigured in the PAN software at the time of distribution,
for example.) PAN provides an architecture that allows communities of this sort to
develop without overconstraining their structure.
Another use of PAN might be to have individual volunteers provide views of the
world to be used at a high level of granularity; for example, clients might specify
the names of particular countries or particular ISPs. In this situation, the exclusive
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propagation of metadata might improve scalability considerably.
4.2.3 Responding to Queries
Suppose that a client issues a query for information that a particular directory
server cannot provide but knows how to find. The directory server then has a choice.
It may issue a referral, telling the client how to retrieve the information itself from
other directory servers in the network, or it may treat the query recursively, forwarding
the request on behalf of the client, and ultimately responding to the client with the
information in the same manner that it would had it possessed the information at
the time at which it received the query.
The difference between recursive and non-recursive (referral) responses to queries
is comparable to the difference between their analogues in DNS. Referrals have the
advantage that directory servers do less work, so servers under heavy load may wish to
use this method. Recursive queries have the advantage that clients do less work and
directory servers may cache the results. An enterprise may want to deploy servers
that support recursive queries to allow clients to take advantage of requests made
earlier by other clients if available, and possibly avoid some extra network traffic in
the general case.
Refer to Figure 4.9. If a client queries a directory server that is configured to
treat queries recursively, then the server manages the query on behalf of the client,
and returns a response once it has received an adequate response from the directory
server(s) that it uses to resolve the query.
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Figure 4.9: Recursive Queries.
4.2.4 Repeated Queries and Circuit Length
It is entirely conceivable that on occasion, two servers that are both generally
accessible from the same set of clients possess different data, such that one server
refers clients to the other. In such circumstances, we want a means by which the
server can send a hint to the client suggesting that it should try connecting directly
to the other server, so that it might avoid creating an unnecessarily long circuit for
subsequent queries and the data plane. So, we have the directory server add a special
attribute to its query response, indicating to the client that it may try querying the
other directory server directly. Depending upon a variety of factors, the client may
choose not to follow this recommendation, or the client may not be able to contact
the other directory server directly. However, the practical utility of reducing circuit
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length in circumstances like these is worth the added complexity.
Figure 4.10: Handling Queries.
Figure 4.10 provides a summary of the ways in which a directory server may handle
a query. Assume that a client requests a forwarder known only by the directory server
labelled B, but it asks the directory server labelled A instead. Directory server A
may handle the query in three distinct ways. In the first case, labeled (b), directory
server A handles the query non-recursively, telling the client to build a circuit through
A to B so that it can issue a query to B. In the second case, labeled (c), directory
server A handles the query recursively, querying B for the requested information and
responding to the client with the result. In the third case, labeled (d), directory
server A has reason to believe that the client might be able to contact B directly, for
example by observing that B and the client are on the same network. In this case, A
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handles the query non-recursively but provides a hint to the client suggesting that it
might be able to contact B directly, avoiding an unnecessary extension of the circuit
to A. Of course, the client may disregard this hint, and the client should accept that
the hint may be incorrect.
4.3 Configuration
A number of parameters govern how individual PAN directory servers interact with
forwarders, clients, and their peers. These parameters include peering directives and
policy directives. Peering directives, which we describe in this section, allow individual
directory servers to make local decisions about what circuit-building information to
propagate to their neighbors, or whether to summarize the information and require
downstream clients to manage multiple queries. Policy directives, which we describe in
Section 4.4, allow operators of directory servers to control aggregation, specify which
information to propagate by attribute and propagation path, and manage network
resources.
4.3.1 Filtering and Aggregation
Recall that directory servers have control over the contents of Metadata and
Compiled-Metadata attributes. Filtering and aggregation configuration rules instruct
directory servers how to adjust the values of these attributes. These rules are con-
figured as part of the policy configuration described in Section 4.4. A brief overview
follows; Section 5.3 provides a full treatment.
Directory servers may be configured to filter certain metadata. This may be
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desired if a directory server chooses not to propagate certain kinds of perspective
information to certain other directory servers.
Additionally, directory servers may be configured to aggregate metadata carrying
perspective information, improving scalability. Two forms of aggregation are possible.
The first form of aggregation involves collapsing substantively identical nodes (i.e.,
same attributes) into a single attribute set and advertising that attribute set. Since
substantively identical nodes offer the same perspective as far as a client is concerned,
no information is lost in this process. The second form of aggregation involves collaps-
ing substantively similar, but not identical, nodes (i.e., partially matching attributes)
into a more general attribute set by single-attribute aggregation (or by subdivision, as
discussed in Section 5.3.1, which may be considered a special kind of aggregation but
is not part of the policy configuration).
Information is lost as directory servers decide what information to discard (i.e.,
the extent of aggregation, subdivision, and filtering) to reduce the number of distinct
sets of metadata to a reasonable value. The directory server should then set a flag
indicating what data has been discarded, so that downstream directory servers can
continue the same aggregation if they so choose, and so that clients have a hint about
what upstream directory servers have answers to more specific queries.
4.3.2 Peering Arrangements
Directory servers establish manually-configured peering relationships with each
other in a manner similar to how autonomous systems establish peering relationships
with each other in a BGP context (note the security advantages afforded by having
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humans explicitly configure the relationships). A special configuration file contains
a list of neighboring directory servers (hereafter referred to as neighbors) along with
peering policy and reachability information in the following format:
"neighbor" SP FNAME SP POLICY SP HOST ":" PORT (4.3)
The POLICY field represents a peering directive that takes one of five values. Fig-
ure 4.12, located at the end of this chapter, provides a conceptual illustration.
• Full. The directory server propagates both directory records and forwarder
records received from the specified neighbor, adjusting the Propagation-Path at-
tribute of each record by appending the name of the neighbor for loop-detection.
The directory server must not adjust the Forwarding-Path, which contains the
full source route. The directory server may alter Metadata and Compiled-
Metadata attributes.
• Prepend. The directory server propagates both directory records and for-
warder records received from the specified neighbor, adjusting the propagation
path by appending the name of the neighbor and also adjusting the Forwarding-
Path of each forwarder record by prepending its own name. The difference
between prepend and full is that prepend instructs clients to build circuits
through this node en route to the destination, whereas full does not. Modi-
fication of other attributes is subject to the same conditions that apply to the
Full directive.
• Summarize. The directory server propagates directory records received from
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the specified neighbor, adjusting the propagation path by appending the name of
the neighbor. However, rather than propagating all forwarder records from this
neighbor, the directory server propagates only forwarder records corresponding
to directory servers. In addition, the directory server creates a Summary at-
tribute for this neighbor and adds the names of each forwarder whose forwarder
record is received from this neighbor other than the neighbor itself. The direc-
tory server should also provide one possible forwarding path to each forwarder
listed in the Summary attribute.
Similarly, the directory server creates a Compiled-Metadata attribute for this
neighbor; filtering and aggregation rules, strategies for which are described in
detail in Section 5.3, may constrain which entries are included. The directory
server may define this attribute as the union of all Metadata attributes in-
cluded in all forwarder records received via this neighbor except the forwarder
record for the neighbor itself. The directory server should also provide one
possible forwarding path, chosen according to local preference, to each Metadata
attribute listed as part of the Compiled-Metadata attribute.
• Proxy. The directory server propagates neither directory records nor forwarder
records received from the neighbor. Instead, the directory server creates a
new directory record for this neighbor, according to the following specification.
The Summary attribute of the new directory record must contain the full list
(subject to filtering and aggregation rules) of all of the names of all of the
forwarders for which the directory server received forwarder records from this
neighbor and all of the names of all of the forwarders appearing in all Summary
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attributes included in all directory records received from the specified neighbor.
For each neighboring directory serverN , the directory server should prepend its
name and the names of forwarders along the path to N to all of the forwarding
paths for all of the forwarders listed in the Summary attribute. Note that the
result is one possible forwarding path to the desired forwarder; while clientsmay
use this information to build a circuit, it is by no means canonical.
Similarly, the Compiled-Metadata attribute of the new directory record should
contain the full list (subject to filtering and aggregation rules) of all Metadata
attributes included in all forwarder records received via the specified neighbor
and each element of each Compiled-Metadata attribute included in each direc-
tory record received via the specified neighbor. In this manner, clients may
be referred to the specified neighbor when they request a forwarder name or
attribute that propagated to this directory server via the specified neighbor.
The directory server also retains one possible forwarding path, chosen accord-
ing to its local preference, to each Metadata attribute listed as part of the
Compiled-Metadata attribute. The difference between proxy and summarize is
that summarize propagates directory records indiscriminately, whereas proxy
propagates only one directory record for the given neighbor, accumulating all
of the forwarders in all directory records received from that neighbor into its
Summary attribute.
• None. The directory server does not propagate anything received from this
peer. This peering directive specifies that a directory server should send pe-
riodic directory updates to this neighbor but should not make use of any
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directory updates that it receives from this neighbor.
Consider the network topology and configuration shown in Figure 4.13, in which
the peering directive for directory server E is specified by the corresponding row in
Table 4.12. With the full peering directive, E propagates all of the records that it
receives, including the summaries that it receives from A and B. With the prepend
peering directive, E propagates all of the records that it receives, but also adds its
own name to the (otherwise empty) forwarding paths for each of the records. With
the summarize peering directive, E propagates the directory records for A and B
as before, but rather than propagating a forwarder record for D1, it lists D1 in the
Summary attribute of the directory record for D. With the proxy peering directive,
E does not propagate the directory records for A and B, since they are not direct
neighbors. Instead, E includes all forwarders advertised by C, including A, A1, B,
and B1, in the Summary attribute for C and does not include directory records for
A and B. For the none peering directive, E propagates no directory records for C or
D.
If a directory server is configured such that the hostname field of some neighbor
directive takes the form HOST "." FNAME ".exit:" PORT, then the directory server
should wait for the specified neighbor to build a persistent circuit to the directory
server before it attempts to establish contact (i.e., request a burst) with that neighbor.
Refer to Figure 4.13, located at the end of the chapter, for an example of how
peering arrangements affect propagated records.
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4.3.3 Propagation of Perspectives
There are two reasons why directory servers may choose not to propagate all data
received from their neighbors to the rest of the network: scalability and policy. In
the former case, directory servers may choose to aggregate data in order to reduce
network load, and in the latter case, directory servers may choose to avoid telling
their neighbors about received advertisements to conform to legal restrictions or to
avoid receiving unwanted traffic in the data plane.
There are two design tradeoffs relevant to aggregation. First, there is a natural
tradeoff between scalability and query latency. In small networks, it may be accept-
able to propagate full information about all perspectives, including full paths and
descriptors to any potential client location. The benefit is that clients experience
improved performance since one query will be sufficient to provide a client with all
of the information that it needs to construct a complete circuit. However, in large
networks, maintaining this consistency throughout the entire network can be quite ex-
pensive in terms of directory server resources required, and arguably more expensive
than the additional connection setup latency imposed by requiring either successive
(non-recursive) or forwarded (recursive) queries.
Second, there is a natural tradeoff between scalability and query specificity. In
small networks, it may be reasonable to provide a means by which all clients can
specify each forwarder uniquely, but in large networks, the cost to scalability asso-
ciated with maintaining specific information about each forwarder at each directory
server in the entire network may be infeasible. PAN policy directives, described in
Section 4.4, provide aggregation commands that allow individual directory servers to
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make local decisions about how to aggregate individual perspectives.
If the metadata have been aggregated, and a client wants to request a more specific
perspective than that afforded by the metadata possessed by the directory server that
it chooses to query, then it must choose some matching subset of its desired query
and query a directory server matching that subset. If the client does not succeed in
finding a suitable perspective while following a certain path, then it may backtrack,
but the client could potentially query an arbitrary number of directory servers before
establishing with certainty that a perspective matching its query does not exist.
4.4 Policy Framework
The configuration of each directory server includes a policy that defines which
routes to accept, which routes to propagate, and how to assign preferences among
routes. We use the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) as a starting
point (4). By selecting the relevant features of RPSL, adapting them to handle
the additional complexity associated with perspective descriptions, and adding some
features to improve incentives for deployment, we create a Perspective Routing Policy
Specification Language (PRPSL), a form of RPSL adapted for use with PAN directory
servers.
We begin with the IETF-specified RFC describing RPSL. Recall from Chapter 3
the analogy between PAN directory servers and autonomous systems. We provide
our specific changes below, followed by some illustrative examples.
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4.4.1 Modifications to RPSL
Since the PAN directory servers effectively play both the role of router and the
role of autonomous system in a BGP routing environment, we can eliminate all of
the router-specific classes and attributes (e.g., the inet-rtr class). The classes for
contact information (the role class) and extensibility (the dictionary class) may
still be useful, but we do not propose any modifications or extensions.
The existing RPSL as-set and peering-set classes are both designed to refer to
sets of autonomous systems, so we change the definitions to specify a set of directory
server identifiers (all directory servers are forwarders, so these are the same as self-
certifying forwarder identifiers, specified by FNAME as given in Section 4.1) instead. We
also introduce a new class, forward-set, which specifies a set of forwarder identifiers
(also represented by FNAME); the purpose is to disambiguate cases in which we refer
to directory peers and cases in which we refer to individual forwarders.
The existing RPSL route-set class describes routes in terms of IPv4 prefixes;
routes in PAN are described by perspectives instead. Hence, we change the definition
of the route-set attribute as described in Section 3.3 (specifically Table 3.1).
Similarly, the existing RPSL filter-set class describes filtering rules in terms of
autonomous systems and IPv4 prefixes; PAN filtering rules for perspectives are de-
scribed in Section 3.3. However, we do not only want the ability to filter routes based
upon perspectives; we also want the ability to filter routes based upon how perspec-
tives were received as well. For example, a directory server may want to filter a route
advertisement based upon whether it was received from some particular peer, whether
some particular forwarder appears in its forwarding path, or whether some particular
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directory server appears in its propagation path. Hence, our revised filter-set class
incorporates the filtering rules described in Table 3.2, logical operators AND, OR, and
NOT, as well as the following additional filtering options:
• neighbor <as-set>. Returns true if the neighbor from which a given route
advertisement was received is a member of the list of directory servers given by
<as-set>.
• forwarding-path:<as-set>. Returns true if any of the forwarders listed in
the forwarding path attribute of the given route advertisement is a member of
<as-set>.
• propagation-path:<as-set>. Returns true if any of the directory servers
listed in the propagation path attribute of the given route advertisement is a
member of <as-set>.
We simplify the aut-num class to eliminate the features irrelevant to PAN per-
spectives, redefining the attributes as follows. The aut-num attribute describes the
identity of the directory server in question; its format is given as a directory server
identifier. Table 4.4 provides the syntax for our modified import and export at-
tributes (note the simplifications), as well as two new attributes, expose and limit.
We define the attributes as follows:
• Import. This attribute specifies that a route matching the indicated filter
set should be accepted from the neighbors matching the indicated peering set.
The optional pref argument indicates the relative preference to assign to routes
accepted via this filtering rule.
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attribute syntax
import: from <peering-1> [pref <integer-1>]
. . .
from <peering-N> [pref <integer-N>]
accept <filter>
export: to <peering-1> [pref <integer-1>]
[accounting <accounting-set-1>]
. . .
to <peering-N> [pref <integer-N>]
[accounting <accounting-set-N>]
announce <filter>
expose: to <forward-1> [pref <integer-1>]
[accounting <accounting-set-1>]
. . .
to <forward-N> [pref <integer-N>]
[accounting <accounting-set-N>]
announce <filter>
limit: for <accounting-set-1> [allocate <bandwidth-1>]
. . .
for <accounting-set-N> [allocate <bandwidth-N>]
Table 4.4: Modified Syntax for RPSL aut-num Class Attributes. PAN sim-
plifies the import and export class attributes but preserves the use of these attributes
to assign preferences. The new expose attribute directs how directory servers may
answer requests from clients. The new limit attribute and the associated accounting
action govern the management of network resources.
• Export. This attribute specifies that a route matching the indicated filter
set should be announced to the neighbors matching the indicated peering set.
At most one route for a given perspective may be announced to each neigh-
bor. The optional pref argument indicates the relative preference to assign to
routes announced via this filtering rule; preferences specified via the export
attribute have precedence over preferences specified via the import attribute
for announcements to peers. The optional accounting action takes a single
argument, an accounting-set, which corresponds to a particular category of
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traffic whose combined bandwidth is limited using the limit attribute.
• Expose. Unlike BGP speakers, which advertise routes only to their peers, PAN
directory servers advertise routes to clients as well. The expose attribute allows
directory server operators to specify which routes to advertise to clients when
they request a route to a particular perspective. Clients optionally authenticate
to the directory server, and routes matching the specified filter set are ex-
posed to clients matching the specified forward set. The default behavior is to
advertise all routes to any client that asks. The optional pref argument indi-
cates the relative preference to assign to routes advertised via this filtering rule;
preferences specified via the expose attribute have precedence over preferences
specified via the import attribute for announcements to peers. The optional
accounting action takes a single argument, an accounting-set, which corre-
sponds to a particular category of traffic whose combined bandwidth is limited
using the limit attribute.
• Limit. This attribute describes the volume of traffic that a directory server
will carry for routes grouped in a particular accounting-set. The accounting
action is useful as a means of limiting the volume of traffic that a directory
server will handle for its neighbors, possibly to ensure that its implemented
forwarding policy matches its incentives.
Note that both pref and accounting options are strictly internal; they are not
advertised to neighbors or clients in any form.
For the route class, we make no changes, though we emphasize the particular
attributes that we use for aggregation:
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• components <filter-set>. The set of routes that form the aggregate.
• aggr-bndry <as-set>. The directory servers in the given as-set define the
aggregation boundary beyond which only the aggregate route is exported.
• aggr-mtd {inbound, outbound}. This attribute indicates whether aggrega-
tion is performed when the route is received or when the route is advertised.
• export-comps <filter-set>. The unaggregated perspectives indicated by
the given filter-set are advertised outside the aggregation boundary specified
by the aggr-bndry attribute (note that this field provides exceptions to the
aggregation boundary; the purpose is to satisfy external policy constraints).
• inject <as-set>. The directory servers in the given as-set perform the
aggregation indicated by this route instance.
• holes <filter-set>. The perspectives indicated by filter-set constitute
standing exceptions to the aggregation rule indicated by this route instance.
4.4.2 Examples
Next, we provide some examples to illustrate how the policy framework can be
applied to express routine policy configurations. We consider the topology given by
Figure 4.11.
Example 1. Import Policy. DS5 accepts all routes except routes to Taiwan from
DS3 and accepts routes to Taiwan from DS1 and DS2 only.
aut-num: DS5
import: from DS3 accept NOT loc:Taiwan.*;
from DS1 AND DS2 accept loc:Taiwan.*;
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Figure 4.11: Example Topology to Illustrate Policy Configuration.
Example 2. Preferences. DS5 accepts all routes from both DS3 and DS4, but
prefers routes from DS4 (routes with a lower pref value are preferred). DS5 also
allows all clients to query for all perspectives.
aut-num: DS5
import: from DS3 accept ANY pref 2;
from DS4 accept ANY pref 1;
expose: to F-ANY advertise ANY;
Example 3. Exposure policy. DS5 accepts all routes from DS3 and DS4, announces
all routes to DS1 and DS3, and announces all routes except routes to Tibet to DS2.
DS5 allows all clients to query for perspectives in Massachusetts, but allows only
clients in filter set FSET1 to query for perspectives in China that provide access to
political content.
aut-num: DS5
import: from DS3 accept ANY;
from DS4 accept ANY;
expose: to F-ANY advertise loc:US.MA;
to FSET1 advertise loc:CN AND ief:+political;
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export: to DS1 AND DS3 announce ANY;
to DS2 announce NOT loc:CN.Tibet.*;
Example 4. Provenance-specific filter sets. DS5 accepts all routes from DS1,
except those with F2 in the forwarding path, and all routes from DS2 except those
with F3 in the propagation path. DS5 advertises all routes to DS3, except those with F3
in the propagation path, and all routes to DS4, except those with F2 in the forwarding
path.
aut-num: DS5
import: from DS1 accept NOT forwarding-path:F2;
from DS2 accept NOT propagation-path:F3;
export: to DS3 announce NOT propagation-path:F3;
to DS4 announce NOT forwarding-path:F2;
Example 5. Accounting. DS5 accepts all routes from each of its neighbors, but
prefers them in a particular order; lower pref values indicate greater preference.
However, when choosing which routes to advertise to DS4, DS5 prefers to advertise
routes from DS3 rather than from DS2, when possible. Routes advertised to DS4 have
a total combined bandwidth limitation of 50MB/s, and routes advertised to DS3 have
a total combined bandwidth limitation of 100 MB/s.
aut-num: DS5
import: from DS1 accept ANY pref 1;
from DS2 accept ANY pref 2;
from DS3 accept ANY pref 3;
from DS4 accept ANY pref 4;
export: to DS3 announce ANY accounting ACCTSET1;
to DS4 announce neighbor:DS2 pref 7
accounting ACCTSET2;
to DS4 announce neighbor:DS3 pref 5
accounting ACCTSET2;
limit: for ACCTSET1 allocate 100MB/s;
for ACCTSET2 allocate 50MB/s;
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Example 6. Aggregation. If DS5 receives advertisements from DS4 for perspec-
tives in Canada, it only propagates the advertisements as an aggregate outside the
aggregation boundary indicated by the union of DS5 and DS4. If DS5 receives adver-
tisements from DS1 or DS3 for perspectives that allow access to news content, then it
aggregates the advertisements into a single advertisement for news content. Similarly,
if DS5 receives advertisements from DS1 or DS2 for perspectives that allow access to
sites located in Iraq, then it aggregates the advertisements into a single advertisement
for Iraq. Note that advertisements from DS1 for perspectives in Iraq that allow access
to news content are propagated as two aggregates: one for news and one for Iraq.
route: loc:Canada;
components: loc:Canada.*;
aggr-bndry: DS4 OR DS5;
aggr-mtd: outbound AS-ANY;
route: ief:news;
components: ief:+news;
aggr-bndry: DS1 OR DS3 OR DS5;
aggr-mtd: outbound AS-ANY;
route: loc:Iraq;
components: loc:Iraq.*;
aggr-bndry: DS1 OR DS2 OR DS5;
aggr-mtd: outbound AS-ANY;
Section 5.3 provides a discussion of strategies for aggregation and bandwidth ac-
counting, highlighting their usefulness in achieving scalability and compatibility with
operator incentives.
Chapter 4: Directory Service 177
4.5 Dynamic Learning
The salient challenge in reconciling scalability and performance is to improve
circuit building by reducing backtracking in a manner that does not require storing
too much perspective information among the directory servers. There is a natural
tradeoff between backtracking and advertising combinations of attributes, so directory
servers should only advertise combinations of attributes based upon their usefulness
to users, dynamically determining which queries are popular and which are not and
deciding whether to advertise a perspective on this basis.
4.5.1 Exponential Problem in Managing Perspectives
Each perspective consists of a set of attributes, and users of a Perspective Access
Network can use a set of attributes to specify a class of perspectives from which
they would like to view the Internet. The cost of broadcasting all client requests to
the entire network is overwhelming, so we propose a scheme by which perspectives
advertise themselves to a distributed directory service. Unfortunately, if the number
of possible attributes is too large, directory servers will be unable to store all possible
combinations. For example, if there are thirty possible attributes, then there would
be 230 (over one billion) distinct combinations of attributes. By contrast, modern
BGP routing tables contain fewer than two hundred thousand prefixes.
For some applications of Perspective Access Networks, clients would not be ex-
pected to request arbitrary combinations of attributes, and for those applications,
scalability is not an issue. However, for applications that require more flexibility for
clients, such as circumvention of political filtering, scalability becomes a challenge as
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the distinctiveness of perspectives that clients request from the system may poten-
tially grow quite large.
One possible way to address this problem is to advertise individual attributes
separately, and require clients to systematically probe for combinations by guessing
which directory servers know a particular combination and backtracking when they
guess incorrectly. While this may work as a one-off solution, it is undesirable since
it may take clients an unreasonably long time (e.g., the time required grows faster
than linearly as the network size scales) to find a perspective. Fortunately, for some
applications, only a subset of all possible sets of attributes are actually requested
often enough by clients to be important to maintain in the directories. In these cases,
we might only need assurance that directories will be able to efficiently accommodate
the most commonly sought-after perspectives. Even if there is space to accommodate
enough of the most commonly sought-after perspectives, the set of commonly sought-
after perspectives may change over time, in which case we need a means of ensuring
that we can handle the natural churn intrinsic to the set of popular perspectives.
We consider the selection issues that affect the tradeoff between expressivity of
requests and performance of the directory servers:
• Churn: the minute-to-minute popularity contest among perspectives, possibly
resulting from governments adjusting their filtering policies.
• Drift: the change in the set of available attributes over time, possibly resulting
from long-term social trends.
• Requests: whether some sorts of requests are intrinsically more likely to oc-
cur than others, for example requests for combinations of a smaller number of
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attributes.
With these issues in mind, we present a method for using hysteresis to improve
stability, and we specify an algorithm for determining the most sought-after per-
spectives. Then, we describe a particular case study, political filtering, in which the
number of potential perspectives scales exponentially with the number of distinct at-
tributes, and for which our algorithm allows us to avoid excessive churn. Finally, we
use arguments based upon evidence from the development of content-filtering tech-
niques, legal discussion, and international policy literature to assert that the routing
tables in the directory servers will be reasonably stable.
4.5.2 Hysteresis Approach
Suppose thatN is the number of distinct attribute sets that are sufficiently popular
to be meaningful, andM is the maximum table size that a directory server can handle.
If N is smaller than M , then we have no problem. However, if N is larger than M ,
then churn will occur as the directory server discards existing attribute sets to make
room for new ones that also meet the desired criteria. The instability could potentially
affect downstream directory servers as well, as particular attribute combinations are
repeatedly added and removed.
The solution in this case is to use hysteresis to induce stability among the attribute
sets maintained in the routing tables of individual directory servers.
There are several established techniques for implementing hysteresis in lists, all
of which have the effect of inhibiting changes in the set of entries. We outline some
hysteresis techniques and the situations that brought them about:
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BGP Route Flap Dampening
The goal of interdomain routing is to ensure that the various autonomous sys-
tems within the network have routes to all presently available destinations. If an
autonomous system learns of a way (or a better way according to its own policy) to
reach a particular prefix, it propagates the route advertisement to its peers. If an au-
tonomous system discovers that a route to a particular prefix has become unavailable,
it propagates a withdrawal, indicating that the route is no longer available. Occasion-
ally, network errors or misconfiguration cause route flapping, a condition in which the
route to a particular prefix is advertised and withdrawn repeatedly. Unstable routes
cause problems by unnecessarily increasing the traffic between BGP peers and con-
sequently increasing the processing performed by these peers. The task of avoiding
route flapping presents a challenge: while accepting or maintaining an inferior route
to a destination for a period of time is not a disaster, accepting or maintaining an
invalid route to a destination can be a serious problem.
Route flap dampening is designed to reduce the impact of unstable routes on
the network by systematically inhibiting the acceptance of new routes. There are
two specific approaches. The first approach uses fixed timers to enqueue updates for
a period of time and then accept all of the updates atomically, as a batch. Since
route flapping tends to occur over intervals of tens of minutes to hours, the effective
use of fixed timers alone to control dampening would necessarily have a significant
deleterious impact on routing table convergence. The second approach is to suppress
the acceptance of routes that have been recently observed to be “flapping.” Thus,
if a route is added and removed quickly, it receives a penalty that exponentially
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decays over time, and if the accumulated penalty value is too high, then further
advertisements of that route are ignored until the penalty value subsides to a level
that permits the acceptance of the route (139).
Securities Indices
Securities indices exist to gauge the overall performance of a broad class of secu-
rities. Index funds are often created to allow investors to take positions on the broad
class of securities without having to manually manage the weights of individual com-
ponents themselves. Some investors use indices as a hedge, to take relative positions
on individual securities relative to the market as a whole. Indices are periodically
rebalanced to ensure that the set of securities remains an appropriate cross-section of
the market. Since trading carries an associated cost, investors have an incentive to
prefer investing in index funds whose composition remains stable.
There are several established ways of creating buffers that systemically limit the
“turnover,” i.e., the number of routine changes in the composition of the index.
One method is to require certain performance metrics to be consistent for a few
rebalancing periods before they cause a change in the index composition; consider the
continued eligibility requirement for adjusted market capitalization of an individual
index component of the NASDAQ-100 Index (92). A second method is to create
a “buffer zone”: suppose that there are two parameters for a single metric used to
determine index membership. If the value of the metric is greater than the larger
value, then the security is added to the index; if it is less than the smaller value, then
the security is removed from the index; but if it is between the two values, the security
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remains in its current state. This approach is described in the methodology overview
for Morningstar Indices (89). A third method, which is particularly appropriate if the
rules of the index require always having exactly N elements, is to maintain a ranking
of the top N + k elements, and only remove an element from the index if its rank
falls below N + k. The NASDAQ-100 Index uses this strategy as well in its periodic
Ranking Review (92).
Frequency-Based Replacement
Virtual memory caching reduces the incidence of high-latency disk access. Know-
ing which pages to cache and which to discard is the critical challenge, and the best
decisions are those which accurately predict future page requests. Relatively naive
strategies such as discarding and replacing pages that are least recently used (LRU)
can help, but they can be suboptimal. A better approach might be to investigate the
frequency of requests for individual pages, and not discard pages if they have been
accessed frequently in the recent past.
Maintaining detailed records of the frequency of requests and the times at which
they occurred is potentially cumbersome, requiring substantial time and space. One
way of handling this issue is to use generational replacement, which involves organizing
cached pages into tiers based upon the frequency of observed requests (62). After a
page is initially requested, it spends some time cached in a pool for newly cached
pages. Subsequently, rather than replacing this entry, it is moved to a pool in the
middle of a priority chain. If a page is requested sufficiently frequently, it is promoted
to a higher-ordered pool; if it is requested sufficiently infrequently, it is demoted to
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a lower-ordered pool. When a new page is cached, the page to be replaced is chosen
from the lowest-ordered non-empty pool. By providing some differentiation between
pages that are naturally requested frequently over a long period of time and arbitrary
pages that might happen to be accessed once, this strategy allows a smarter prediction
of future page accesses in real-world scenarios.
Discussion
The directory service in Perspective Access Networks has some characteristics of
a routing table and some characteristics of a fixed-size securities index, so the table
of attribute sets reflects these characteristics. The table of attribute sets is like a
fixed-size securities index in that directory servers want the number of entries in the
table to remain bounded. Thus, for maintaining the set of popular queries, we use a
stability buffer. In both cases, the directory servers want to minimize the number of
unnecessary updates.
Additionally, the table is like a routing table in that individual directory servers
must propagate new paths for the same attribute set if they are received and selected
to maintain path vector correctness; hence, for routing table changes, we choose a
method akin to route-flap dampening. Suppose that a given attribute set is listed
among routes available to a particular directory server. If the route for that attribute
set is repeatedly advertised and withdrawn, then that may result in propagating
changes to neighbors (regardless of whether the attribute set is a combination of at-
tributes or not). So, to reduce the effect of such oscillatory behavior, if we observe that
a route is being repeatedly advertised and withdrawn, we suppress the propagation
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of advertisements for that route for some time period.
We recommend the following approach. To determine the set of attributes, we use
the N +k approach: suppose that a directory server wants to advertise a table of size
N . Then, the directory server will track the top N + k queries for attribute sets for
which a route is available. A new attribute set will be added only to fill a vacancy
left by a departing attribute set, and an old attribute set will be removed only if its
rank falls below N + k. We assume that the directory server has the space necessary
to store entries for a substantially larger number of attribute sets for the purpose
of counting frequencies. (Presumably, queries that occur fewer than some minimum
number of times per unit time period can be discarded from this larger list.)
4.5.3 Algorithm
We provide pseudocode for the behavior of the directory server in response to two
triggers related to perspective ranking: (a) the event in which a client request for a
particular attribute set is received, and (b) a periodic event signalling the rebalancing
of the list of the most popular attributes.
Suppose that the directory server is continuously maintaining a list of available
routes to particular attribute sets. Also suppose that N and k are as described in
Section 4.5.2, i.e., N is the number of combined attribute sets to advertise, and N+k
is the rank below which currently advertised combined attribute sets will be removed
from the list. Then, our algorithm to determine which perspectives is as follows:
01 Routine Request( S ):
02 If NOT Count[S]:
03 Count[S] <- 0
04 Count[S] <- Count[S] + 1
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05 ForEach S’ in AllSubsets( S ):
06 Request( S’ )
07 Return()
08
09 Routine Rebalance():
10 Ranked <- Sort( Count )
11 NewTable <- []
12 For Position := 0 to N + k :
13 If CurrentlyInTable( Ranked[Position] )
14 AND CurrentlyAvailable( Ranked[Position] ):
15 Append( NewTable, Ranked[Position] )
16
17 ToAdd <- N - SizeOf( New Table )
18 For Position := 0 to N + k :
19 If CurrentlyAvailable( Ranked[Position] )
20 AND NOT CurrentlyInTable( Ranked[Position] ):
21 ToAdd <- ToAdd - 1
22 If ToAdd < 0 :
23 Break
24 Append( NewTable, Ranked[Position] )
25
26 Count <- {}
27 Return(NewTable)
The Request routine (Lines 1–7) runs whenever the directory server receives a
request from a client for some attribute set S. The Count data structure is an asso-
ciative array that maps attribute sets to positive integers, each of which represents
the number of times in which the particular attribute set has been requested. The
AllSubsets function returns all non-empty subsets of a given attribute set; notice
that a request for an attribute set is a request for all non-empty subsets of itself as
well.
The Rebalance routine (Lines 9–26) runs periodically, whenever the directory
server wishes to update its list of popular attribute sets. The Ranked data structure
is an array that holds the list of attribute sets requested since the last time Rebalance
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was called, sorted by popularity The CurrentlyInTable function takes an attribute
set and returns true if the attribute set is currently being advertised (i.e., it was deter-
mined to be in the top N last time), and false otherwise. The CurrentlyAvailable
function takes an attribute set and returns true if there is an available route to the
attribute set, and false otherwise. Lines 12–15 ensure that the top N+k attribute sets
remain in the list of attribute sets to continue propagating, so long as they are still
available. Lines 17–24 fill the remainder of the list with the highest-ranked available
attribute sets that were not among the top N + k.
In Section 5.5.1, we show how to evaluate our algorithm in the context of one
particular use of Perspective Access Networks.
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Figure 4.12: Peering Directives. Suppose that a forwarder publishes to directory
server A, and directory server B accepts updates from directory server A subject
to some particular peering directive. If the peering directive is Full or Prepend,
then B will propagate the forwarder record in addition to a directory record for A.
If the peering directive is Summarize or Proxy, then B will include the name of
the forwarder in the Summary attribute in the directory record for A. If the peering
directive is None, then B will propagate no information about A or the forwarder
records propagated from A. White pages are forwarder records; gray pages labelled d
are directory updates.
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Figure 4.13: Peering Directives. This example topology illustrates the function-
ality of the various peering directives. Refer to Table 4.5 for an explanation.
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directive records propagated attributes
full dir A, fwd A summary: A1
dir B, fwd B summary: B1
dir C, fwd C
dir D, fwd D
fwd D1
fwd E
prepend dir A, fwd A summary: A1
fwd-path: E
dir B, fwd B summary: B1
fwd-path: E
dir C, fwd C fwd-path: E
dir D, fwd D fwd-path: E
fwd D1 fwd-path: E
fwd E
summarize dir A, fwd A summary: A1
dir B, fwd B summary: B1
dir C, fwd C
dir D, fwd D summary: D1
fwd E
proxy dir C, fwd C summary: A,A1,B,B1
dir D, fwd D summary: D1
fwd E
none fwd E
Table 4.5: Peering Directives. Consider the scenario illustrated by Figure 4.13,
in which {A,B,C,D,E} are directory servers, with rectangular boxes indicating the
peering directives for the indicated neighbors and {A1, B1, D1} are standalone for-
warders. The table indicates what records are propagated and what corresponding at-
tributes are defined when E applies the indicated peering directives for its neighbors,
C and D.
Chapter 5
Evaluation
In this chapter we provide quantitative and qualitative arguments to assess the
technical merits of Perspective Access Networks.
Our quantitative results are based upon experiments performed on our realized
prototype, Blossom. The implementation of Blossom is mostly intended to provide
a proof of concept and a framework for discussing the technical issues. Nonetheless,
we are able to empirically observe some of the more interesting issues related to
scalability and performance.
Without a realistic user base in the live Internet, it is difficult to quantitatively
determine the relative importance of the various design tradeoffs discussed in the
previous chapters. However, the opportunities for qualitative evaluation are substan-
tial. Part of this chapter is devoted to exploring the practical issues associated with
deployment of Perspective Access Networks. We intend our judgments to provide
some direction and insight for how to best capitalize on the features provided by our
infrastructure.
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We divide this chapter into four sections. The first two sections provide empir-
ical analysis and discussion. In the first section, we assess the user experience by
evaluating the performance of the Blossom client. In the second section, we consider
the directory service; we explore the effects of the various directory server configu-
ration parameters on network scalability. We also briefly discuss some issues related
to the dynamic behavior of the PAN infrastructure. The last two sections provide
qualitative evaluation and judgments about the practical usefulness of our system as
proposed. In the third section, we focus upon deployability issues. Here we present
some strategies for the use of aggregation to address network scalability as well as
strategies for the use of filtering and bandwidth provisioning to address the incentives
of PAN infrastructure providers. In the final section, we discuss the practical appli-
cability of PAN, including what we see as its uses in the near-term and speculation
about how PAN might be used in the future.
5.1 Client Performance
The experience of end-users of the PAN infrastructure is largely determined by
the behavior of the PAN client. There are different components to client performance.
The first component is the lookup process, which contributes to circuit setup latency;
this factor is influenced by the degree of aggregation and the extent to which directory
servers are able to answer queries from clients. The second component is the ongoing
performance of the tunnel after it has been constructed. Recall that we intend PAN
to be suitable for low-latency applications, such as Web browsing and interactive
sessions; we evaluate the performance of our Blossom client with this decision in
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mind:
• First, we assess circuit setup performance in detail, including both the selection
of circuits using the Blossom directory servers as well as the construction of
circuits using Tor. We show how to isolate the aspects of the observed perfor-
mance that we can improve from the aspects that are dictated by the underlying
network.
• Second, we briefly highlight relevant aspects of the performance of Tor, which
serves as the underlying transport and circuit-building substrate for Blossom.
5.1.1 Circuit Setup
We deployed Blossom on about 300 PlanetLab nodes for the purposes of con-
ducting empirical tests. To test setup latency for circuits involving multiple hops
through the forwarding network and the effect of client queries on path setup time,
we generated some paths of various lengths using randomly chosen PlanetLab nodes
and constructed circuits using those paths. Using these paths, we performed two
experiments:
• Generic Circuit-Building Test. We tested the time taken for Tor to build
a circuit for a specified path by requesting to send TCP traffic to some port on
the final node in the circuit. The results of this test are represented as solid
triangles in Figure 5.2. Each triangle represents the median observed TCP
connection setup latency using predetermined circuits of that particular length
over ten independent trials. We are interested in using PAN for interactive
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applications, and by comparison, the International Telecommunications Union
recommends an average call setup delay of eight seconds for international calls
via the ISDN (67). Furthermore, user studies have shown that users sometimes
shift the focus of their attention after as little as two seconds (112).
• Circuit-Building Test with Queries. In our second experiment, we tested
the time taken for Tor to build a circuit according to a path that the Blossom
client determines by iteratively issuing queries to each successive directory server
along the path to the final node in the circuit. The results of this test are
represented as hollow circles in Figure 5.2. Each circle represents the median
observed TCP connection setup latency using dynamically determined circuits
of that particular length over ten independent trials. In each case, the number
of queries performed is equal to the number of hops minus one. Note that
connection setup consistently takes longer when the Blossom client performs
queries.
Whether a client will have to perform queries or not depends upon how directory
servers within the Blossom network are configured. Figure 5.1 illustrates the interac-
tion that takes place between a Blossom client and directory servers when the client
extends the circuit from length n to length n + 1. The top portion of the interac-
tion, marked “Query component,” only occurs when the client issues a query before
extending the circuit.
In both cases, since the process of extending a circuit from length n to length
n + 1 involves sending messages back and forth over the entire O(n) length of the
circuit, the circuit setup time scales quadratically with the length of the circuit. The
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Figure 5.1: Extending a Circuit (with Querying). Clients that do not already
know the next hop in the circuit must first send a query to the current directory server
before instructing Tor to extend the circuit.
two parabolic lines in Figure 5.2 correspond to a quadratic least-squares regression
of the data from each of the two experiments, respectively; Table 5.1 provides the
coefficients. Observe that queries introduce noticeable additional latency, particularly
as circuit length increases. Figure 5.3 presents the same results, except subtracting
the expected network delay times between pairs of nodes (i.e., all of the round-trip
times indicated in Figure 5.1). We obtained the pairwise network latency values from
a set of measurements conducted by C. Yoshikawa.1
The circuit-setup experiments involved randomly-chosen PlanetLab (66) nodes.
As a result, while the experiments do not correspond to worst-case scenarios, the
results are “conservative” in the sense that the neighboring nodes are chosen without
1PlanetLab: All Sites Pings, http://ping.ececs.uc.edu/ping/
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Figure 5.2: Circuit Setup Latency. Time taken to build a circuit and establish
an end-to-end TCP session for circuits of varying lengths. Circuits built according
to predetermined paths are shown as filled triangles; circuits built via paths deter-
mined dynamically via Blossom querying are shown as hollow circles. The solid lines
represent quadratic least-squares regression curves for the two experiments.
regard for the underlying network topology. We suspect that in actual PAN networks,
administrators of PAN directory servers would arrange themselves in a less random,
more advantageous topology. Observe that network latency accounts for the vast
majority of delay associated with connection setup. Unfortunately, there is no way
to reimplement Blossom that avoids this delay; the only solution is to improve the
underlying network. However, Figure 5.3 shows that system-internal delay accounts
for some portion of the time spent during circuit setup, and this particular delay can
potentially be improved by reimplementing Blossom. Note that this delay will also
increase with circuit length, since establishing longer circuits involves interaction with
a greater number of directory servers, which scales linearly with circuit length, and
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Figure 5.3: Circuit Setup Latency, Adjusted for Network Delay. This
graph presents the same experiments as Figure 5.2, but adjusted to remove the round-
trip times introduced by network delay. Note that the scale of the y-axis differs from
Figure 5.2.
more cryptographic operations, which scale quadratically with circuit length.
As described in Section 4.1.2, when forwarder records providing access to the
desired perspective do not exist, PAN clientsmay build a path based upon forwarder-
specific or directory-specific forwarding path information contained in the Summary
or Compiled-Metadata fields. Our experiments expose the following tradeoff: if a
client tries to explicitly build a path based upon forwarding path information, it
sacrifices some measure of control over the path as well as some confidence that the
forwarding path information is accurate, but the process of querying all directory
servers along the forwarding path degrades circuit setup performance.
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experiment a b c
predefined 0.0674 -0.2960 0.7310
dynamically determined 0.1867 -0.5926 0.7721
predefined minus RTT 0.0138 -0.1785 0.5263
dynamically determined minus RTT 0.0268 -0.0483 0.0330
Table 5.1: Coefficients for Quadratic Least-Squares Regression. These
coefficients define the parabolas defined by the equation ax2 + bx + c = 0 for the
experimental results illustrated in Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
Overall, if we accept the ITU eight-second call setup delay recommendation for
the PAN circuit construction process, our experiments illustrate that for sufficiently
short circuit lengths (up to eight hops for dynamically determined circuits, up to
twelve hops for predefined circuits), circuit setup latency is reasonable for human
users.
5.1.2 Data Plane
Next, we consider the ongoing performance of circuits once they have been es-
tablished. Tor provides a proof-of-concept of a special-purpose overlay network that
routes general-purpose traffic, and the Tor experiment has demonstrated the success-
ful, unmediated deployment of networks of this type for altruistic purposes. Blossom
uses Tor (38) for building circuits and subsequently transporting the data of TCP
streams between client applications and servers via the established circuits. Therefore,
a thorough evaluation of Blossom thus includes a consideration of the appropriateness
of using the data plane that Tor provides.
Presently, the Tor network is optimized for interactive applications, and empiri-
cally observed usage patterns reflect this fact. Researchers at Rice University have
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discovered that the most popular uses of Tor are low-latency applications such as
Web browsing (69). Traffic to the TCP ports most commonly used for web servers
(80 and 443) constitutes over three-fourths of the traffic, and much of the remainder
of the traffic appears to consist of low-latency instant messaging protocols such as
IRC and interactive shell applications such as SSH. Other anonymity systems such
as I2P2 may be more well-suited to high-latency applications such as filesharing; the
research to demonstrate this is currently inconclusive.
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Figure 5.4: Throughput of High-Capacity Tor Nodes. Data from 28 April
2006.
The limitations of the Tor anonymity network as it exists today can be suffi-
2I2P, http://www.i2p.net/
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Figure 5.5: Circuit Setup Latency of High-Capacity Tor Nodes. Data
from 28 April 2006.
ciently explained by the nature of the individual forwarders of which it is composed.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the throughput and latency of each of the twenty highest-
capacity Tor nodes that exit to port 80, respectively.3 (Note that these observations
involve Tor exclusively and do not measure Blossom.) The most active Tor forwarders
carry a peak bandwidth of over two megabytes of traffic per second. The current us-
age pattern indicates that a typical stream using one of these forwarders chosen at
random can expect a sustained throughput in excess of 200 kB/s. Observe that the
circuit setup latency for the Tor nodes is somewhat greater than the latency observed
3Capacity is determined by highest bandwidth achieved over a ten-second interval during the last
24-hour period. Refer to http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/tor-spec.txt for details.
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in our experiments described in Section 5.1.1; this may be the result of limitations
related to the large number of concurrent connections among Tor nodes. As of April
2006, the high-performance Tor forwarders running at Harvard can expect to have
established roughly 2000 concurrent connections at any given time.
Ultimately, the Tor network as currently implemented has some important short-
comings. In particular, Tor is not implemented in hardware, so individual Tor for-
warders are not nearly as powerful as they could be. Additionally, the Tor net-
work consists of low-cost, general-purpose personal computers operated by volun-
teers, largely on networks not designed to carry Tor traffic. Furthermore, the most
recent implementation of Tor has serious performance limitations on popular oper-
ating systems, specifically Windows XP and derivatives. As a result, many of the
servers are not performing close to their theoretical potential, and deployment has
been somewhat hindered.
Additionally, there are some concerns about impact of the use of Tor circuits
on end-to-end performance; two main factors affect performance. First, the core of
the Internet generally does not constrain the bandwidth available to an end-to-end
connection, and latency in the core is relatively small. However, the forwarders in the
Tor overlay are generally personal computers and servers at the edge; if all forwarders
and the client have similar, symmetric upstream connectivity, then a circuit of length
n can be expected to increase perceived latency by a factor of 2n+1. Second, the act
of concatenating TCP sessions may interfere with TCP congestion control, causing
degraded performance.
However, the popularity and usage patterns of Tor corroborate its utility for low-
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latency applications. As this discussion has shown, performance of these systems is
adequate for a variety of conventional Internet applications, and the choice of Tor for
the Blossom data plane is therefore appropriate.
5.2 Directory Performance
To illustrate some of the design tradeoffs inherent to the PAN directory service,
we performed empirical measurements using a deployment of roughly 300 nodes on
PlanetLab. In our experiments, each of the nodes serves as a forwarder in the PAN
overlay, and some subset of the nodes also serve as directory servers. We refer to
nodes that perform just forwarding as standalone forwarders.
For each of our experiments, we assigned forwarders and directory servers at ran-
dom from the set of PlanetLab nodes that we had previously determined to be respon-
sive. As with the circuit-setup experiments described in Section 5.1.1, the selection
process for these experiments assigns forwarder roles randomly, so the topologies that
we chose are “conservative” in the sense that pairs of nodes that directly communicate
with each other are determined without regard to the underlying network infrastruc-
ture. We suspect that pairwise communicators in most PAN networks deployed in
practice would be (at least somewhat) topologically close rather than entirely random.
5.2.1 Infrastructure Performance
The PAN control plane consists of communication among directory servers and
between individual directory servers and forwarders. To evaluate the control plane in
terms of control messages and performance between directory servers, we generated a
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symbol description
N number of nodes (∼ 300)
nf number of standalone forwarders per directory server (∼ 16)
nd number of directory servers (∼ 20)
sd size of directory record (varies)
sˆd size of forwarder record with summary (varies)
sf size of forwarder record (∼ 4 kB)
δ number of neighbors per directory server (∼ 4)
Td directory update interval (∼ 60 s)
Tf forwarder fetch interval (∼ 600 s)
Te forwarder record expiration (∼ 86400 s)
Table 5.2: Control Plane Traffic Parameters.
number of different topologies by varying the topology, update frequency, and peering
directives (as described in Section 4.3). Table 5.2 provides a list of the parameters
relevant to our infrastructure experiments.
We then performed a series of experiments that involve selecting different combi-
nations of values for Td, nf , and δ, as well as different peering directives (specifically,
full versus summarize versus proxy). We observed the size and frequency of mes-
sages sent between directories and standalone forwarders as well as messages sent
among directory servers. In practice, we expect low churn for perspectives, as we
describe in Section 5.5.
In each case, we used a set of N nodes, selecting nf standalone forwarders per
directory server, leaving nd = dN/nfe. We organized the standalone forwarders into
nd groups of nf , such that each forwarder in a group publishes its forwarder record to
the same directory server and each directory server receives forwarder records from a
fixed number of neighbors, as shown in Figure 5.6. Note that as we increase the value
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Figure 5.6: Directory Topology. In our experiments, we organize the directory
servers in a symmetric, circular topology in which all directory servers have the same
number of neighbors (δ) and the same number of standalone forwarders per directory
server (nf).
of nf , the number of directory servers decreases, since N is presumed to be constant.
For each experiment, we organized the set of the directory servers into a sym-
metric, circular topology in which each directory servers has exactly δ neighbors.
Forwarders contact their assigned directory servers to publish their forwarder records
and download the latest version of the directory every Tf seconds If the directory
updates are reliable, then Tf depends entirely upon churn, and since we expect low
churn, the value for Tf should not be too small. Directory servers push updates
(such as changes to descriptors, withdrawals for forwarders that have failed) to other
directory servers every Td seconds.
Our experiments investigate the following questions:
• What effect does the degree of connectivity, δ, have on the overall amount of
traffic on the control plane?
• What effect does the extent of clustering nf have on the throughput of con-
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trol messages sent amongst directory servers and between directory servers and
standalone forwarders?
• What effect do peering directives summarize and proxy have on the overall
throughput of control messages?
• What effect does the interval Td between directory updates have on the transfer
rate of control messages between directory servers?
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Figure 5.7: Directory Update Interval. Effect of perturbing Td while setting
δ = 4, nf = 8, and peering directive summarize. (The data transfer rate shown is for
the control plane.)
By our model, the following equation governs the control data rate r generated
by each directory server in the control plane, measured in bytes per second:
r =
nfu
Tf
+
δu
Tk
(5.1)
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Figure 5.8: Forwarder Connectedness. Effect of perturbing δ while setting Td =
60, nf = 8, and peering directive summarize. (The data transfer rate shown is for
the control plane.)
The first term describes the interaction with standalone forwarders, and the second
term describes the interaction with neighboring directory servers. The value of Tk is
determined by the extent to which the records held by individual directory servers
have converged. In an ideal situation, the denominator of the first term would be
exactly Te, though our implementation makes no effort to achieve this goal. The
relationships between the various interval values are given by the following expression:
Td ≤ Tk ≤ Tf ≤ Te (5.2)
The value of u in Equation 5.1 is determined by the particular peering directive
used, and we use the following equations to model how u varies with topology and
the size of records:
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Figure 5.9: Forwarders per Directory Server. Effect of perturbing nf while
setting Td = 60, δ = 4, and peering directive summarize. (The data transfer rate
shown is for the control plane, and the x axis represents δ, the number of directory
server neighbors per directory server.)
ufull = ndsd +Nsf (5.3)
usummarize = ndsˆd + (nd + nf )sf (5.4)
uproxy = δsˆd + nfsf (5.5)
Figures 5.7 through 5.9 depict the approximate outbound data rate for individual
directory servers as observed. The two terms in Equation 5.1 refer to the two lines in
the figures.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the effect of varying the frequency of updates between direc-
tory servers. As the duration between updates increases, the quantity of outbound
Chapter 5: Evaluation 207
traffic to other directory servers decreases in inverse proportion to Td. So, improving
the convergence time for the PAN routing tables requires a concomitant investment
of bandwidth.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the effect of varying the number of directory server neigh-
bors (δ) to which each directory server is connected. As δ increases, the volume of
outbound traffic to other directory servers increases linearly, since changes in internal
state are propagated to all directory server neighbors (because of stability, this is a
potentially rare event). Therefore, improving the robustness of the system by increas-
ing the connectivity between nodes also requires an investment in bandwidth. The
figure shows the outcome of an experiment using the summarize peering directive,
but it is important to note that if the proxy peering directive were used instead,
then the volume of control plane messages would still increase proportionally with δ,
but the size and frequency of the messages would be reduced, since each directory
server is expected to share only δ (rather than nd) directory records with each of its
neighbors.
When we refer to “standalone forwarders,” we could mean individual forwarders
or collections of forwarders with the same perspectives (the perspective peering
directive could be chosen to cause the second case to be treated as the first). However,
our experiments do not take into account aggregation of forwarders with similar
perspectives.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the effect of varying the number of standalone forwarders that
publish their forwarder records to a given directory server. Since our experiments use
a constant number of nodes, adjusting this parameter changes the ratio of directory
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servers to standalone forwarders. Specifically, nf increases while nd decreases. Since
we are using the summarize peering directive, the volume of traffic between a given
directory server and standalone forwarders increases because nf dominates the first
term of Equation 5.1, whereas the volume of traffic sent to other directory servers
decreases because nd and nf dominate the second term of Equation 5.1. So, increasing
the number of “leaves” in the topology by decreasing the ratio of directory servers
to standalone forwarders alleviates some of the traffic in the core of the network but
increases traffic at the edges. Robustness is not necessarily affected, since forwarders
can publish their forwarder records to multiple directory servers. While we do not
show experimental results for that situation, we assert that directing each standalone
forwarder to publish its forwarder record to m directory servers involves substituting
mnf for nf in Equations 5.1 through 5.5.
5.2.2 Traffic Profiles
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 depict the average outbound control plane traffic volume
per minute for a typical directory server. Figure 5.10 presents the outbound traffic
between a directory server and its neighbors, given peering rule summarize and two
different values of nf . Observe that the traffic volume levels off after increasing for
the first twenty minutes while PlanetLab nodes come online4 and routing information
converges. Figure 5.11 shows the average outbound control plane traffic volume per
minute to standalone forwarders. The periodicity is the result of periodic directory
fetches at time interval Tf on the part of standalone forwarders.
4In each of our experiments, each PlanetLab node becomes active at some random, independently
chosen time during the first twenty minutes of the experiment.
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Figure 5.10: Inter-Directory Traffic Profile. Five-minute moving average
snapshots, by minute, for traffic from a typical directory server to its neighbors, given
nf = 6 and nf = 18. We define Td = 20, δ = 8, and peering directive summarize.
In Figure 5.12, we show the overall traffic volume of control messages sent between
directory servers and standalone forwarders using peering rules proxy and summarize.
Recall that the summarize peering directive instructs directory servers to not prop-
agate forwarder records from a directory server neighbor but instead propagate lists
of forwarders whose records are held by the directory servers indicated. The proxy
peering directive instructs directory servers to aggregate all of the names of forwarders
received from a directory server neighbor into a single list; i.e., a directory servers
provide all of the forwarder names but not the directory servers that contain their
records. When the proxy peering directive is used, clients are referred to a neighbor of
the directory server if a satisfactory forwarder record is not found. Recall the inherent
tradeoff between circuit performance and traffic volume to standalone forwarders, as
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Figure 5.11: Traffic Profile between a Directory Server and Stan-
dalone Forwarders. Five-minute moving average snapshots, by minute, for traffic
from a typical directory server to the forwarders whose forwarder records are published
directly, given nf = 6 and nf = 18. We define Td = 20, δ = 8, and peering directive
summarize.
described in Section 5.2.1. A network designer would consider this effect in selecting
a peering directive.
Finally, Figure 5.13 presents a summary of how peering directives affect control
plane activity. We conclude that peering directive full is probably too expensive
to justify the decrease in circuit setup latency in large PANs, but we note that in
small PANs, the full directive may be adequate. Peering directive proxy reduces
control plane traffic quite substantially, but at a cost to circuit performance that
may be prohibitive. Which peering directive to choose is inevitably a function of the
constraints of the underlying network topology and the needs of client applications.
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Figure 5.12: Traffic Profile: Proxy versus Summarize. Five-minute moving
average snapshots, by minute, for traffic from a typical directory server to the for-
warders whose forwarder records are published directly, given nf = 18, δ = 4, and
Td = 20, using peering directives proxy and summarize, respectively.
5.2.3 Comparison to Interdomain Routing
Two of the most important problems associated with BGP are protocol oscillations
and security vulnerabilities (43). Both of these problems arise as a side-effect of the
implementation of policy within BGP.
Protocol Oscillations
Routing oscillations occur as the result of conflicting preferences among autonomous
systems. Indeed, the policy mechanisms of BGP allow the possibility of configura-
tions that never converge. In particular, it is possible for a set of pairwise-neighboring
autonomous systems, arranged to form a cycle, to have static policy preferences that
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Figure 5.13: Peering Directive Comparison. Effect of peering directive on traffic
volume. We show examples for nf = 8 and nf = 12, given δ = 4 and Td = 60. Bars
marked dir indicate traffic to neighboring directory servers; bars marked fwd indicate
traffic to forwarders.
cannot all be simultaneously satisfied. Griffin et al. refer to this configuration as
a dispute wheel, and the result is an infinitely repeating sequence of BGP update
messages (57). Whether such static policy configurations are fundamentally wrong or
simply the result of an intrinsic dispute between the parties managing the autonomous
systems is beyond the scope of our consideration. The significance of route oscillation
is that the abundance of messages induces heavy processing load on individual BGP
routers.
The policy language of PAN allows the expression of static policy configurations
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that can result in similar oscillatory behavior. In particular, since our adapted ver-
sion of RPSL allows a very general expression of preferences that depend upon the
forwarding path, it is possible for dispute wheels to exist. We believe that the trade-
off is worthwhile: preventing such configurations would require reducing the inherent
richness of our policy language.
Another significant source of interdomain routing oscillation involves multi-exit-
discriminators (MED) (58), to which PAN has no analogue.
Security Vulnerabilities
As BGP provides information for controlling the flow of packets between ASes,
the protocol plays a critical role in Internet efficiency, reliability, and security. The
Internet can be severely impacted by BGP failures. Accidental misconfigurations have
resulted in serious routing problems and loss of service (82). However, failures are not
always accidental—attacks intended to cause widespread outage on the Internet will
(and do) target BGP (91; 123). Denial of service is not the only concern; an attacker
might redirect the flow of some traffic through his network so that he can eavesdrop
on it.
BGP has several well-known vulnerabilities. Neither the originating announce-
ment of a route, nor the information attached to it as it traverses ASes are guaranteed
to be correct. Moreover, BGP does not provide any way of identifying the source of
bad data. Hence, misconfigured or malicious routers can, among other things, force
other ASes to accept bad or inefficient routes, hijack address ranges, or simply flood
the network with useless route information.
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By requiring the PAN client to mediate the construction of circuits, we resolve
some of these issues. Specifically, PAN clients have an assurance of the paths that
traffic takes through the circuits that they construct. Also, traffic between the client
and the last-hop forwarder is encrypted, so eavesdropping has limited use (except,
perhaps, in compromising anonymity). However, the last-hop forwarder may still ter-
minate individual connections, or even observe or modify unencrypted TCP streams.
Since Tor does not allow circuits to be dynamically rebuilt after a TCP stream has
been attached, Blossom in particular suffers the weakness that any forwarder in a
circuit may fail, breaking the TCP connection.
5.3 Deployability and Incentives
Deployment of PAN forwarders offers numerous benefits; Section 5.4 describes
these benefits in greater detail. However, a PAN cannot succeed with exit forwarders
alone; the needs of individual organizations must also align with the incentives for
deploying the network itself. Specifically, this means configuring and maintaining
the directory servers that provide the core of the PAN infrastructure. The fear of
legal liability associated with running PAN forwarders or directory servers may have
a significant effect on incentives; we consider such challenges in Section 6.3. In this
section, we consider the technical problems that a PAN might encounter as it scales,
and we describe how the mechanisms in PAN can be used to address these problems.
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5.3.1 Aggregation Strategies
Aggregation promotes scalability; one reason to not aggregate when possible is to
reduce the time required for clients to find the perspectives they seek. Small PAN
networks do not benefit from aggregation enough to offset the cost of increased setup
latency, though as PAN networks expand in size, aggregation will become necessary to
deal with the scaling issues. PAN provides the tools to perform aggregation where it
is necessary for scaling, though for some semantic attribute categories, aggregation is
not possible. In particular, hierarchically-organized categories (e.g., political location,
network name, even geolocation) can by definition be aggregated. Flat categories,
such as those describing filtering policy and functional capability, cannot.
Configuring directory server policy to aggregate hierarchical fields is straightfor-
ward. Refer to Figure 5.14. Observe that directory server DS3 receives perspectives
located in various cities and then aggregates them all into a single announcement
for Canada.Quebec. DS1 receives the aggregated perspective as well as additional
perspectives from DS4. DS1 subsequently aggregates all perspectives from Canada
into a single perspective.
In a PAN, individual perspectives may contain some number of attributes in each
category (while political locations are mutually exclusive, filtering policies are not),
and a user may ask for some particular combination of attributes. While we do not
aggregate across fields to create the cross-product, we do allow individual directory
servers to decide whether to subdivide a perspective that provides a particular combi-
nation of attributes, advertising the constituent attributes individually or in smaller
sets. For example, a perspective that is located in Saudi Arabia and provides ac-
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Figure 5.14: Perspective Aggregation. Certain metadata, such as political loca-
tion and network name, are hierarchical and thus by definition aggregatable by direc-
tory servers. Newly created aggregate perspectives are assigned new, empty forwarding
paths; the forwarding path associated with individual perspectives to be aggregated are
ignored.
cess to news stories might be advertised as two perspectives, one that is located in
Saudi Arabia and one that provides access to news stories. Directory servers may
use a dynamic learning procedure, as described in Section 5.5, to determine which
combinations of attributes are most popular as a basis for determining which sets to
subdivide.
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 present a scenario in which a series of forwarders adver-
tise perspectives with various combinations of attributes denoting location in Iran
and filtering policies that allow access to “Pro-Democracy,” “Religion,” and “News”
Chapter 5: Evaluation 217
Figure 5.15: Subdivision of Perspectives (1). If a directory server receives a
preponderance of perspectives with different combinations of some set of attributes, it
can reduce the number of perspectives that it advertises by advertising the attributes
separately.
content. In Figure 5.15, directory server DS2 advertises “Iran” separately but still
allows combinations of the other attributes. In Figure 5.16, directory server DS2 uses
a policy such that it advertises each attribute separately.
The tradeoff resulting from aggregation or subdivision is that clients are not guar-
anteed to get the perspective that they want in one querying pass through the net-
work. See Figures 5.17 and 5.18 for an example. Figure 5.17 shows a client seeking a
perspective located in Iran that provides access to “Pro-Democracy” content. While
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Figure 5.16: Subdivision of Perspectives (2). Advertising attributes separately
may dramatically reduce the number of perspectives to advertise. Note that DS2 has
no aggregation policy for Religion; by default, directory servers do not perform ag-
gregation.
DS6a and DS6b both advertise that they provide both “Iran” and “Pro-Democracy”
perspectives, only DS6b actually has knowledge of a perspective that provides both.
When the client is in the process of learning the path, it is faced with a choice when
it reaches DS3; suppose that it chooses DS4a as its next hop. Then, when the client
reaches DS6a, it determines that the branch of the path following the decision point is
invalid. The client then chooses the other path, and finds a perspective that matches
its query (see Figure 5.18). We presume that after some number of unsuccessful
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Figure 5.17: Choosing an Uncertain Path. A client seeking a perspective con-
taining a combination of attributes may issue queries along an incorrect path.
attempts, the PAN client will abort and return an error condition to the application.
Observe that the client incurred a penalty for choosing the wrong path. Consider
the following simple model that quantifies the penalty. Consider the directory server
at which a client is faced with a choice among possible successive directory servers as
the decision point (shown by DS3 in Figure 5.17), and consider the directory server
at which a client learns with certainty the correctness (or incorrectness) of its circuit-
building decision as the aggregation point (shown by DS6a in Figure 5.17). Suppose
that there are nd hops between the client and the decision point and na(i) hops
between the client and the aggregation point i. Let β denote the expected number
of times that the client will have to backtrack before finding an acceptable circuit,
and let n∗a denote the average number of hops between the client and the aggregation
point.
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Figure 5.18: Backtracking. If, by querying, a client discovers that a chosen path
does not lead to the desired perspective, it may backtrack to try a different path instead.
Next, suppose that A and B represent attributes, and a client wants a perspective
with both attributes, but attribute A is not provided in a single perspective with
attribute B because of aggregation or subdivision. Suppose that the client finds a
sequence of directory servers that advertise attribute A. Let p(X) represents the prob-
ability of a given perspective having attribute X. Directory servers have knowledge
of the number of entries with perspectives A and B ∩ A, so:
β ≈ 1
p(B|A) =
p(A)
p(B ∩ A) . (5.6)
Next, define τ(n) as the expected time required to build a circuit of length n. The
value of τ(n) can be approximated by the quadratic regression curve given by Table 5.1
(and depicted in Figure 5.2). For simplicity, we assume that all aggregation points
are at the same distance from the client. Note that the client need not backtrack all
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the way to the start of the circuit, but only to the decision point, so each backtracking
requires expected time
[∑β
i=1 τ(na(i))
]
− τ(nd). Therefore, the expected time t that
a client can expect to spend constructing a circuit to a perspective containing both
attributes A and B is given by:
t = (1− β)τ(nd) +
β∑
i=1
τ(na(i)) ≈ τ(nd) + p(A)(τ(n
∗
a)− τ(nd))
p(B ∩ A) . (5.7)
Whether aggregation is sufficiently desirable to outweigh the performance penalty
is determined by the extent to which the impact on client performance outweighs
the impact on directory service performance. In addition, it is possible for clients to
improve upon the circuit setup time given in Equation 5.7 by considering multiple
paths in parallel, but this improvement carries the potential for a substantial cost to
directory servers and forwarders that must respond to unnecessary queries and build
unnecessary circuits.
Finally, improvement over time in the technology of the forwarders themselves
will continue to change the degree of aggregation that is required for scaling.
5.3.2 Resource Management Strategies
PAN infrastructures are quite manageable because the primary elements that
need management are the policy filters configured on the PAN directory servers. The
PAN policy framework is based upon a simplified subset of RPSL, a widely-deployed
and well-understood language for describing the configuration of BGP routing. The
framework augments RPSL to address the special requirements of PAN, which in-
cludes adding a more general set of metadata to describe perspectives and specify
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Figure 5.19: Filtering Policy. An operator may want to configure a directory
server to collect perspectives from two separate networks (for example, one public and
one private) but only share information in one direction.
when to subdivide attribute sets.
The policy language is used to configure the aggregation and forwarding policies
of individual PAN directory servers, including a way of managing resource utilization
as well (bandwidth limitations can be applied on a route-by-route basis).
Figure 5.19 shows an example of a filtering arrangement chosen to separate private
directory servers from a public PAN. Suppose that directory server DS4 is part of a
private PAN, but clients that consult DS5 require access to perspectives available
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Figure 5.20: Semi-Public Directory Server. An operator of a single directory
server may want to participate in both a public PAN and a private PAN at the same
time.
via both DS4 and the public PAN (which is available from a combination of DS1,
DS2, and DS3). Then, DS5 can establish peering relationships with both DS4 (for
routes from the private PAN) and DS2 (for routes from the public PAN), with policies
configured to not advertise routes from DS4 into the public PAN.
Another way to keep the private and public PANs separate is to operate DS2
as a semi-public directory, meaning that it can use circuit extension rules to assure
that private routes remain private while still exchanging public routes. An interesting
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Figure 5.21: Resource Management. Directory servers may be configured with
accounting sets that impose bandwidth quotas on a per-route basis.
feature of PAN is that a single directory server can serve both purposes. For example,
in Figure 5.20, DS2 is explicitly configured to relay advertisements between DS4 and
DS5 without sharing their routes with the rest of the PAN. Of course, this could
mean subjecting DS4 and DS5 to bandwidth limitations associated with entrusting
their conversations to a directory server that also forwards public traffic. Suppose
that the administrator of DS2 wants to ensure that DS2 does not spend too much of
its time relaying traffic between other nodes in the public PAN. Figure 5.21 shows
how DS2 can establish resource management policies, as described in Section 4.4, to
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set a bandwidth quota on traffic between DS1 and DS3.
5.4 Usefulness of Perspective Access Networks
It is difficult to judge the feasibility or usefulness of PAN via experiments or
theoretical analysis. PAN cannot solve every problem. In particular, while scalabil-
ity limits the use of PAN directory servers to describe perspectives in particularly
fine-grained terms, the notion of plausibly universal access is an important guiding
principle for PAN. Most likely, PANs containing perspectives that describe private
networks will be privately managed, and the directory servers that advertise these
perspectives may or may not have peering relationships with directory servers in a
large, “general-use” PAN.
5.4.1 Essential Applications
To assess the most important applications of PAN, we focus on five essential
uses of PAN. To bring the benefits of PAN into sharp relief, we consider the specific
advantages that PAN offers over VPN-based solutions for each application.
• Circumvent Political Filtering. PAN provides a tool that can be used
to promote human rights. Authoritarian regimes and network access providers
sometimes monitor or restrict access to Internet content for political reasons.
Parties interested in providing access to restricted content to dissidents and oth-
ers can deploy PAN infrastructure so that people whose attachment points to
the Internet ordinarily subject them to such monitoring or filtering can access
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Internet content as if they were in other parts of the world. For example, in
China, access to resources varies widely among ISPs, since there is no consis-
tent policy that is applied centrally throughout China’s backbone, but a set of
guidelines instead (99). Thus, if an organization like Open Net Initiative5 were
to use Blossom to conduct clinical filtering tests, it would probably want both
geolocation and jurisdictional location attributes. The primary advantage of
PAN over VPN technology in this context is the directory, which enables users
to generically describe the perspectives that they want without needing to know
what particular hosts are providing the perspectives. The directory also offers
some robustness benefit, since while individual servers that offer a particular
perspective may join and part the network, the perspective itself may remain
extant.
• Enterprise. Organizations with multiple separate networks can use PAN to
selectively extend the trust envelope to allow access across network boundaries.
In particular, an enterprise may want to allow users to access an internal network
segment in one branch office from another branch office. We provide an example
in Section 3.6. The primary advantage of PAN over VPN in this context is the
naming infrastructure: resources in one network fragment have a standard way
of describing resources in other fragments. While in the analogous VPN setup a
user would need to specify the appropriate VPN to use to access some particular
content, PANs make all of these decisions implicit by linking all of the VPNs
together into a single framework.
5Open Net Initiative, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/
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• Geography-Based Personalization. Since we know that the Internet is
not consistent, there may be a market for Internet perspectives. For example,
website internationalization or targeted advertising are sometimes a function of
geolocation. Travelers far from home may be willing to pay to view the Internet
as if they were home, so that they can have some assurance that the content they
find is relevant to their interests. Similarly, a user may want access to targeted
advertising and customized searches available in a location to which that user
is planning a trip. As with the political filtering case, the primary advantages
of PAN over VPN in this context are the directory and the robustness benefits
it provides.
• Distortion or Projection of Location. A user may have in interest
in appearing to be somewhere else for the purpose of determining what is ac-
cessible from a remote perspective. This can be useful for performing security
audits, as it provides a means of appearing to be on the other side of firewalls
and other policy-enforcing boundaries. This use can also be humanitarian; for
example, Open Net Initiative periodically publishes a series of reports catalogu-
ing the extent and scope of Internet filtering in a number of nations (100). Such
cataloguing requires perspectives from which to observe the filtering. As with
the political filtering case, the primary advantages of PAN over VPN in this
context are the directory and the robustness benefits it provides. If network
transparency wanes in the future, then the routing capability will also become
important, since upstream providers may eventually render certain network lo-
cations not directly reachable.
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• Topology-Independent DMZ. An organization may want to externally pro-
vide some view of an internal part of its network, for example to provide access
to some walled garden to the public or to industry collaborators. PAN provides
the ability to provide an “internal DMZ” with all of the flexibility of remote
access to a DMZ at the edge of the network but none of the topological con-
straints. A commercial application of this approach is gaming: individuals can
use PAN so that they can share a local area network and play distributed games
designed for a single LAN. The primary benefit of PAN over VPN in this context
is the routing, since PANs offer a means of reaching perspectives that otherwise
would not be directly accessible. Of course, it is possible for a large enterprise
to construct a persistent tunnel from a VPN server to a publically-accessible
network location in this case, but such an arrangement may not be desirable in
all cases.
5.4.2 Security Considerations
Next, we consider the security implications of the PAN architecture. The circuit-
based design sacrifices stateless forwarding in favor of path authentication and resis-
tance against man-in-the-middle attacks. The salient advantage of PAN over VPN
in resisting adversarial filtering is that a perspective can continue to exist even if an
adversary filters access to some proportion of the PAN forwarders: in theory, as long
as a path exists from the client to the desired perspective, PAN should be able to
find a way to deliver the circuit.
However, the PAN infrastructure introduces some security vulnerabilities as well.
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For example, providing additional infrastructure components within the network in-
troduces new services that can be attacked. Adversaries may choose to operate rogue
forwarders or compromise existing exit forwarders. With control of an exit forwarder,
an attacker could potentially monitor or modify the traffic between the exit for-
warder and the application server. Adversaries may also attack directory servers for
the purpose of returning invalid or misleading query results, injecting bogus route
announcements, or discerning and cataloguing which users are requesting which per-
spectives.
Another serious concern is that a determined adversary can systemically filter ac-
cess to forwarders or directory servers within a PAN. This means that if a repressive
regime decided to block access to PANs by determining the set of PAN forwarders, it
could do so; there are important reasons for designing PANs such that the network
locations of the forwarders and directory servers are public (refer to Section 3.1.3).
Furthermore, if a repressive regime were sufficiently paranoid, it could block all en-
crypted or unapproved traffic, relegating the use of PANs to steganography or covert
channels. While some projects aspire to provide covert channels, PAN itself does
not. Fortunately, case studies have demonstrated that Internet filtering in China (in
particular) is inconsistent (99), suggesting that China is either incapable or unwilling
to systemically filter all access to circumvention technologies. For example, as of July
2006, the set of hosts not generally filtered by China includes most of the Tor network.
Considering the preponderance of incomplete attempts to filter access to Internet
resources by category, we identify a set of useful countermeasures for dealing with a
limited adversary. Consider an adversary that controls a network that traffic from
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PAN users in a particular region of the Internet must traverse. One countermeasure
is to reveal the network locations of PAN forwarders sparingly, perhaps configuring
directory servers in some regions of the Internet to only provide a limited number of
forwarder descriptors per unit time. The challenge is that providing public access to a
circumvention system means providing access to adversaries as well, and if adversaries
know how to reach parts of the network, then adversaries can block the network.
Releasing network locations incompletely and slowly over time creates a race between
adversaries and regular users of the system. The optimistic vision is that while the
set of nodes providing gateway access to the system may change, the fact that users
continue to have access will not.
A second countermeasure is to “multiplex” Perspective Access Network directory
servers with servers that provide other, “innocuous” content that a network infras-
tructure provider cannot afford to deny to its users. Specifically, a popular website
could offer access to a PAN as an indistinguishable part of its service, forcing adver-
saries to choose between denying their users access to this website and denying access
to the PAN.
A third countermeasure is to use the latest techniques for establishing covert
channels as a generic platform, and send PAN traffic over the covert channels. As
mentioned in Section 2.6, Perspective Access Networks do not create covert channels,
but this is not to say that they cannot interoperate with covert channels. Ultimately,
PAN is not a complete solution for dealing with powerful adversaries seeking to deny
access to circumvention technologies. However, it does provide a generic technique
for describing which perspectives to access and constructing circuits to access these
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perspectives; this technique may have greater value to users subject to the whims
of powerful network-controlling adversaries once better covert communication tech-
niques have evolved. In the meantime, we believe that the three countermeasures will
provide significant benefits.
5.5 Scalability
For cases in which the number of directory servers and perspectives are less than
a few thousand, the directory service can maintain the full set of perspectives. The
enterprise, topology-independent DMZ, and geography-based personalization filtering
scenarios described in Section 5.4 fall into this category.
However, an important scaling issue arises when the set of potential perspectives is
large or unbounded. For example, describing perspectives in terms of the individual
sites to which they have access is impractical since there are too many individual
sites to maintain in a list. Similarly, providing a means of guaranteeing that a circuit
can be built to some particular exit forwarder is also impossible for sufficiently large
networks, since clients would only be able to refer to forwarders by their equivalence
classes.
5.5.1 Case Study: Political Filtering
One possible application of Perspective Access Networks is circumvention of polit-
ical filtering. This application is interesting because the number of possible attribute
sets that clients can request may grow to be quite large in practice, and it is tractable
because clients may tend to request only a small, relatively stable fraction of the re-
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questable attribute sets. We suspect that most queries will include one policy-based
filtering attribute combined with one location attribute, though certainly combina-
tions of locations with multiple policy-based filtering attributes are possible.
Our challenge is to demonstrate that the sets of tuples (whether location-attribute
pairs or n-tuples of location and multiple attributes) have enough stability to prevent
excessive churn within the directory system. Excessive instability results when the
bottom positions of the advertised ranking often fluctuate. There are two possible
causes for such instability. The first cause is insufficient differentiation in popularity
(i.e., shallowness of the popularity curve) among attribute sets. In this case, natural
random sampling will cause rankings to vary widely, requiring large portions of the list
to be replaced at each rebalancing. One way to reduce the impact of random sampling
is to sample over a longer time interval (i.e., increase the rebalancing interval). The
second cause of instability occurs when the set of popular attribute sets varies greatly
over relatively short time-intervals, i.e., the set of interesting perspectives changes.
One way to reduce the impact of change is to increase the amount of hysteresis.
We argue that the set of interesting perspectives is both sufficiently small and
sufficiently stable that it is not necessary to increase hysteresis or the rebalancing
interval to levels that render the system ineffective by keeping the list of popular
attribute sets unnaturally static. First, we present an argument that the of kinds of
resources to which a given jurisdiction has an interest in inhibiting access is likely to
change fairly slowly with time. Second, we show that (a) the category sets imple-
mented by popular filtering software are both small enough to be manageable and
(b) the categories themselves are reasonably consistent across filtering platforms.
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Indication of Stability from Existing Policy
According to Netanel, cyberanarchism asserts that users have the ultimate ability
to choose the set sites that they want to visit (94). A cyberanarchist might argue,
like Sieber (117), that filtering Internet content would be technically difficult if not
impossible to do in real-time: data may be in arbitrary formats, data may be en-
crypted, etc. However, Netanel argues that users face substantial switching costs
when moving from one “virtual forum” to another (94), and blacklists have proven
to be effective in reducing access to content, even if they are not completely without
false positives or false negatives. (Note that Perspective Access Networks potentially
reduce the switching costs.)
In recent years, the Open Net Initiative has published a series of investigative re-
ports characterizing the extent to which Internet content is filtered by each of about
20-30 repressive regimes worldwide. The Open Net Initiative devised a set of thirty
controversial categories, and for each category, ONI found a few examples of popu-
lar websites and tested the reachability of those websites from Internet hosts in the
various countries considered by the study. The results illustrated differences in filter-
ing strategies among regimes that seek to filter Internet content. ONI has observed
ISPs in Yemen to have substantial filtering rates for content involving sex, nudity,
and drugs. Burma blocks sites providing email and pornography as well as impor-
tant sources of news relevant to Burma. These categories do not seem particularly
time-sensitive, though some forms of filtering are time-sensitive; for example, certain
websites were inaccessible to subscribers of a certain ISP in Belarus on that country’s
2006 election day (101).
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Even within Western nations, there is substantial interest in generally restricting
access to certain kinds of content available via the Internet. Ultimately, such inter-
est generally involves a small number of categories. Indeed, we can enumerate these
categories as surely as we can enumerate the various “nasty human impulses that
are normally constrained by the sanction of collective morality” to which the Inter-
net “holds up a mirror” (65). The official policy of essentially all Western countries
includes restriction of pornography and opposition of child pornography in all of its
forms. Restrictions in the EU follow the “slippery slope”, transcending US restric-
tions by also opposing speech that incites “hatred, discrimination, or violence” (95),
including regulations in Germany regarding speech about the Holocaust.
Even though the US Supreme Court has generally demonstrated an aversion to fil-
tering Internet content on the grounds that it violates the First Amendment (“freedom
of expression operates best in an unregulated marketplace” (95)), the US Congress
has passed legislation such as the Communications Decency Act (1996), the Child
Online Protection Act (1998) and the Children’s Internet Protection Act (2000), all
of which were intended to limit access to particular kinds of content available via
the Internet and all of which impose the burden on Internet content providers. The
content restricted by those laws is mostly limited to various forms of pornography
and obscenity, and the stated intent is primarily to prevent minors from being able
to access that content.
A 1997 law enacted by the government of Germany imposes similar restrictions
on content, but goes even further: it declares that ISPs must either block these forms
of content or provide customers with a device capable of the task, ostensibly because
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the content is considered unsuitable for minors. The restrictions extend beyond those
imposed by the US laws to include content that incites violence, contains hateful
speech, or glorifies World War II (93).
In both the US and Germany, a study has shown that the general population ranks
“pornography” and “protection of minors” as two of the four most important risks
associated with the Internet, below “data protection” but above “fraud, manipula-
tion.” Most people surveyed also indicated that they categorically favored banning
pornography and hate speech from the Internet (9).
The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) presents an argument sup-
porting the idea that filtering categories in the Western world can be expected to be
fairly stable and long-lived. PICS aims to provide a standard language for describing
content available via the Internet such that it can be reasonably filtered.6
Indication of Stability from Existing Mechanisms
Filtering technology, including filtering technologies deployed in several repressive
regimes, generally consist of “commercial filtering products developed by U.S. corpo-
rations” (140). We argue that while the individual constituent hosts and URLs listed
by these filters may fluctuate and change over time, the broad categories themselves
are generally not time-sensitive. From our earlier discussion, it seems clear that the
difference between filtering policies implemented by various regimes largely lies in the
set of categories that they seek to filter.
Several years ago, CyberPatrol published a list of criteria for each of twelve content
6Platform for Internet Content Selection, http://www.w3.org/PICS/
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categories.7 WebSense also published a list of 31 categories as well as 50 subcategories
to describe the rationale for listing the URLs that appear on its lists.8 The category
lists themselves are quite similar: a 2005 report contrasted four URL blacklisting
databases (SurfControl, SmartFilter, Blue Coat, and WebWasher) and found 18 dis-
tinct categories that were directly comparable between the filters (17). Details varied
only very slightly; the only significant differences among the filters were the particu-
lar URLs that they happened to filter, and, therefore, the relative effectiveness of the
various databases as measured by the volume of entries in the filter.
While the sets of categories differ slightly among filtering systems, the categories
mostly overlap, suggesting that the number of distinct categories is small. Also, the
semantic descriptions of the categories do not seem time-dependent in any significant
way. Combined with our (previous) assertion that a small number of new categories
do not have a significant effect on the system, we assertion that the interests of
governments remain largely constant over time, even if their degree of success does not.
Considering our algorithm for inducing stability even in the event that some transient
churn does occur, we believe that perspective churn will not prevent Perspective
Access Networks from functioning effectively for the political filtering scenario.
5.5.2 Concrete Example
Research has demonstrated that the Internet filtering of China is the most sophis-
ticated in the world (99). According to a 2002 Rand Corporation report, the Internet
7CyberPatrol Category Definitions: 1/20/99, http://web.archive.org/web/20010405232448/
http://www.cyberpatrol.com/cybernot/criteria.htm
8WebSense URL Categories, http://www.websense.com/global/en/ProductsServices/
MasterDatabase/URLCategories.php
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filtering in China is is organized around three main content categories (22):
• Falun Dafa / Falun Gong
• The China Democracy Party
• Opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet and Taiwan
As an example, we consider the filtering of Web pages related to Falun Dafa by
network access providers in China. Suppose that a person in China who wants to
use a PAN to access Internet content related to Falun Dafa; this person has several
options:
• 1. Ask for a location from which Falun Dafa would probably not be blocked
(e.g., USA).
• 2. Ask for the relevant filtering-policy attribute (i.e., +religion) and assume
that Falun Dafa would not be blocked from the resulting perspective, though it
might be located in China, therefore exposing the person issuing the query to
surveillance or prosecution.
• 3. Ask for a combination of location and filtering-policy attribute (e.g., +religion
and USA), with an intent of viewing Falun Gong content from a society like the
one specified.
• 4. Ask for a combination of location and a small set of filtering-policy at-
tributes (e.g., +religion and USA and +newsoutlets) if the content happens
to simultaneously fall under two categories that could be filtered.
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Scenarios
For cases (1) and (2), we only need to worry about the network propagating
single attributes, the most basic unit of perspective information. We assume that
this information will propagate as far as policy permits. In general, when a client
contacts its local directory server (DS) with a request for an attribute set, it receives
a list of candidates for the next-hop DS (i.e., the neighboring DSes from which the
DS being queried had received notification of availability of the perspective) in the
circuit to be built toward a perspective matching the query. The client chooses one
and iterates (without ever backtracking, as long as we assume that these perspectives
have enough redundancy to not be subject to transient failures). Once the circuit has
been built, the client attaches the application data stream to the circuit.
For cases (3) and (4), we argue that since queries for this combination of attributes
are sufficiently popular, the combination itself is propagated unsubdivided through
the network in the direction of clients that have given this combination of attributes its
popularity. Now, when the client receives a list of candidates, it may receive next-hop
candidate DSes that offer partial matches to the query. If it chooses one of these, then
it must be prepared for backtracking. However, since we argue that perspectives are
stable and the specific combination of attributes is sufficiently popular, the DS being
queried should receive a complete match from its neighbors and thus backtracking
will not be necessary once steady state is achieved.
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Analysis
Finally, we use the considerations described in Section 4.5.1 to evaluate our Falun
Dafa scenario:
• Drift. In China, filtering of particular sites and patterns often starts and ends,
but the categories correspond to long-term political disputes and are stable.
• Churn. The combined perspective (two or more (unlikely to be more than
three) attributes total, as described in cases (3) and (4) above) will continue
to be available as long as it remains popular (which it will, as long as China
continues its filtering practice). Hysteresis will handle the case of China tem-
porarily shutting off filtering for visiting dignitaries (as described in the RAND
Corporation report).
• Requests. As long as the chain of forwarders selected by the person in China
enforces pairwise agreement that “religion” includes access to Falun Dafa con-
tent, then it will be sufficient to request the attribute +religion to access Falun
Dafa content.
The same argument applies for the other two categories of filtering in China as well,
though perhaps using some combination of government and news-outlets categories
instead of religion.
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5.6 Determining Attribute Categories
Our argument in Section 5.5.1 indicates that the number of attributes that are
useful to describe actual Internet content filtering regimes is sufficiently small to
be scalable. In this section, we address the concern about category specificity in
PAN by presenting a method for determining what those attributes should be. We
demonstrate that it is possible to have a list of categories that is both:
• sufficiently small to address the scalability (directory size, control plane mes-
sages) and management (ability for forwarders to conveniently describe their
perspectives in terms of the set of attributes) issues, and
• sufficiently large to contain categories that afford clients the specificity they
need to describe what they want to access (e.g., Falun Dafa is more specific
than religion, but may still need to be described separately).
Consider the case of the a client seeking a perspective that provides access to
Falun Dafa, as introduced in Section 5.5. The directory server presents the user
with a list of attributes for which it can issue queries (and attribute descriptions,
as described below). If one of the attributes is Boston and one is +Falun Dafa (or
an attribute whose description as provided to the client includes Falun Dafa), then
barring the errors described below, the user will receive a perspective that provides
access to Falun Dafa from Boston. If there is no Falun Dafa category but there is
a Religion category that does not include Falun Dafa in its description, then the
user can proceed with the query but the kind of religious content available from the
resulting perspective may or may not include Falun Dafa.
Chapter 5: Evaluation 241
In the context of policy-based filtering, forwarders can advertise inaccurate per-
spective information for three reasons (we consider the example of a forwarder adver-
tising ”Religion” when it does not provide access to Falun Dafa content):
• Misunderstanding Attribute Definitions. A forwarder operator does
not know that the ”Religion” attribute actually requires the ability to access
Falun Dafa content. To address this concern, we propose that neighboring di-
rectory servers periodically exchange ”attribute descriptions”, which are lists
of content available via the Internet (e.g., URLs) that must be accessible for
the perspective to be considered to have a specified attribute. A forwarder can
download an up-to-date list of attribute descriptions from the directory server
of its choice and determine what it can access from the attribute descriptions so
that it knows how to describe its perspective in a manner consistent with what
clients believe the various attributes to mean. Clients should query the direc-
tory service to learn the attribute descriptions during startup and periodically
thereafter, so that they can present users with the list of possible attributes.
Users then can determine the set of available attributes and build their queries
accordingly.
• Errors. A forwarder operator knows what the ”Religion” attribute means,
but makes a mistake in describing the perspective as having that attribute.
Unfortunately, systematically mitigating the impact of mistakes is impossible,
though directory servers may ”verify” forwarders before accepting them: Direc-
tory servers are presumed to trust the forwarders whose records they advertise.
Just as certification authorities have a mechanism for ascertaining the validity
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of the keys that they sign, directory servers may use the attribute descriptions
to test forwarders before approving their attributes. (The mechanism for test-
ing may, for example, involve verifying SSL certificates, or verifying a hash of
the content of a snapshot of a web page as provided by a third party.)
• Purposeful Inaccuracy. A forwarder operator knows what the ”Religion”
attribute means, but deliberately decides to advertise it anyway, despite knowl-
edge that the forwarder does not have access to Falun Dafa content. There is
no clear way to distinguish this from the ”Errors” case.
Depending upon the nature of the inaccuracy, directory servers have two means
of resolving purposeful inaccuracy:
• Directory Server Pushback. If clients report (or directory servers observe
through testing) a preponderance of forwarders that claim an attribute but
fail to provide access to resources with that attribute, the directory servers may
respond by not accepting advertisements about that attribute from the neighbor
through which those forwarders are accessible.
• Creation of New Attributes. Suppose that the inaccurate forwarders
are systemically failing to provide access to some well-defined subcategory of
resources (like resources related to Falun Dafa under the Religion category).
Then, the directory server can advertise (and describe) this new category (e.g.,
Falun Dafa) in the list of attribute descriptions that it periodically sends to its
neighbors (neighbors are not obliged to accept it). Directory servers may also
create new categories in this fashion, and they may drop categories (for scala-
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bility) by simply not advertising them in the list of attribute descriptions. The
process of creating and destroying attributes can be human-mediated (creating
new categories in response to complaints from clients) or semi-automatic (in
which the system checks for systemic access failures).
At a high level, whether Falun Dafa ought to be a category of its own, separate
from Religion, is not obvious. If the Internet consisted of only two distinct kinds
of perspectives (perhaps one that filters content and one that does not), then we
would need only one attribute to describe the perspective. The reason that greater
richness among the categories is needed is that there are regions of the network that
provide access to some categories of content but not others, and we require a means
of describing these differences. For example, in the case of religious content filtering,
we know that there are Internet regimes that block content related to Islam and not
content related to Falun Dafa, as well as Internet regimes that block Falun Dafa and
not Islam. By specifying a broad category such as Religion, we lose the benefit
of all of the perspectives in the disjunction of those two categories. Conceivably, if
the proportion of forwarders in locations that provide access to one but not both
is sufficiently large, then the clients would benefit from having distinct categories.
Otherwise, having two separate categories is detrimental as a result of increased table
size and overhead.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
From commercial uses to human rights, Perspective Access Networks have a vari-
ety of interesting applications. They also provide an argument in the ongoing tussle
between supporters of network neutrality and those interested in regulating access to
Internet resources.
This chapter summarizes our work, assesses its social context and significance, and
provides speculation about the future role of Perspective Access Networks. The first
section summarizes our specific contributions. The second section characterizes the
clear and present threats to network neutrality posed by the use of network location
to identify and classify Internet users. The third section presents our vision of the
legal and economic ramifications of the deployment of a general-purpose system that
allows Internet users and service providers to share perspectives. The fourth section
introduces some opportunities for future research projects in the space. The final
section contains closing remarks.
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6.1 Principal Contributions
If nothing else, PAN presents a new and useful way of considering the organiza-
tion of Internet services and Internet connectivity. Our work provides the following
contributions to the design of large-scale, general purpose internetworks:
• 1. Definition of Problem Space. The argument for PAN derives directly
from real-world concerns. We introduce the technical issues, considering Internet
history (79), design principles (29; 18), and conflicts of interest that naturally
arise as the result of technical choices (30; 28). We also outline a variety of social
issues: some socially conservative governments have required or implemented
filtering within the network to restrict access to politically sensitive content.
Additionally, some content providers use geographic origin to restrict access
to commercial content by country; both commercial1 and educational (110)
content providers have been known to do this. While some of the more serious
scenarios, such as systemic blocking of content by network access providers for
commercial reasons and large-scale differences in access to content within and
among Western nations, are not entirely realized, these and other concerns are
quite real and have recently received substantial media attention.
• 2. Exploration of Solution Space. To position our work in the context
of existing research, we provide an exploration of the most significant work in
fields related to routing around network obstructions. We show how the key
insight of our perspective-oriented approach differentiates Perspective Access
Networks from prevailing approaches to addressing well-established problems.
1ABC, Inc. streaming service, http://dynamic.abc.go.com/streamin
Chapter 6: Conclusion 246
• 3. Network Architecture. We specify a set of design goals and desiderata
for a system that provides access to resources from different perspectives, and we
consider the relevant tradeoffs associated with our specific design choices. We
enumerate the requirements for a substrate that provides circuit-building and
data transport functionality to our service. We suggest a number of potential
applications of our technology, and we show how these applications make use
of the specific features that we choose.
• 4. Directory Service. The PAN architecture lets clients consult a directory
service to receive instructions to construct source routes for their application
data. With scalability and ease of deployment in mind, we propose a directory
service for our infrastructure. We provide a detailed specification of the func-
tionality and behavior of this service, including both communication within the
control plane as well as interaction between directory servers and clients.
• 5. Policy Framework. PAN extends the well-known routing policy con-
figuration language, RPSL, to provide a policy framework that allows adminis-
trators of PAN directory servers to manage filtering and aggregation. RPSL is
designed for use with BGP (4), and we consider how the policy needs of BGP
differ from the policy needs of PAN. We specify revisions to RPSL based upon
these differences, and we provide a number of examples to illustrate how our
policy language can be used to meet the needs of administrators of directory
services.
• 6. Implementation. We introduce Blossom, an implementation of PAN
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suitable for actual use. Blossom relies upon Tor (38), a source-routing overlay
network for TCP streams, for its circuit-building and data transport. While
the goal of the deployed Tor network is anonymity, and our primary objective
is access to resources from client-specified perspectives, we present an argument
in favor of the appropriateness of the Tor software and its controller interface
in meeting the PAN transport-layer requirements.
• 7. Empirical Results. We provide some empirical measurements of Blossom
to assess the feasibility and dynamic behavior of PAN. The client performance
measurements include measurements of throughput and latency of forwarders
within the Tor network as well as a detailed evaluation of circuit setup per-
formance using the PAN directory service. We also provide directory service
measurements, evaluating the system in terms of size of forwarding tables, size
of control plane messages, and frequency of control plane messages. In addition,
we perform some experiments to illustrate the dynamic behavior of the control
plane.
• 8. Strategies for Deployment and Scaling. Techniques for perform-
ing filtering and aggregation become necessary to ensure scalability of PAN. We
speculate about how providers of PAN directory servers might want to use filter-
ing and aggregation to their advantage, and we show how our policy framework
provides the expressiveness to allow configuration consistent with their objec-
tives. We also provide a mechanism for resource management, so that directory
servers can provision bandwidth on a per-route basis.
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6.2 Misuse of Location Information
Perspective Access Networks present additional challenges to service administra-
tors who seek to use network location in fraud detection and abuse prevention. In
particular, the use of network location to draw conclusions about users has become
quite commonplace on today’s Internet. Numerous institutional subscription services
use IP address as the exclusive means of identifying users. IP addresses are some-
times also used as a criterion in fraud detection and abuse prevention, for example,
flagging discrepancies between geographic location associated with an IP address and
that associated with mailing address for credit card billing. For abuse prevention,
many websites that allow public contributions (e.g., wikis, blogs, chat rooms, etc.)
simply block the IP addresses from which chronic abuse emerges. Using IP addresses
to categorize or identify users seems like a reasonable approach in general, but there
are some important caveats as well. We briefly examine the long-term architectural
dangers as well as short-term policy risks as we strive to put the costs and benefits
of using location information into perspective.
6.2.1 Practical Justification
There is little doubt that some ISPs are more vigilant than others in curtailing
spam and abuse. Many network administrators have accepted the idea that it is
easier or more effective to fight spam by fighting the act of sending spam instead of
addressing the security vulnerabilities that make spam feasible or the market forces
that make spam desirable. At least for the present, knowing the ISP from which
a connection originates certainly provides some statistically meaningful information
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about whether the user responsible for the connection is likely to engage in antiso-
cial behavior. Similarly, teaching Bayesian spam filters about network location may
enhance their effectiveness in reducing spam.
Providers of online subscription services can be reasonably assured that most
connections from IP addresses assigned to institutions that restrict access to their
systems are from authorized users of those systems. Also, the overhead of setting up
a mechanism that uses this information is far simpler than most alternatives.
The extent to which IP addresses can be used to discern geographic location is
limited. For example, AOL uses large-scale proxy networks, and the IP addresses from
which traffic from AOL subscribers originate (sometimes) do not carry fine-grained
location information.2 In addition, network providers that use 3G, the communi-
cations standard used for packet-switched cellular telephone networks, generally do
not assign IP addresses geographically; as a result, emergency services for such net-
works use global positioning system (GPS) receivers or timing analysis to determine
location (115).
Nonetheless, in recent years, a market has emerged for so-called “geolocation”
services, which provide a mapping from network location to physical, geographic
location. Service providers collect data from Internet service providers and resell it to
geolocation customers in the form of datasets or permission to execute queries on their
databases. Geolocation products have been developed for several uses, including fraud
resolution, spam mitigation, targeted advertising, and digital rights management.
An important premise of geolocation is that there is much to learn about individual
Internet users from how they are connected to the network, and such information can
2AOL Proxy Info, http://webmaster.info.aol.com/proxyinfo.html
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be used as a basis for implicitly categorizing users by risk level or market segment.
Geolocation affords advertisers the possibility of offering products and services specific
to particular localities. Content providers wishing to disallow people from certain
countries or regions from accessing certain content may, to a significant extent though
not completely, use network location information to achieve this goal.
Similarly, it is reasonable that credit charges from locations that are far from the
home of a credit card holder and that are known to be hotbeds of credit fraud merit
close scrutiny. But this can have problems too: a large percentage of credit card use
is associated with travel. Also, the preponderance of mail-order catalogs and (still
easier to distribute) web pages allow even small local shops with only telephonic credit
transaction clearing to have many remote customers. The credit industry typically
errs on the side of giving users easy access to its services rather than denying undesired
access when these goals conflict. The content industry typically adopts the opposite
approach. For this reason, the IP address from which traffic originates is only one
of many factors in authorization and identification for credit approval and fraud
detection rather than an absolute or sole discriminator.
So far, it seems that the primary incentive for those who use network-layer in-
formation for application-layer decisions is to provide an expedient means of autho-
rization that strikes an acceptable balance between easy access for desired usage
and adequate deterrence against undesired usage. In short, it works. To date, IP
addresses have been a resource difficult enough to obtain or spoof that they have
fulfilled this role in authorization and fraud detection. More proper authentication,
however, would require user certificates, a PKI, or other mechanisms that have proved
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difficult to set up in large, relatively open contexts and have not seen widespread user
adoption where they do exist. And, as long as end user systems not under institu-
tional control remain as vulnerable as they now are to root-level intrusion, end-to-end
authentication could also be an illusory approach to security. However, that is a much
broader and separate problem than the one we are considering.
6.2.2 Immediate Side Effects
The ability to block abuser IP addresses is a powerful but ill-suited tool for some of
the problems to which it has been applied: in a few cases, individual sites have blocked
access from IP addresses in a broad geographic area. Two well-known examples are
the blocking by a major-party presidential campaign of its web site from IP addresses
outside the US just prior to the 2004 US presidential election and the blocking of
2004 Olympics coverage from IP addresses inside the US. In 2002, Pennsylvania ISPs
blocked access to 1.6 million innocuous Web sites in an attempt to satisfy a state
mandate intended to curtail child pornography (12). More recently, the major US
ISP Verizon was the subject of lawsuits when it began blocking all email from Europe
and other continents by default as a spam deterrent (81); since that time, Verizon
has agreed to a settlement.
In general, infallibly binding the identity of users to how they happen to be
connected to the Internet is not only impossible, but also undesirable. Proxies,
workarounds, dynamic addresses, mobility, system vulnerabilities, and other com-
plications make network location useful as a heuristic at best. To the extent that it
is useful, the ability to use network location as an indicator of identity is a technical
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shortcoming of the current Internet that can be overcome.
One of the main drawbacks to using network location for authorization is that
legitimate users cannot access a service when away from their home institutions. It
is possible to set up tunneling such that their accesses appear to originate from an IP
address within the permitted range, but this may be onerous, technically difficult, or
simply not possible as a matter of policy. A major expense associated with deploying
and maintaining virtual private network (VPN) infrastructures derives from the need
for individuals and businesses to access Internet resources that rely upon network
location information to differentiate between valid and invalid users.
Furthermore, abusers can use proxies to connect through unblocked locations fairly
easily. Arguably, Perspective Access Networks accelerate this process, but it is already
happening and ultimately unavoidable. Individual proxies themselves can be blocked,
but with multitudes of newly compromised hosts emerging daily, the effectiveness of
that approach is limited. Networks designed to protect honest users from traffic
analysis such as Tor (38) can be blocked because they explicitly provide a means
of doing so, but abusers can take advantage of million-node botnets with no easily
discernible pattern of IP address source. The result of network-based authorization,
then, would seem to block the honest user from protecting herself while leaving the
abusers unblocked and harder to find.
6.2.3 Long-Term Security Risks
We have noted some immediate practical problems, but solutions that avoid these
problems raise additional security concerns of their own. IP tunneling simply to allow
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use of institutional subscriptions when it is not otherwise needed is an extreme solu-
tion that may open the possibility of other intrusions to the institution. University
librarians, among others, have long recognized the problem that authorization by IP
address poses for remote users trying to access institutional services. This has been
one of the prime motivators for development and increasing adoption of systems such
as Shibboleth3, which provides single sign-on and user-controlled credential manage-
ment independent of IP addresses.
If legitimate users of credit systems have incentive via easier authorization of their
transactions to route their traffic through an IP address associated with their home
location, then they reveal via routing information their interactions with merchants
and financial institutions not only to those principals but to observers as well. To
the extent that users depend upon firewalls as a substitute for vigilance, installation
of firewalls may leave them more vulnerable to identity theft, spear phishing, and
the like. And, as actual large-scale systematic fraudsters become aware of the use
of authentication by IP address, they are provided with specific incentive to spoof
authorized or trusted (i.e., low-fraud) locations, or worse, to break into systems in or
near those locations. This approach thus has the potential for greater vulnerability
and risk for the legitimate user with a false sense of protection against the actual
adversaries.
3Shibboleth, http://shibboleth.Internet2.edu/
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6.2.4 The Role of Network Access Providers
The fact that network location provides an effective way to assign blame for ma-
licious activity raises questions about the extent to which network access providers
ought to be responsible for the comportment of the systems for which their networks
serve as attachment points to the Internet.
Regulators have substantial interest in supporting the principle of enforcement
within the network, since the network could potentially provide convenient points
of control for execution of policy. Furthermore, lobbying by major telecommunica-
tions carriers generally encourages a movement away from uniform, open access and
toward vertically-integrated “silos” in which carriers determine the set of resources
that customers may access (14). So, there exist strong industry and regulatory forces
to empower network operators at the expense of network neutrality and end-to-end
connectivity. A recent ITU-T proposal advocates expanding the role of ISPs to re-
quire that they ensure that traffic traversing their wires adheres to certain normative
requirements (102).
6.2.5 Function Creep and Expedience
Making use of the routing infrastructure itself to protect participants from each
other is an arms race that sacrifices as collateral damage the neutrality characteristics
of the Internet that provide its principal advantages over alternative interconnection
paradigms.
The consistent response that those proposing such methods offer to proponents
of end-to-end services is that it is too late to salvage the end-to-end principle and
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that compromise is in order. Indeed, network-layer techniques have shown promise
as expedient short-term remedies to exigent security threats, and as a result, govern-
ments and regulators have called upon ISPs to implement technical solutions within
the network (149). Vint Cerf recently argued that, as far as security is concerned,
it does not make sense to use the network to compensate for operating systems that
protect themselves inadequately.
According to Cerf, the more you ask the network to examine data—to
authenticate a person’s identity, say, or search for viruses—the less effi-
ciently it will move data around. “It’s really hard to have a network-level
thing do this stuff, which means you have to assemble the packets into
something bigger and thus violate all the protocols,” Cerf says. “That
takes a heck of a lot of resources.” (129)
In other words, if we start requiring the network to perform tasks other than
routing, then we undermine the ability of the network to do its most essential job.
Another problem with such function creep is that it can become entrenched. Once
a technique such as authentication by IP address is widely established, if legitimate
technical reasons to substantially change how addressing and routing is done should
arise, then they may be harder to implement and establish because existing systems
are hamstrung by the use of IP addresses as authenticators or anti-fraud mechanisms,
even if that usage was originally introduced as only an expedient.
6.2.6 Separating Identification from Routing
IP addresses were introduced to allow routing of IP packets. As we have al-
ready seen, if they are used for other purposes, and if identification and authorization
become conflated with routing, then the purpose for which they were designed is un-
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dermined: both legitimate users and attackers end up using IP addresses not because
of routing, but to appear as authorized users. Onion routing was introduced ten years
ago as an infrastructure that “separates identification from routing” (108). “Parties
are free to (and usually should) identify themselves within a message. But the use
of a public network should not automatically give away the identities and location
of the communicating parties” (53). Anonymity from one’s communication partner
is not the primary motivation for Onion Routing; users may simply need to protect
their points of attachment from attackers, whether personal (e.g., stalkers or identity
thieves) or enterprise (e.g., corporate competitors gathering intelligence). In each
case, the security benefits of separating routing from identification are substantial,
even if the challenges it poses to the security models of some services are similarly
great.
How will increased user mobility, increased use of anonymization networks for
security by honest users, etc. interplay with the use of IP-address information for
authentication and authorization? Intuitively, it seems that these two technologies
are headed for a clash.
6.2.7 Discussion
The use of network location information in authentication, abuse detection, and
fraud mitigation will have a substantial impact on the Internet environment for the
next several years. Adversaries may or may not adapt to these techniques before
the techniques become entrenched in the architecture of critical services. However,
if history is a guide, they will adapt at some point, and more quickly if IP-address
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location technology increases their incentives to do so. If we are to avoid arriving,
therefore, at an entrenched burden with no ultimate benefit, we must understand
the technology that we are using to do the job. In this section, we characterized
some of the unanticipated ways in which relevant technologies for using network
location interact. One response to understanding this is through governance and
policy, but our focus herein is the technology itself. The complexity, brittleness, and
overhead involved in the deployment of solutions that use network-layer address for
authorization may stifle innovation in the future, even if each individual step along
this path seems reasonable. But the news is not all bad: systems like Shibboleth
and Perspective Access Networks provide a technological path that can continue to
lead institutions away from authentication by IP address. Similarly, since network
location is only one of many factors considered by fraud detection systems used in the
credit industry, the technical framework already exists to allow an abandonment of
network location as a factor as it diminishes in significance. This need not mean the
end of geolocation services either; for example, people will still want to know about
nearby restaurants and services. Geolocation services will just need to be based on
information other than IP address if they are to continue serving a useful purpose. If
the already existing security and functionality problems arising from IP-address-based
abuse deterrence do not lead to its abandonment, then the incentives it provides to
network attackers ultimately should.
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6.3 Legal and Economic Effects
Large-scale, public deployment of Perspective Access Networks could potentially
have significant legal and economic effects. For example, the uses we described in
Section 5.4 are quite beneficial. Additionally, PAN may have value in promoting end-
to-end security models within both enterprises and the Internet at large. As described
in Section 6.2, some enterprises and providers of Internet services use network location
for security purposes, either as an authenticator or as a basis for an assumption that
the traffic is not exposed to the public. The authentication system we propose in
Section 3.5 may be useful as part of a migration path from location-dependent to
end-to-end security measures.
However, there are also risks, commercial factors, and chilling effects that could
potentially cause influential parties to discourage large-scale deployment and use of
PAN. For example, many service providers actually intend to use network location
as a means of differentiating and categorizing users, and deployment of Perspective
Access Networks has the potential to confound their efforts. Of course, open proxies
can be used to circumvent geography-based access restrictions today, but the proxies
themselves are generally considered illegitimate because they usually run on compro-
mised or misconfigured hosts. PAN could potentially bring circumvention into the
mainstream, and once this happens there could be calls for ISPs to implement policies
that disallow the operation of PAN forwarders.
Perhaps the most serious threat to network neutrality involves the possibility
that ISPs might filter or restrict access to Internet content for commercial reasons.
Indeed, Edward Whitacre, the CEO of SBC, has even suggested the possibility that
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both providers of content (e.g., Disney) and providers of services (e.g., Skype) ought
to compensate the ISPs of their target audiences (98; 13) as part of a business model
reminiscent of the cable television industry in the US. Clearly, the idea that ISPs
should have the power to arbitrate which subset of the Internet to provide to its
customers is very much alive. In fact, research has indicated that it is in the best
interests of network providers to use compensation from content providers as a basis
for discrimination among content providers, providing customers with inferior access
or even no access to sites hosting particular content (137). While network neutrality
regulations have certain costs, there is little else to prevent ISPs from selectively
discriminating.
In the context of the Internet governance argument described at the beginning of
Chapter 1, Clark et al. suggest that a tool that allows Internet users to circumvent
provider-selected routing could be influential in shifting the balance of power (28); we
assert that a tool that allows Internet users to circumvent provider-selected filtering
and quality degradation has similar value. Indeed, a Perspective Access Network
can be used as such a tool, though it could potentially thwart useful price or service
discrimination.
Since Perspective Access Networks may allow a user to select the most relevant ge-
olocation, they may provide an opportunity to improve advertising efficiency, offering
advertisers an incentive to support the proliferation of Perspective Access Networks.
However, advertisers may have reason to oppose deployment of PANs if such deploy-
ment means the loss of ability to dominate a local market, and they may also opt to
oppose deployment of PANs simply because they do not fully understand the business
Chapter 6: Conclusion 260
implications.
Finally, recall that PAN, unlike the Tor network with which Blossom happens to
interoperate, is not designed with anonymity in mind; projection of network location is
really all that PAN seeks to achieve. However, this fact may not be enough to prevent
Blossom forwarders from eliciting abuse complaints, and the political climate could
easily result in the listing of Blossom forwarders on the increasingly preponderant
blacklists that have been purportedly established for the purpose of fighting spam.
Specialists have often characterized such blacklists as a form of vigilantism, and it is
clear that blacklists have been previously used for purposes of questionable merit (55).
6.4 Future Work
PAN affords a plethora of opportunities for future research and development; in
this section, we consider some of the possibilities.
For example, it remains to be determined how well PAN interoperates with envi-
ronments that deliberately restrict access to resources, such as governments censoring
the web sites that their citizens could otherwise view. In such a scenario, researchers
need to determine how effectively PAN could provide access to blocked resources de-
spite continual discovery and shutdown of PAN forwarders that enable this access.
(Without functional steganography, hiding the identities of those who use a PAN may
be quite difficult.)
The locality feature of PAN could be used to improve web searches in the Inter-
net today as well as in the increasingly fragmented Internet of the future. To take
advantage of locality in PAN, we would need some sort of mechanism capable of
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performing targeted web searches. The idea is that it would be interesting to have
a “fragmentation-aware” search engine that references content not available in the
particular fragment of the Internet in which the client resides.
Equally interesting are the policy questions that arise from having a system like
PAN deployed across the Internet. Many enterprises use end-to-end authentication for
some of the services they provide in their private networks, but there are a number
of popular services that rely upon the assumption that the only hosts that have
access to the service are physically on the same LAN or have particular network-layer
addresses. Moreover, deployment of PANs in the Internet could threaten the business
models of companies providing or depending on geolocation services for anti-fraud
resolution, digital rights management, and spam detection. Convincing these parties
to move away from network-layer authentication as the basis for their security will
be an interesting task.
At its core, PAN is designed to heal fragmentation, which means that Internet
users can potentially use perspectives to gain access to resources to which they did not
have access previously. However, PAN can be used to provide access to services that
use end-to-end authentication mechanisms, and our scheme from Section 3.5 handles
services that use network location as a factor in their security assumptions. Intuitively,
we are inclined to believe that PAN deployment is morally just and proper when
used to provide access to filtered media content otherwise unavailable to dissidents
in oppressive regimes, and morally questionable when used to provide unauthorized
access to private resources or subscription services. However, the technology itself
makes no such distinction.
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Another question is whether PAN can be used to resolve namespace arbitrage;
proper use of this system could lead to a reduced number of lawsuits related to
trademark contention resulting from allocation of resource names. On the other hand,
it might cause trademark resolution, as it relates to names of Internet resources, to
become a much thornier issue.
While the goals of PAN and the uses of Blossom networks are not the same as the
anonymity goals of the Tor network, there is no intrinsic conflict. It might be worth
considering extending the Blossom software to make it useful for clients by providing
specific access to perspectives as we have described, anonymous access to content in
the manner provided by the current Tor network, or some sort of hybrid of anonymity
and specificity. This idea has been publically suggested (150), though the details of the
implementation remain unspecified. Clearly, as the Tor network expands to include
nodes operating inside regimes around the world with different filtering policies, the
experience of Tor users will become less predictable in the absence of the ability for
users to exercise some control over specificity. In the long run, the issue at hand is not
only about avoiding unwanted location-based optimizations in search engine results:
as ISPs and lawmakers act to make use of Internet control points, we can expect an
increasing disparity among views of the Internet from different locations.
6.5 Closing Remarks
Our proposed design of Perspective Access Networks is motivated by four main
objectives:
• enable perspective sharing across the Internet by providing low-latency, topology-
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independent access to resources,
• allow locality in naming,
• provide support for the configuration of policies that satisfy the interests of
providers of perspective services, and
• promote decentralized management of names and addresses.
The design we propose satisfies these objectives with the aggregation and scala-
bility limitations described in Chapter 5.
Perspective Access Networks provide a convenient means of providing access to
otherwise restricted networks and providing end-to-end connectivity to pairs of Inter-
net nodes that are not directly connected to each other. However, PAN technology is
not just a means of sustaining some recondite network design principle; it has prac-
tical uses in isolating policy decisions from in-band network technology decisions.
We have yet to explore the extent to which multiple large-scale independent PAN
networks could reasonably coexist. Nonetheless, with recent new threats to Internet
consistency (governance disputes, geolocation services, DNS root disputes, and acci-
dental or deliberate censorship of resources), it is worth considering the design and
implications of a radically different vision of the Internet—one without a well-defined
core, consisting of fragments whose names and address spaces are not ordained hier-
archically.
Indeed, Perspective Access Networks address the core of an ongoing tussle sur-
rounding network neutrality. Both policy decisions and technical decisions that result
from this tussle will have a profound impact on the future of Internet applications,
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commerce, and freedom, and only recently have these issues received public attention.
In 2005, the US Supreme Court struck down common carrier requirements for broad-
band networks, allowing the possibility that network carriers may choose to provide
discriminatory access to content (128). Research has shown that providing discrim-
inatory access is in the best interests of individual carriers, though the impact on
incentives for deployment of Internet services could be substantial (137). Technology
such as deep packet inspection and other advanced filtering techniques have only re-
cently become economically practical (40). The decisions of infrastructure providers
and regulators in the months ahead will have long-lasting effects for the Internet.
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